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Can justiciable socioeconomic rights assist in the formulation of government policies and 
programs that are accountable to Nigerian citizens? This dissertation has tried to answer the 
question by establishing that mechanisms of accountability such as the rule of law and separation 
of powers have been enacted into the Nigerian Constitution. But the government’s 
socioeconomic policies have not been accountable, as reflected in my content analysis of 
Nigeria’s health-care and education sectors. I show that the sole exception was the Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) decision of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. But Nigeria has subsequently argued that socioeconomic rights are 
nonjusticiable, and they are merely Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy under its Constitution. I analyzed cases from the U.S. States of Kentucky, New Jersey, 
and New York, whose constitutions provide for free public education for children, and prove that 
courts have the capacity to adjudicate upon socioeconomic policies of governments in the area of 
education and make such policies accountable to constitutional mandates. I evaluated the 
jurisprudence from India, where socioeconomic rights are nonjusticiable directive principles of 
state policy, but her Supreme Court has expanded the right to life to encompass directive 
principles of health care and education. But it is very instructive that India, in 2002, opted for a 
constitutional amendment to transform the nonjusticiable provision on primary education of the 
Directive Principles of State Policy into a justiciable fundamental human rights provision under 
its Constitution. The South African Constitutional Court, in interpreting its Constitution, wherein 
socioeconomic rights are justiciable has formulated a reasonableness test doctrine in evaluating 
the seriousness/effectiveness of the various programs that the South African government had 
designed to implement socioeconomic rights. I then conclude that existing mechanisms of 
accountability in Nigeria can be complemented by constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic 
rights. The same principles formulated by the Nigerian judiciary in striking down 
unconstitutional legislation or in securing civil and political rights are applicable to judicial 
adjudication over socioeconomic rights. A constitutional amendment to make socioeconomic 
rights justiciable will ameliorate Nigeria’s public governance accountability deficit.      
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INTRODUCTION 
Subject of the Dissertation  
Socioeconomic rights are not justiciable under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria decreed by the military in 1999. They are classified as nonjusticiable Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, just as they were categorized by its template, 
the military decreed 1979 Constitution.
1
 I argue in this dissertation, that justiciable 
socioeconomic rights derived from a constitutional amendment, can contribute to existing 
accountability mechanisms in striving to make the Nigerian state more accountable.
2
 Justiciable 
socioeconomic rights will subject government policies to objective judicial scrutiny and 
complement existing mechanisms of accountability to make the Nigerian state more accountable 
for its socioeconomic policies.
3
 All available complementary mechanisms of accountability, 
including constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights must be deployed to continuously 
tackle Nigeria’s accountability deficit in public governance.     
                                                          
1
 “It must be emphasized that the duty thus cast on the state is only to pursue a policy that is geared 
towards securing the amenities specified; it does not confer on any individual a corresponding entitlement 
to demand such amenities as a right. Regrettably, however, the Constitution provides no machinery for 
ensuring such compliance, and expressly excludes the use of the courts for the purpose, even to the 
limited extent of a mere declaration by a court that the government is or is not complying with the 
principle. This exclusion is predicated on the danger of a confrontation between the court and the political 
organs and on the alleged incompetence of lawyers to decide such matters. The danger of confrontation 
hardly justifies the complete exclusion of judicial intervention, and judges are no less competent than 
politicians to assess the performance of government. However the National Assembly is given power to 
provide for a machinery to promote and enforce the directive principles of the Constitution.” Nwabueze, 
B.O. Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making: The Morohundiya Lectures Faculty of Law University of 
Ibadan, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1993), p.157.   
2
 Section 9 (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for such amendment 
which “shall not be passed in either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is supported by 
the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of that House and approved by resolution 
of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the States.” A greater percentage of votes are 
required for amending the fundamental human rights provisions in Chapter four and for the creation of 
new states as well as boundary adjustments.   
3
 Socio-economic rights will address Achebe’s question: “How do we begin to solve these problems in 
Nigeria, where the structures are present but there is no accountability?” Achebe, Chinua, There was a 
Country: A Personal History of Biafra, (New York, Penguin Press, 2012), p. 252. 
2 
 
 Nigeria’s current finance minister has been at the vanguard of the accountability 
movement in Nigeria and her efforts would be greatly complemented by justiciable 
socioeconomic rights. The Nigerian judiciary, Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Union of 
Journalists, progressive politicians, members of organized civil society, and ordinary citizens 
have utilized existing mechanisms of accountability to check the accountability deficits of the 
Nigerian state during military rule and under previous civilian regimes, as well as the current 
evolving experiment with democracy introduced by the military decreed 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. These efforts could be complemented by constitutionally justiciable 
socioeconomic rights, which would subject government socioeconomic policies to greater 
scrutiny and ameliorate the accountability deficit of public governance in Nigeria. Reforming the 
Nigerian state has always been a dangerous venture, as evidenced by the kidnapping of the 
mother of Nigeria’s finance minister on December 9, 2012, in Nigeria.4   
 The Nigerian economy earned over $300 billion from oil revenues between 1982 and 
2007, but paradoxically, poverty is still the lot of most Nigerians. From 1991 to 2001, 70 percent 
of Nigerians lived on less than a dollar a day.
5
 “The widespread poverty is perhaps the clearest 
demonstration of the failure of governance in Nigeria.”6 The position today remains the same if 
not worse. Nigeria ranked 142 in the 2010 Human Development Report, with life expectancy at 
                                                          
4
 Efeizemor, Victor, ‘Okonjo-Iweala’s 83- year Old Mother Kidnapped’ This Day , Lagos, December 10, 
2012, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/okonjo-iweala-s-83-year-old-mother-kidnapped/133118/ 
(accessed on December 10, 2012).   Okonjo-Iweala stated that the kidnappers wanted her to resign as 
finance minister due to oil subsidy reforms to check multibillion dollar fraud but they released  her mum 
after five days in captivity, BBC News, December 17, 2012,  ‘Nigeria’s Okonjo-Iweala: Kidnappers 
‘demanded resignation’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20762630 (accessed on December 17, 
2012) 
5
 Human Development Report 2003, (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2003), p. 200 
6
 Obiagwu, Chinonye and Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm, ‘Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism and 
Militarism’, in An-Na‘im  Abdullahi Ahmed, (ed.), Human Rights Under African Constitutions: 
Realizing the Promise for Ourselves, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 211-250 
at p.241.   
3 
 
48.4 and gross national income (GNI) per capita of $2156 (PPP2008$).
7
 Maternal mortality still 
ranks among the worst in the world, with 1,100 women losing their lives per 100,000 live births.
8
 
Nigeria also has one of the worst infant mortality rates in the world.
9
 This problem could be 
remedied if the Nigerian government would take seriously such socioeconomic issues as public 
health and education following the lead of countries in similar situations in different parts of the 
world.
10
 Countries that are more effectively governed generally utilize public resources 
                                                          
7
 Human Development Report 2010, (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2010), p.145.      
8
 Ibid. at p. 158;  Ezegwu E.C; Onah H.E; Ezegwu F.O. and Okafor I.I. ‘ Maternal Mortality in a 
Transitional Hospital in Enugu, South East Nigeria,’ African Journal of Reproductive Health, Vol. 13, 
No. 4 (December, 2009)., pp. 66-72. Harrison, Kelsey, ‘Maternal Mortality in Nigeria: The Real Issues,’ 
African Journal of Reproductive Health, Vol. 1, No.1, (March, 1997), pp. 7-13. Scott-Emuakpor, Ajovi, 
‘The evolution of health care systems in Nigeria: Which way forward in the twenty-first century,’ 
Nigerian Medical Journal, Vol.51, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 53-65, full text available at: 
http://www.nigeriamedj.com/article.asp?issn=0300-
1652;year=2010;volume=51;issue=2;spage=53;epage=65;aulast=Scott-Emuakpor (accessed on April 3, 
2012). Audu, B.M; Takai, U.I. and Bukar, M. ‘Trends in maternal mortality at University of Maiduguri 
teaching hospital, Maiduguri, Nigeria-A five year review,’ Nigerian Medical Journal, Vol.51, No. 4, 
(October-December 2010), pp. 147-151, full text available at: 
http://www.nigeriamedj.com/temp/NigerMedJ514147-2844549_075405.pdf (accessed on April 3, 2012).  
A higher figure of 1,120 maternal mortality per 100, 000 live births  was revealed at the fourth annual 
Nurses Scientific Conference in Lagos, Nigeria (whose theme was: ’Maternal and Child Care: Challenges 
to Nursing Practice’)   by Mrs. Jokotade Agunbiade,  Lagos State Director of Nursing Services, who 
claimed that: “Nigeria’s maternal, child health statistics is the world’s worst.” Olukayode Thomas and 
Joke Kujenya, ‘Can Jonathan save mothers from dying at childbirth?’ The Nation, Lagos, April 3, 2012, 
http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/41881-can-jonathan-save-mothers-from-dying-
at-childbirth.html (accessed on April 3, 2012).    
9
  Save the Children, Nutrition in the First 1,000 Days: State of the World’s Mothers 2012,  p. 57  
http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/.PDF (accessed 
on May 8, 2012) , see also, UNICEF, State of the World’s  Children 2012: Children in an Urban World,  
http://www.unicef.org/sowc/files/SOWC_2012-Main_Report_EN_21Dec2011.pdf (accessed on May 8, 
2012).   
10
 After listing South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates as developing 
countries which became prosperous between 1960 and 1985 while simultaneously eliminating poverty 
and drastically reducing infant mortality, Amartya Sen states that:  “Another issue concerns the identity of 
the remaining five countries in the list of the top 10 in reducing infant and child mortality. They are all 
much poorer countries, which have nevertheless achieved tremendous lowering of under-five mortality 
(reductions of 70 to 80 per cent during 1960-85), have reached very low absolute mortality rates, mainly 
through public programmes of medical care, epidemiological control and elementary education. The list 
includes socialist economies such as China and Cuba. Others on the list are Costa Rica, Chile and 
Jamaica, and all of them have used, for significant parts of the period,  much public intervention in 
securing health care, medical facilities and basic education across the population.” Sen, Amartya, Public 
Action to Remedy Hunger, The Fourth Annual Tanco Memorial Lecture, August 2, 1990, Queen 
Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London, at pp. 13-14. 
4 
 
consistently over several decades to improve life expectancy.
11
 Nigeria ranked 156 in the 2011 
Human Development Report with life expectancy at 51.9 years,
12
 and a gross national income 
(GNI) per capita of $2069 (PPP2005$).
13
 It ranked 153 in the 2013 HDR, with life expectancy at 
52.3 years.
14
   
 Nigeria with a territorial size of 923,768 square kilometers (almost twice the size of the 
state of California) and a population comprising over 250 major ethnic  nationalities and around 
160 million people.  It is the eighth most populous country in the world.
15
 Nigeria is a major 
producer of crude oil and gas, but there is no stable electricity power supply. Hospitals that can 
afford electricity generating plants depend on them during surgical procedures. Manufacturing 
plants also depend on electricity producing generators to function. A power outage caused the 
June 3, 2006, Sosoliso airliner crash at the Port Harcourt airport in Nigeria, which killed over 
one hundred passengers who were mainly schoolchildren. Only one very badly burned passenger 
survived the crash. Ordinarily, the runway lights would have been lit to guide the landing of a 
plane in a severe rainstorm, but in this case they were not lit. . The standby generator at the 
airport was not switched on because it was daytime and its fuel was rationed for use at night.
 16
 
 The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its carbon copy, the 1999 
                                                          
11
 Ibid. at p. 16. 
12
 Human Development Report 2011, (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2011), p.126, 
full text available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed on April 28, 
2012).  
13
 Ibid. at p. 129. 
14
 Human Development Report 2013, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, (New 
York: United Nations Development Program, March 14, 2013), p.146, full text available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013%20
Report%20English.pdf (accessed on April 23, 2013).  
15
 National Planning Commission, Annual Performance of the Nigerian Economy 2010, full text available 
at:  http://www.npc.gov.ng/vault/ECONOMY.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2011). 
16
 Dada, Steve; Ezeobi, Chiemele and Ogbodo, Dele, ‘Six Year After Sosoliso Plane Crash Blamed on 
Power Failure,’ ThisDay Newspaper, Lagos and Abuja, June 14, 2012, 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/six-years-after-sosoliso-plane-crash-blamed-on-power-
failure/117950/ (last visited June 14, 2012) 
5 
 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, both contain a bill of rights recognizing civil and 
political rights while entrenching the supremacy of the Constitution. In some ways they are 
similar to the Constitution of the United States.
17
 In both countries socioeconomic rights are not 
constitutionally protected by their supreme federal constitutions, but unlike Nigeria’s thirty-six 
states, the fifty states of the United States have their own constitutions, some of which are older 
than the 1787 U.S. Constitution. Constitutions of forty-nine of the U.S. states guarantee primary 
and secondary education to some extent. The exception is the Mississippi state constitution.
18
 In 
forty-five of the states, litigation over the funding of education is ongoing.
19
 Litigation has also 
occurred over the funding of health insurance challenges, mounted by several American states to 
                                                          
17
 Horowitz, Donald L. ‘Many Uses of Federalism,’ Drake Law Review, Vol. 55 (2006-2007), pp. 953-
970. 
18
 Henkins, Louis, et al Human Rights, (Thompson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009), at p. 1477; see also 
Rebell, Michael, ‘The Rights to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity,’ The Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1. (March, 2012), pp. 47-117;    
19
 ACCESS, Teachers College, Columbia University, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (accessed on May 7, 2012); a distribution of the  
outcome of the cases with plaintiffs winning 27 and the states as defendants winning 20 with 6 no court 
decision as at March 2010 can be accessed at: 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/New_Charts/03_2010eq_ad_schoolfundinliability.pdf (accessed 
on May 7, 2012); the Supreme Court of North Carolina 2004 decision in Hoke County Board of 
Education v. State 599 S.E. 2d 365 led to an increase in the North Carolina budget for public schools 
from $6.88 billion in 2005 to $7.5 billion in 2006. Silberman, Todd and Kane Dan, ‘School’s budget ship 
comes in,’ The News & Observer, July 06, 2006, 
http://ncprogress.org/PDF/070606%20newsobserver%20_%20Schools%20budget%20ship%20comes%2
0in.pdf (accessed on May 9, 2012); Ryan, James E. ‘Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation,’ 
Texas Law Review Vol. 86, (2007-2008), pp. 1223-1263; Rebell, Michael A. and Wolff, Jessica R. 
Litigation and Education Reform: The History and the Promise of the Education Adequacy Movement, 
(Teachers College, Columbia University: The Campaign for Educational Equity, March, 2006), pp. 1-24, 
full text available at: http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/adequacy-history.pdf (accessed on 
May 9, 2012); Greif, Alexandra ‘Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s Experience 
Implementing the Abbott V Mandate,’ Yale Law and Policy Review Vol. 22, (2004), pp. 615-658; 
Saunders, Thomas ‘Settling without Settling: School Finance Litigation and Governance Reform in 
Maryland,’ Yale Law and Policy Review Vol. 22, (2004), pp. 571-614;  Almeida, Tico A. ‘Refocusing 
School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State of North Carolina,’ Yale Law and Policy 
Review Vol. 22, (2004), pp. 525-570; Wetzler, Lauren A. ‘Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform 
and Desegregation Came to Compete in Connecticut,’ Yale Law and Policy Review Vol. 22, (2004), pp. 
481-524; Rebell, Michael A. and Metzler, Jeffrey ‘Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story of School 
Finance Litigation in Vermont,’ Journal of Law and Education, Vol. 31, (2002), pp. 167-190.  
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the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), signed into law on March 23, 2010, by 
America’s President Barrack Obama.20     
 Nigeria’s Constitution differs from the American Constitution and contains a Chapter II, 
titled Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, which contains a plethora 
of nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights.
21
 I attempt to show how the constitutional process in the 
United States at the state level has navigated to some extent around the strictures/constraints of 
an American Constitution that does not provide for socioeconomic rights. Nevertheless poverty 
and unemployment as well as difficult survival challenges for low income earners remain 
widespread in American society. The strategy in the United States has been to employ ordinary 
legislation both at the states level and at the federal government level to provide welfare rights. 
 I have juxtaposed the theoretical debates over socioeconomic rights which are justiciable 
in South Africa and nonjusticiable in India with the Nigerian legal regime, which provides for 
socioeconomic rights as nonjusticiable fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy under Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as 
highlighted above. South African courts unlike Nigerian courts are empowered to enforce 
socioeconomic rights through constitutional mandates. South Africa’s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court, has formulated the standard of reasonableness concept, to evaluate the 
accountability of government policies in the fulfillment of constitutionally mandated 
                                                          
20
 Joondeph, Bradley W. ‘Federalism and Health Care Reform: Understanding the States’ Challenges to 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,’ Publius: Journal of Federalism Vol. 41. No. 3 (2011), 
pp.447-470; Gamkhar, Shama and Pickerill, Mitchell J. ‘The State of American Federalism 2010-2011: 
The Economy, Health Care Reform and Midterm Elections Shape the Intergovernmental Agenda,’ 
Publius: Journal of Federalism Vol. 41. No. 3 (2011), pp. 361-394, at pp. 367-368,374-376, 381-382. 
21
 Read, James S. ‘The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979: “Washington Model”? Journal of African 
Law, Vol.23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1979), pp.131-174; The Hon. Justice Kayode Eso, ‘The Problems of 
Interpretation and of Application of the Provisions of the Constitution,’ in All Nigeria Judges Conference 
Papers, Ilorin, Kwara State, 8th -16th March 1982, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), pp. 127-173. 
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socioeconomic rights.
22
 “But at the same time the standard of reasonableness enables courts to 
hold the state accountable in a manner consistent with the doctrine of the separation of 
powers.”23 Nigerian governments have accorded respect to constitutionally enforceable 
provisions but not to legislative provisions on education. This has been demonstrated by 
Nigeria’s flagrant disobedience of court orders directing compliance with the provisions of the 
2004 Universal Basic Education Act. In the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 
SERAP v. Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission
24
 decision of November 2010, the 
Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice found Nigeria in 
violation of Article 17 of the African Child’s Right, Act (a Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights-Banjul Charter), section 15 of the Nigerian 2003 Child’s Right Act 
and section 2 of the 2004 Compulsory Free and Universal Basic Education Act. The court then 
ordered the Nigerian government to make adequate arrangements for compulsory and free 
education for every Nigerian child.
25
 The court dismissed Nigeria’s objection that education is 
merely a prerogative of government policy under the nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy.
26
  Nigeria has not embarked on any remedial actions to comply with 
the judgment and the ECOWAS jurisprudence on Nigeria is analyzed in greater detail in section 
4 of chapter 4 in this dissertation.       
                                                          
22
 Quinot, Geo and Liebenberg, Sandra, ‘Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa’ Stellenbosch Law Review, Vol. 22, 
No. 3, (2011), pp. 639-664. 
23Ngcobo, Sandile, South Africa’s Transformative Constitution: Towards an Appropriate Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers’ Stellenbosch Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2011), pp. 37-49 at p. 46. 
24
 ECW/CCJ/APP/12/7. 
25
 ECOWAS Court orders Nigeria to provide free education for every child, Vanguard, Lagos, November 
30, 2010, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/ecowas-court-orders-nigeria-to-provide-free-education-
for-every-child/   (accessed on April, 25, 2011).  
26
 Nwauche, E.S. ‘Enforcing ECOWAS Law in National Courts,’ (Journal of African Law, Vol. 55, No. 2, 
2011), pp. 181-202, at p. 197. 
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 Can socioeconomic rights be employed in the realization of a Nigerian State with 
improved accountability? This dissertation argues that socioeconomic rights can contribute to the 
formulation of state policies and programs that are accountable to the people. Such policies and 
programs can ultimately lead to the formulation by technocrats and political leaders of 
socioeconomic policies that are accountable to Nigerians. Accountable government policies hold 
a greater promise of diversifying the oil dominated economy and the development of relevant 
programs to boost the manufacturing and agro-allied sectors, which have the potential of 
generating greater income and prosperity for the average Nigerian as well as more tax revenues 
than oil for socioeconomic goods.         
 Education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Nigeria remain severely 
underfunded and experienced qualified teachers are scarce commodities at all levels. Yet an 
educated and healthy populace with enabled capabilities is a necessary catalyst for the economic 
and industrial development of any country, desirous of improving the quality of life of its 
citizenry.
27
 Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
published in 1776, advocated compulsory public primary education with a syllabus that covered 
literacy skills, geometry, and mechanics.
28
 Thomas Paine’s “Rights of Man” published  in the 
United States around the same time also strongly advocated for compulsory publicly funded 
                                                          
27
 Sen, Amartya, ‘Capability and Well-Being’ in Sen, Amartya and Nussbaum, Martha (eds.) The Quality 
of Life: A study prepared for the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) of the 
United Nations University, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 30-53, at p. 44; Nussbaum, Martha, 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 90; Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Capabilities and Human Rights,’ University of Fordham Law Review, 
Vol. 66 (1997), pp. 273-300; Nussbaum, Martha C. ‘Women’s Education: A Global Challenge,’ Signs, 
Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter 2004), pp. 325-355; Nussbaum, Martha ‘Education and Democratic Citizenship: 
Capabilities and Quality Education,’ Journal of Human Development, Vol.7,  No. 3 (November 2006), 
pp. 385-395; Nussbaum, Martha, ’Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique,’ 
Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), pp. 23-37, at p. 33 
28
 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Lerner Max, (ed.) (New 
York: The Modern Library, 1937), pp. 737-738.     
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primary education.
29
 As Tanzania’s Head of State, Julius Nyerere of made education and health 
care his priorities.
30
 The development of human capabilities as a step towards freedom from 
poverty is a necessary anodyne for the Nigerian State in need of improved accountability in 
public governance.
31
  
 Research Question                                 
This dissertation will attempt to answer the question: Can justiciable socioeconomic rights assist 
in the formulation of government policies and programs that are accountable to Nigerian 
citizens?     
Scope of the Dissertation                                      
This dissertation is concerned with the accountability deficit in Nigerian public governance and 
is limited primarily to health and education aspects of nonjusticiable socio economic rights 
mentioned under Chapter II Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of 
                                                          
29
 Nussbaum, Martha, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), p.139. 
30
 “What Freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the soil provided the rains 
do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, medical care, or even good feeding. Certainly 
he has freedom to vote and to speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to him than his 
freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom become 
properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity.” Nyerere, Julius K. 
‘Stability and Change in Africa,’ (an Address to the University of Toronto, 1969), reproduced in Africa 
Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), C30-31; quoted in Howard, Rhoda ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: Should 
Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa,’ 
Human Rights Quarterly,  Vol. 5, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 467-490, at p. 467 
31
 “The insecure sharecropper, the exploited landless labourer, the totally subdued housewife, the 
overworked domestic servant, and the hard core of the unemployed even in the richer countries, may all 
come to terms with their respective predicaments by the sheer necessity of uneventful survival. Grievance 
and discontent may be submerged in cheerful endurance and the acceptance of the ‘natural order’, and the 
victim may learn to take pleasure in small mercies. The relative deprivations are thus muffled and muted 
in the interpersonal scale of utility comparisons….the perspective of freedom provides a more real view 
of different persons’ interests.” Sen, Amartya, ‘Rights as Goals,’ Text of the Austin Lecture given on 
April 6, 1984, , at the University College London, April 6-8, 1984, in Guest, Stephen and Milne (eds.), 
Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice, Eleventh Annual Conference of the United 
Kingdom Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden 
GMBH, 1985),  p. 24.  
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the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It examines the approach in the United 
States toward the employment of ordinary legislation and states’ constitutions to secure 
socioeconomic rights in a constitutional culture strongly against constitutionally guaranteed 
socioeconomic rights. However, this approach has not worked well in Nigeria. For example, the 
2004 Universal Basic Education Act has a poor record of implementation, due to the absence of 
an accountability mechanism to enforce socioeconomic rights in Nigeria. Constitutionally 
guaranteed civil and political rights have been well protected by the Nigerian judiciary and its 
decisions are obeyed by the Nigerian government. 32 It is important to note that socioeconomic 
goods can be also attained through ordinary legislation in jurisdictions where socioeconomic 
rights are not constitutionally enforceable. This has been the experience with social security 
education and healthcare in Europe and to some extent in the United States.
33
 Nevertheless the 
United States spends billions of dollars on socioeconomic goods for its citizens, which exceed 
even European spending.
34
 A claim can therefore be made for the attainment of socioeconomic 
goods through other means, besides constitutional enforcement.
35
     
 This dissertation examines prominent socioeconomic rights cases decided by the 
                                                          
32
 Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 S.C.; Shugaba Darman v. Federal Minister of 
Internal Affairs (1981) 2NCLR 459; Bishop Olubunmi Okojie v. Attorney-General of Lagos State (1981) 
1 NCLR 218; Attorney-General Imo State v. Ukaegbu (1981) 2 NCLR 568; Governor of Lagos State & 
Others v. Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu & Another (1986) 1 NWLR (Part 18) 621.    
33
 Waldron, Jeremy, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 32; Henkin, Louis  et al Human Rights, (New York: Foundation Press, 1999), p. 86; “U.S. 
domestic order…sustains institutions that alleviate want…” Shulman, Mark R. ‘The Four Freedoms: 
Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time of Insecurity,’ Fordham Law Journal, Vol. 
77, (2008-2009), pp. 555-581, at p. 580. 
34“In 1992 total spending on social welfare, excluding education and veterans’ benefits, by government at 
all levels was $936 billion, whereas the justice system (police, courts, and prisons) cost $94 billion and 
the military cost $298 billion.”  U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1997 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1997), Tables 576, 338, 515, reproduced in Kelley, 
David, A Life of One’s Own: Individual Rights and the Welfare State (Washington D.C.: CATO Institute, 
1998), p. 27. 
35
 Hohfeld, Wesley, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,’ 23 Yale 
L.J. (1913), pp. 16-59, at pp. 28-32. 
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Constitutional Court of South Africa and the directive principles in the Indian Constitution to 
gauge their impact on accountability in public governance. The right to education provisions in 
the constitutions of the U.S. states of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York are also analyzed 
through the jurisprudence of their courts to ascertain the impact of constitutional mandates on 
public governance accountability.  The dissertation focuses on pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria on the correlation between corruption and deprivation of socioeconomic 
rights.
36
 Forces in the Nigerian legal system that have utilized existing mechanisms of 
accountability would be greatly enhanced  by constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights 
and knock out the bottom of persistent arguments by government lawyers that the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution recognizes socioeconomic rights as nonjusticiable fundamental principles and 
objectives of state policy. The general comments of the Committee of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are also evaluated. Nigeria acceded to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on July 29, 1993.
37
                 
Research Methodology                               
The methodology employs a comparative constitutional law approach.
38
 Comparative legal 
analysis is premised on the fact that no two legal systems are the same.
39
 Nigeria’s 1999 
                                                          
36
 Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation and others  [2002] 9 N.W.LR. 
(Pt.772) 222 at 283-474. 
37
 http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en 
(accessed on 12 April, 2011).  
38
 Zweigert, Konrad and Kötz, Hein, Introduction to Comparative Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
(3rd ed. Translated from German by Tony Weir); Banakar, Reza and Travers, Max (eds.) Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research, (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005); Langford, 
Malcolm (ed.) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jacob, Herbert et al. (eds.) Courts, Law, and Politics in 
Comparative Perspective, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996); Merton, Robert, K. 
Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: The Free Press, 1968).    
39
 Glendon, Mary Ann; Gordon, Michael W. and Osakwe, Christoper, Comparative Legal Traditions, (St. 
Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1982), p. 10. This explains the lack of results of the law and 
development project exported to Africa by leading American scholars in the 1960s. “Immediately after 
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Constitution is almost a carbon copy of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and it reflects decades of autocratic military rule in Nigeria.
40
  Law reports and other legal 
materials I have procured from Nigeria and key materials available at Cornell library became 
the primary materials for this dissertation. Secondary materials include classical texts and 
contemporary seminal texts, as well as textbooks and journal articles on socioeconomic rights, 
international law, political economy, philosophy, and political science. Materials were limited to 
those that related to the research question. The secondary materials above and key publications 
were readily provided by Cornell University library and its external links. The librarians were 
very proactive and an invaluable help with my research needs. Judicial decisions from Nigeria, 
India, the United States, and South Africa were relied upon. The complexity of comparative 
constitutional law is factored within the comparative analysis of differing climes with varying 
sociopolitical cultural norms.
41
 The online data bases of the Cornell University Library, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
independence, American lecturers were trotting around African University campuses selling their ‘Law 
and Development’ courses in which they preached that development could be enhanced, facilitated, 
encouraged etc. through law.” Shivji, Issa G. The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, (London: 
CODESRIA Book Series, 1989), p.65, note, 22; “The need to see our own and foreign legal institutions in 
context means that comparative law by its very nature is an interdisciplinary field, one that depends 
heavily on practical knowledge and empirical investigation. Legal norms cannot be fully understood 
without some knowledge of their sources: their political, social, and economic purposes; the milieu in 
which they operate; the role of thelegal profession; the operation of the court system.” Glendon, May 
Ann; Gordon, Michael Wallace and Carozza Paolo G. Comaparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell, 
Second Editiion, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Group, 1999), p.11.   
40
 “Thus it can be seen that the basic choices as to the form of the new Constitution were in fact made by 
the outgoing military government.”  Read, James S. ‘The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979: 
“Washington Model”? Journal of African Law, Vol.23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1979), pp.131-174, at p. 135. 
41Tushnet, Mark, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,’ Yale Law Journal (April, 1999), 
pp. 1225-1309, at pp.1227-1228, 1307; Choudry, Sujit, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward 
a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation,’ 86 Ind. L.J. (1998-1999) pp. 819-892, at p. 825. 
Sandra Liebenberg after appraising Tushnet and Choudry above, succinctly put it this way in the South 
African context: “References to comparative constitutional law in the interpretation of a national 
constitution are thus susceptible to two main criticisms: arbitrariness, in the sense that judges frequently 
only draw from jurisdictions whose language and legal traditions are familiar to them; and superficiality, 
in that they suffer from the inevitable lack of in-depth knowledge of the relevant historical, social and 
legal contexts. On the other hand, openness to learning from other constitutional cultures and traditions 
constitutes a major resource for transformative critique and development of our own constitutional 
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African Union, and the Economic Commission of West African States; as well as agencies of 
the United Nations, especially the High Commissioner for Human Rights Office, and the United 
Nations Development Program were also utilized. A content analysis of the socioeconomic 
jurisprudence in Nigeria, India, the United States and South Africa was embarked upon. At the 
international stage, I evaluated the general comments of the Committee of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a decision of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on socioeconomic violations in Nigeria as well jurisprudence of 
the Economic Community of West African Court of Justice relating to Nigeria’s socioeconomic 
obligations under the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.                                    
Arrangement of the Dissertation                                        
In chapter one I argue that mechanisms of accountability have been adopted in Nigeria, and I 
establish that mechanisms of accountability such as the rule of law and separation of powers 
have been enacted into the Nigerian Constitution. I evaluate the concept of accountability in 
public governance and proceed to examine the existing mechanism of accountability in Nigeria, 
starting with the rule of law. I examine the accountability mechanism of separation of powers 
and give a snapshot of both the international and domestic bills of rights as mechanisms of 
accountability and I then examine human rights commissions. I treat transparency in governance 
as a mechanism of accountability, and follow it with an analysis of freedom of the press as a 
veritable tool in the accountability toolbox. I move on to interrogate fiscal mechanisms of 
accountability in the expenditure of public funds in Nigeria and  end with an analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
culture.” Liebenberg, Sandra, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution, 
(Claremont, South Africa: JUTA, 2010), p. 118. Even in international criminal law domestic norms add 
nuance to supposedly global paradigms, see: Greenawalt, Alexander K.A. ‘The Pluralism of International 
Criminal Law,’ 86 Ind. L.J. (2011) pp. 1063-1130.   
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African Union’s peer review accountability mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development.           
 In chapter 2, I argue that government socioeconomic policies have not been accountable, 
and I establish this claim convincingly. I map out the role of the military in the creation of an 
unaccountable Nigerian State reflected in military coups and the plunging into an abyss of a 
devastating civil war that resulted in over a million deaths. I establish respectively the dire state 
of Nigeria’s health-care and education sectors through a content analysis of comprehensive data. 
I then analyze and conclusively prove the deleterious effects of corruption on socioeconomic 
rights in Nigeria. My case studies of the accountability profiles of some Nigerian state 
governors and my comprehensive analyses of financial data show conclusively that billions of 
dollars in oil revenues still get stolen annually in Nigeria. I end the chapter with an analysis of 
two American cases, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR and United States of America v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States. 
The cases establish the negative impact of multinationals on accountability of public governance 
in Nigeria occasioned by their bribing of political leadership in Nigeria in order to win 
multibillion dollars contracts. Finally  based on established evidence, I conclude that there is a 
huge accountability deficit in public governance in Nigeria.                                
 In chapter three I examine the status of socioeconomic rights as Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy. Here I also establish the involvement of military juntas 
in Nigeria in aborting the peoples’ will to have socioeconomic rights entrenched as justiciable 
constitutional fundamental rights in the Nigerian Constitutions decreed by the military juntas.  I 
proceed to highlight the Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy.  I then evaluate 
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Nigerian socioeconomic jurisprudence and proceed to analyze the concept of locus standi in 
Nigerian jurisprudence. I examine the socioeconomic jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria as well as the constitutional framework that is inclusive and represents a broad spectrum 
of the desires of Nigerians. I conclude that there is very strong evidence of broad support for 
justiciable socioeconomic rights by Nigerians to contribute to making socioeconomic policies of 
government accountable. A constitutionally guaranteed and relaxed right of access to courts in 
Nigeria is also required to empower aggrieved citizens as litigants to improve the accountability 
matrix of public governance.      
  In chapter four I focus on the international context of socioeconomic rights. I argue that 
constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights will assist Nigeria in fulfillings its obligations 
under international human rights law and improve accountability of its socioeconomic policies. I 
briefly trace the theoretical debates about whether or not socioeconomic rights are fundamental 
rights, like civil and political rights. I go on to analyze the General Comments jurisprudence of 
the Committee set up by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
after which  I examine the socioeconomic jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and use the famous SERAC decision against Nigeria on socioeconomic 
rights as a case study. I end by analyzing the socioeconomic jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the Economic Community of West African States   (ECOWAS) on Nigeria. I conclude in this 
that the SERAC decision and ECOWAS Court of Justice jurisprudence on Nigeria shows 
conclusively that socioeconomic rights can complement existing mechanisms of accountability 
and ameliorate the accountability deficit of Nigerian public governance by subjecting 
socioeconomic policies of government to judicial scrutiny.            
16 
 
 In chapter five I embark on a comparative analysis of the implementation of 
socioeconomic rights in different countries. Through the scholarship of American professors like 
Mark Tushnet, Lawrence Sager, and Frank Michelman I learn how the United States has 
ameliorated the limitations of a constitutional tradition strongly opposed to constitutionalized 
socioeconomic rights through the use of ordinary legislation by both the federal government and 
the states to provide socioeconomic goods, such as basic education.  I juxtapose the United 
States experience with that of Nigeria, where socioeconomic rights are not justiciable, but are 
listed as fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy under Chapter II of the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I then proceed to analyze jurisprudence on 
education in the American states of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York; whose constitutions 
provide for free public education for children. I show conclusively that the education 
jurisprudence in the three states improved accountability in public policies on education.   
 In the latter portion of the chapter I analyze public interest litigation based socioeconomic 
jurisprudence in India; and conduct a brief analysis of the transformative constitutions of 
Argentina and Colombia, both of which contain enforceable socioeconomic rights. I also 
establish in the next section, that a number of African countries have incorporated justiciable 
socioeconomic rights in their constitutions within the past two decades, to improve 
accountability of public governance. I conclude that Nigeria has positive lessons to learn from 
the education jurisprudence of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York in improving 
accountability and in the crafting and implementation of public school educational policies. 
Nigeria can benefit equally from the experiences of Argentina, Columbia, and India in improving 
accountability of public governance through the subjection of government policies to a minimum 
threshold of scrutiny by the judicial branch. India has also amended its Constitution to make 
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education an enforceable socioeconomic right for children up to the age of fourteen, while at the 
same time the Indian Supreme Court has expanded the constitutionally guaranteed right to life to 
encompass a right to health care. I conclude that all mechanisms of accountability including 
constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights must be on deck to ameliorate Nigeria’s 
accountability deficit in public governance.        
 Chapter 6 critically evaluates the most prominent socioeconomic rights decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in interpreting constitutionally mandated socioeconomic 
rights, and I demonstrate that those crucial decisions improved the accountability of the 
government’s socioeconomic policies. The formula employed by South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court in the decisions was a reasonableness test. I end the chapter with an analysis of the Court’s 
rejection of the minimum core formula of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.            
 In chapter seven which concludes this dissertation, I argue that socioeconomic rights can 
ameliorate the accountability deficit in Nigerian governance. Constitutionally justiciable 
socioeconomic rights can ameliorate the accountability deficit of the Nigerian state through the 
subjection of government’s socioeconomic policies to judicial scrutiny. I evaluate constitutional 
legitimacy and the capability of courts to adjudicate over socioeconomic rights. I show that 
existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria can be complemented and enhanced by 
constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights that will subject government’s socioeconomic 
policies to judicial scrutiny. I then proceed to outline the findings of this dissertation and make 
recommendations.   
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                                                 CHAPTER ONE                                              
MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY ADOPTED IN NIGERIA                                       
1.0. Introduction                       
I argue in this chapter that mechanisms of accountability have been adopted in Nigeria. I 
establish that mechanisms of accountability, such as the rule of law and separation of powers 
have been enacted into the Nigerian Constitution. In Section 1.1 I render an analysis of the 
concept of accountability in public governance, and then analyze examples of the mechanisms of 
accountability with the rule of law in section 1.2. In section 1.3 I proceed to examine the 
accountability mechanism of separation of powers and in section 1.4 provide a snapshot of both 
the international and domestic bills of rights as mechanisms of accountability. Human rights 
commissions are examined in section 1.5, transparency in governance as a mechanism of 
accountability in section 1.6, and freedom of the press as a veritable tool in the accountability 
toolbox in section 1.7. Section 1.8 interrogates fiscal mechanisms of accountability in the 
expenditure of public funds in Nigeria. I end the examples of mechanisms of accountability in 
section 1.9, with the African Union’s peer review accountability mechanism of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development.                                                
1.1. Accountability in Public Governance 
The attainment of accountability in public governance has preoccupied human societies over the 
ages.
42
 Greek Athenian democratic thought is one of the earliest documented sources of 
accountable governance. In the fifth century it debated the concepts of aneuthynos 
(unaccountable) and hypeuthynos (accountable) in securing democratic governance. Herodutus, 
                                                          
4242
 Mashaw, Jerry L. ‘Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance,’ in Dowdle, Michael W. Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 115-156. 
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the historian, and playwrights Sophocles and Aeschylus, as well as Democritus, the philosopher 
devoted significant portions of their scholarship in the fifth century to accountable governance.
43
 
“It was only in democracies that machinery was evolving to hold officials to account, and in fact 
there is every reason to believe that by the middle of the fifth century hypeuthynos “accountable” 
had become a democratic catchword.”44 Sir John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon of the Whig 
party in England published the Cato letters in the London Journal from 1720 to 1723 letters 
including copious examples of Athenian accountability. By publishing the letters they were in 
essence demanding Athenian accountability from Robert Walpole, the leading Whig cabinet 
member and his colleagues.
45
 “The purpose of these examples was principally to demonstrate the 
dangers of runaway ministers and the need to hold public men accountable.”46    
 Accountability in Athenian democratic thought and practice can be distilled into the 
concepts of answerability, responsiveness, and sanctions. Answerability simply meant that public 
power was held in trust on behalf of the public and a public official must demonstrate in a 
transparent manner that every exercise of public power was to promote public good. 
Responsiveness meant that public policies were to be distilled from public debates and executed 
in an inclusive manner. Sanctions were punishments imposed on public officials for infractions 
or abuse of public power. It was only when these concepts of accountability were fulfilled that an 
Athenian public official was allowed to take an honorable retirement from office; otherwise 
                                                          
43
 Roberts, Jennifer Tolbert, Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought, 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1994), pp. 35-39. 
44
 Ibid. at p. 36. 
45
 Ibid. at pp. 150-152. 
46
 Ibid. at p. 151. 
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sanctions ranging from exile to execution could be imposed after a trial pronouncing that he had 
committed a breach of accountability.
47
  
Within thirty days of laying down his office, each official had to present his records for audit or 
be liable to prosecution. Even officials to whose hands no public funds had been entrusted had to 
have a statement to that effect approved. During the first portion of the review, the outgoing 
official’s records of the public funds he had received and expended were carefully checked 
against relevant documents in the state archives…by a board of λογωταί, Athens’ public 
accountants. If the λογωταί found cause for suspicion in the accounts of any officeholder they 
would pass the information on to the συνήγορο, who would arrange the delinquent official’s 
prosecution before a regular court. An official convicted of embezzlement or taking of bribes 
would have to pay ten times the amount involved. If the charge was simply one of 
maladministration, the penalty was only twice the amount mismanaged. If no irregularities 
appeared, it would be proposed to the court that the official’s accounts be cleared, but the 
ultimate verdict lay with the court itself, and any citizen had the right to appear before the court 
and challenge its recommendation. Even if the financial portion of the audit passed uneventfully, 
however, a second period of scrutiny followed. For three days a board of ten state examiners 
chosen by lot, the ϵΰθυνοι, sat to hear charges of misconduct of a nonfinancial nature. These 
could be brought by any citizen who felt that the magistrate had been guilty of malfeasance. He 
might accuse the magistrate of having wronged him personally or having acted detrimentally to 
the welfare of any other person or of the state. Offences committed by an official against a 
private citizen might result in a regular δίκη; if a public wrong was suspected and a prima facie 
case seemed to exist, the charge was referred to the θϵσμοθέται, who in turn brought it before a 
court. Only when these examinations and any prosecutions from them had been completed was 
an outgoing official permitted to lay down his office with honor. Only when his ϵΰθυναι were 
complete, we read, was it legal for a man to set out on a journey, transfer his property to anyone 
else, be adopted into a different family, or even make a votive offering to a god. In other words, 
the state had a lien on the property and civic freedom of all officials until their accounts were 
settled.
48
 
In contemporary times, the concept of public accountability, has borrowed heavily from the 
Athenian concept of accountability in public governance. It has evolved over several centuries 
into the modern concept of separation of powers.
49
 “Nevertheless the ideas of the ancients about 
the nature of law, and about the means of controlling power in civil societies, provided much of 
the basic material to which writers in later ages were to turn for ammunition in the great battles 
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over the control of the machinery of the State.”50 An example is English politics in the eighteenth 
century, highlighted above.          
 In Africa, constitutional arrangements have generally concentrated power in the 
executive branch of government
51
 and created imperial presidents.
52
 The pattern commenced in 
Ghana in 1960, and spread to other former British colonies in Africa.
53
 This consolidation of 
power in the presidency has been to the detriment of the legislative and judicial branches of 
government.
54
 A key component of research into the architecture of African constitutions must 
endeavor to make the executive branch accountable, typified by a very powerful president 
according to constitutional mandates in each country. “To begin with, little importance is 
attached to constitutional sanctions against the abuse of power and there is often a lack of 
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democratic ethic amongst politicians in the country.”55 This entails empowering the legislative 
and judicial branches as independent effective checks and balances on the executive; but 
ultimately the emergence of the three branches as equal partners in governance will enhance 
accountability of public governance to the governed in African countries.    
 The role of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s that stripped 
African countries of their sovereignty must not be underplayed because those policies crafted by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank accentuated dictatorship and suppressed 
accountable democracies.
56
 Constitutions are supposed to control governments, in democratic 
arrangements.
57
 Constitutions become meaningless when they are unable to limit executive 
power.
58
 “The theory of the separation of powers and checks and balances emphasizes the 
element of control.”59         
 African scholars and public servants “have worked for and argued for accountability, 
transparency and probity in government and public affairs often in extremely difficult and 
dangerous circumstances.”60 Conventions to promote democratic ethos also need to be developed 
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in African countries to respect constitutional mandates and provisions.
61
 Sociocultural forces 
have an important role to play in socializing public officerholders to view public office as a trust 
to be used for the enhancement of the welfare of the governed.
62
 The answerability aspect of 
public accountability in the British tradition of ministerial responsibility epitomizes such 
democratic ethos.
63
 Moral failures of cabinet ministers are equally sanctioned in Britain.
64
 
Maintaining conventions on the proper use of public power for public good is a necessary 
democratic ethic in Africa’s constitutionalism to secure accountability.65       
 In Africa, “the crucial question is how we can move away from merely theorizing about 
constitutionalism to practical institutionalism of its basic tenets.”66 Accountable governance 
enhances the legitimacy of governance and aids its durability.
67
 This it achieves under a 
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constitutional democracy, by being transparent, responsive and inclusive in socioeconomic 
policy formulation and execution.
68
 All branches of a government must be answerable, and 
responsive to constitutional mandates promoting the welfare of the governed, failing which they 
would incur constitutional sanctions.
69
 These are the fundamental principles of a government 
accountable to the governed under constitutional democracy.
70
 “Moreover, a strong civil society 
will hold the government accountable and curb government functionaries’ excesses and abuse of 
power.”71 All of the above factors; must inform an inclusive and broad based constitution 
making process, that aims at accountability in public governance predicated upon a civil society 
allowed to nurture the ethos of constitutionalism.
72
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 Accountability in public governance has also been a key objective of the Organization of 
African Unity and its successor body, the African Union as well as the Economic Commission of 
West African States and Nigeria is a member of these bodies. The term “good governance” has 
been the preferred terminology employed by these bodies in their various instruments analyzed 
below, to convey the concept of public governance accountability. From the preceding analysis it 
can be safely asserted that  
Public accountability is the requirement that those who hold public trust should account for the 
use of that trust to citizens or their representatives. Public accountability signifies the superiority 
of the public will over private interests and tries to ensure that the former is supreme in every 
activity and conduct of a public official. Without effective accountability, bureaucratic power 
runs amock. In popular parlance, power corrupts and absolute, i.e. unchecked and unaccountable 
use of power, tends to corrupt absolutely.
73
   
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its inaugural ministerial conference on 
human rights held in April 1999, in Grand Bay, Mauritius, adopted and affirmed the 
“interdependence of the principles of good governance, the rule of law, democracy and 
development.”74 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) adopted in Lome, Togo on July 
11, 2000, came into force on May 26, 2001, when the OAU became the AU.
75
 The African 
Union also aims to “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and 
good governance.”76 The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
was adopted on July 11, 2003, in Maputo, Mozambique and came into force on August 5, 2006. 
It demands “Respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of 
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law and good governance.”77 The principles also enjoin state parties to be transparent and 
accountable in public governance.
78
         
 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was adopted on January 
30, 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and it came into force on February 15, 2012.
79
 It aims to 
“promote good governance by ensuring transparent and accountable administration.”80 In 
addition, the Charter stipulates that 
State parties shall strive to institutionalise  
 Accountable, efficient and effective public administration; 
 Strengthening the functioning and effectiveness of parliaments; 
 An independent judiciary; 
 Relevant reforms of public institutions including the security sector; 
 Harmonious relationships in society including civil-military relations; 
 Consolidating sustainable multiparty political systems; 
 Organising  regular, free and fair elections; and 
 Entrenching and respecting the principle of the rule of law.81 
 
The Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance adopted on December 21, 2001, addresses the concept of good governance in 
conjunction with human rights and the rule of law in section VII.
82
  It stipulates that 
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 Member States and the Executive Secretariat shall endeavour to adopt at national and 
regional levels, practical modalities for the enforcement of the rule of law, human rights 
justice and good governance. 
 Member States shall ensure accountability, professionalism, transparency and expertise in 
the public and private sectors.
83
 
 
1.2. Rule of Law                                                 
The rule of law features prominently in the 1999 Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and boldly proclaims that: “The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any 
person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except 
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”84 It further stipulates that “If any other 
law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and 
that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.”85 In modern times, the rule of law 
entails that both the governed and government officials be bound by determinate and publicized 
law which is not retroactive, with inbuilt accountability checks on executive power and 
legislative power.
86
 This modern view also predetermines the legal relationship between 
individuals and also between the individual and the state.
87
 Institutions manned by government 
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officials and laws are pathways or tools for achieving the ends of the rule of law.
88
 Oxford law 
professor Andrew Venn Dicey was most famously associated with the term at the end of the 
nineteenth century.
89
 However the concept of the rule of law has a pedigree of several centuries 
and predates Dicey.
90
 In the 1780 Constitution of the state of Massachusetts, the rule of law is 
reflected as “a government of laws and not of men.”91 It has been argued that two of the 
attributes of the rule of law propounded by Dicey, equality of all before the law, and access to 
independent judicial adjudication of disputes, guarantees accountability in the exercise of the  
coercive power of government.
92
          
 A.V. Dicey interpreted the rule of law to comprise “three components”93:   
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to 
the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or 
even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are ruled by the 
law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of the law, and by the law 
alone; but he can be punished for nothing else. It means again equality before the law, or the 
equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law 
Courts; the “rule of law” in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others 
from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals; there can be with us nothing really corresponding to the “administrative law” 
(droit administratif) or the “administrative tribunals” (tribunaux administratifs) of France. The 
notion which lies at the bottom of the “administrative law” known to foreign countries is, that 
affairs or disputes in which the government or its servants are concerned are beyond the sphere 
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of the civil Courts and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies. This idea is 
utterly unknown to the law of England, and is indeed fundamentally inconsistent with our 
traditions and customs. The “rule of law” lastly may be used as a formula for expressing the fact 
that with us the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of 
a constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as 
defined and enforced by the Courts; that in short, the principles of private law have with us been 
by the action of the Courts and Parliament so extended as to determine the position of the Crown 
and of its servants; thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land.
94
    
 The Parliament of England subsequently acted through the administrative machinery that 
evolved from the nineteenth-century industrial era into the bureaucratic machinery of the welfare 
state of the twentieth century, which exercised delegated wide discretionary authority with 
increased administrative powers. This reality, according to William Robson, debunked Dicey’s 
claim that the rule of law in England lacked “wide discretionary authority on the part of the 
government”95           
 The second point made by Dicey on the absence in England of “administrative tribunals” 
(tribunaux administratifs) of France was a misunderstanding/misrepresentation of the French 
system as Robson clearly demonstrated above. England definitely operated administrative 
tribunals, that treated government officials differently from ordinary citizens; and the Crown up 
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until 1947, was not liable in tort until the passage of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. 
Government officials still enjoy certain privileges in court.
96
 Administrative tribunals in France 
employed public administration experts to determine the liability of government officials and not 
to shield them from from regular courts as claimed by Dicey.
97
     
 The third component of the rule of law, according to Dicey, was shaped by his 
background as member of the Whig Party. He disliked the idea of an enumerated bill of rights in 
a constitution. “Whigs of the nineteenth century assumed that the Constitution was built up on 
free or unrestricted competition.” The Whig Party was funded and promoted by the 
manufacturing class of the nineteenth century.
98
        
 There is no clear-cut definition of the rule of law, and various definitions have evolved 
over the centuries in different places and climes.
99
 But its central features in democratic 
constitutional arrangements require that governmental powers must not be arbitrary, or 
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concentrated in one body, and that such powers must be accountable to the electorate.
100
 It has 
also become an overarching concept of constitutional democracy for the separation of 
governmental powers and respect for human rights as well as judicial independence.
101
 
Separation of powers under the rule of law ensures “that stability and predictability of the rules 
which is the core of constitutionalism.”102 The Economic Commission of West African States 
(ECOWAS) established in 1975, in its 2001 Democracy and Good Governance Protocol to the 
ECOWAS Treaty states that  “Member States recognise that the rule of law involves not only the 
promulgation of good laws that are in conformity with the provisions on human rights, but also a 
good judicial system, a good system of administration, and good management of the State 
apparatus.”103             
 The International Congress of Jurists at its 1959 Delhi meeting interpreted the rule of law 
as the responsibility of the judiciary and lawyers to protect the civil and political rights of 
individuals, and stated that it entails the upholding of human rights in administrative and 
criminal procedures. Further, human rights were not to be derogated using the excuse of 
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government security.
104
 In addition, the rule of law must facilitate the socioeconomic climate for 
individuals to fulfill their aspirations in dignity.
105
 The 1961 Lagos Conference on the Rule of 
Law distilled the rule of law to require a constitution freely adopted by citizens, which 
guarantees democratic representation and fundamental human rights.
106
 An independent judiciary 
is sine qua non for the existence of the rule of law and a free press promotes the rule of law to 
check authoritarian rule.
107
 An independent police institution is also crucial in the rule of law 
matrix.
108
    
 Political will of the ruling elite to promulgate just laws that regulate their conduct and 
respect for laws by the ruled have been recognized as vital to entrenching a rule of law culture.
109
 
This much was stated by the Nigerian Supreme Court in 1986, when in flagrant disregard of a 
court order that restrained the Lagos State government from evicting Odumegwu Ojukwu from 
his father’s house, Lagos State evicted him forcefully. The house had earlier been declared an 
abandoned property during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, when Odumegwu Ojukwu led 
the abortive eastern Nigerian secession attempt. The Supreme Court held that governments and 
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constituted authorities are bound and restrained by the laws of the land, and that failing this, 
anarchy would become the norm.
110
      
 Rule of law has also been problematic as a factor in the economic development literature 
on causality.
111
 The question is, does rule of law promote economic development, or is it 
economic development that leads to rule of law?
112
 British Department for International 
Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
development assistance bodies have expended millions of dollars on rule of law initiatives in 
Nigeria.
113
 The European Union is also involved in rule of law initiatives.
114
 The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) also recognizes the rule of law as one of vital 
ingredients of development.
115
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 The issue then is, if law can be employed to assist economic development, can law also 
assist in the improvement of accountability in public governance? I analyze the role of law in the 
improvement of accountability in public governance in chapters 4 and 5 dealing with 
socioeconomic jurisprudence at the international and domestic courts, respectively. Chapter 6 on 
socioeconomic jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court shows that the 
reasonableness test formula applied by the Court to the health-care, housing, and social security 
policies of the government resulted in improved accountability of socioeconomic policies of the 
South African government.          
 In the 1960s, the United States employed first-rate legal scholars from prominent law 
schools to work on a law and development project, wherein legal assistance would serve as a 
catalyst for socioeconomic development in the developing world. Disillusionment with the 
instrumentalist approach to law as a tool for social change set in among these scholars in the 
1970s.
116
 In the 1990s, the World Bank assimilated the rule of law as a tool to enable 
governments to become accountable and run more efficient development policies.
117
 The World 
Bank Annual Reports in 2003 and 2004 revealed that its rule of law projects in 100 countries had 
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gulped $3.8 billion since 1993.
118
 The foundation for the expenditure was laid in 1989, when it 
declared that:  
 It is not just the unpredictability of policies that discourages investment, but also the uncertainty 
about their interpretation and application by officials. This problem is exacerbated by the 
frequent lack of a reliable legal framework to enforce contracts. The rule of law needs to be 
established. In many instances this implies rehabilitation of the judicial system, independence for 
the judiciary, scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at every level of government, 
transparent accounting of public monies and independent public auditors responsible to a 
representative legislature, not to an executive. Independent institutions are necessary to ensure 
public accountability.
119
 
 The rule of law when properly observed is claimed to enable a virtuous circle of inclusive 
political governance.
120
 “Despite its origins in neoclassical thought, rule of law discourse has 
expanded over time to include a variety of alternative theoretical viewpoints.”121 Nigeria’s 
judiciary has strenuously upheld the rule of law, and it is one of the stabilizing features of 
existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria that aids accountability in governance.    
1.3. Separation of Powers  
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria divides governmental powers into 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers under Chapters V, VI, and VII. The powers of each 
branch of government are listed out in great detail. Separation of powers connotes a clear 
division of powers between the executive, the legislative, and judicial arms of government, with 
                                                          
118
 Santos, Alvaro, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in 
Trubek, David M and Santos, Avaros (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 253-300, at p.253, footnote 1. 
119
 The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1989), p.192. 
120
 “What’s more, the principle of the rule of law opens the door for greater participation in the political 
process and greater inclusivity, as it powerfully introduces the idea that people should be equal not only 
before the law but also in the political system. This was one of the principles that made it difficult for the 
British political system to resist the forceful calls for greater democracy throughout the nineteenth 
century, opening the way to the gradual extension of the franchise to all adults.” Acemoglu, Daron and 
Robinson, James A; Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2012), p. 333. 
121
 Thomas, Chantal, “Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory and Practice: Toward an 
Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, (May, 2011), p. 1002. 
36 
 
each arm independent of the other arms, but serving as checks and balances on one another.
122
 
The three branches do not exist in watertight compartments, and in the execution of their various 
functions they impact one another and influence policy outcomes that affect society.
123
   
 Montesquieu was one of the earliest exponents of the formula, which he gleaned from a 
misreading of the English constitutional model. He was influenced by John Locke’s 1690 
“Second Treatise on Government,” wherein Locke advocated monarchical dispensation of 
justice. Montesquieu, in his 1748 The Spirit of the Laws, stated that 
Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience 
shows us that every man invested with power is liable to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far 
as it will go.…To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the nature of things that one power 
should be a check on another.…When the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person or body…there can be no liberty.…Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is 
not separated from the legislative and the executive. There would be an end to everything if the 
same person or body, whether of the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all three powers.
124
   
 1.4. International and Domestic Bills of Rights                                
Another layer of accountability has been the international concern with human rights to make 
countries conform with a minimum threshold of human rights protection in the policies they 
formulate to administer their territories. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) epitomizes such concern. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) came into force on January 3, 1976, after the thirty-fifth country ratified the 
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treaty.
125
 The ICESCR and the UDHR in combination with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) are termed the “International Bill of Rights.”126     
 In Nigeria fundamental human rights were entrenched in the 1960, 1963, 1979, and 1999 
Constitutions. Chapter IV provisions on fundamental human rights of the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees the right to life.
127
 It also guarantees the right to 
dignity of the human person and prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
128
 The 
right to personal liberty is guaranteed.
129
 The right to fair hearing is also guaranteed by the 
Constitution.
130
 Other civil and political rights are also guaranteed by the Constitution.
131
   
1.5. Human Rights Commission                                
During the 1960s and up until the 1970s, the ombudsperson took root as an accountability 
mechanism all over Africa.
132
 “The 1990s saw the development of a new and potentially more 
significant institution, the Human Rights Commission (HRC).”133 In Nigeria the brutal dictator, 
General Sanni Abacha, established the Nigerian Human Rights Commission to deflect 
international criticisms of the appalling human rights record of his junta. The enabling 1995 Act 
was amended in 2011, after a six-year delay to make the Commission more independent. But the 
previous two executive secretaries were removed from office in June 2006 and March 2009, 
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respectively, before the end of their tenures, for being critical of government human rights 
violations.
134
   
 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, the current chairperson of the Nigerian Human Rights 
Commission, was invited by the Nigerian police to explain his comments made on March 5, 
2012, that the police in Nigeria “execute well over 2,500 detainees summarily every year.”135 
Fact Sheet No. 19, issued in April 1993 at Geneva by the United Nations, analyzed national 
institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, and it recognized that the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations first mooted the idea of such institutions in 
1946.  Fact Sheet No. 19 listed a number of functions of such national institutions, including the 
ombudsperson and human rights commission:   
Another important function of a human rights commission is systematically to review the 
government’s human rights policy in order to detect shortcomings in human rights 
observance and to suggest ways of improving it. Human rights commissions may also 
monitor the State’s compliance with its own and with international human rights laws and 
if necessary, recommend changes. The ability of a commission to initiate enquiries on its 
own behalf is an important measure of its overall strength and probable effectiveness. 
This is particularly true in regard to situations which involve persons or groups who do 
not have the financial or social resources to lodge individual complaints.
136
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The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) was created in May 
1986.
137
 The Committee has essentially played the norm-clarification role, explaining possible 
consequences of the CESR-proposed socioeconomic rights. Alston, a former chairman of the 
Committee has elaborated upon the norm clarification of the Committee.
138
 The Committee’s 
General Comment 10, issued on December 1, 1998, clarified the role of national human rights 
institutions in the realization of human rights, including socioeconomic rights. Such a role entails 
the promotion and protection of human rights through educating the judiciary, private sector, 
public sector, and labor movements on socioeconomic rights, as well as evaluating whether 
domestic legislation and administrative policies are in tandem with the provisions of the 
CESCR.
139
 “Unfortunately, this role has too often either not been accorded to the institution or 
has been neglected or given a low priority by it. It is therefore essential that full attention be 
given to economic, social and cultural rights in all of the relevant activities of these 
institutions.”140 This is a vital point that has not been well addressed in the human rights 
literature, and national human rights institutions, including the Nigerian one, have focused on 
violations of civil and political rights, and neglected socioeconomic rights violations, except in 
housing eviction matters. 
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1.6. Transparency in Governance 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria’s current finance minister, who occupied the same position from 
2003 to 2006, introduced transparency into government accounts by publishing monthly 
disbursements to local, state, and federal ministries in newspapers, so that relevant 
constituencies would know the revenue profile under the control of their elected legislators, 
local government chairmen, and state governors.
141
 In addition, she made sure Nigeria became 
the first country to sign on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
142
 
Transparency in governance also goes a long way in making institutions accountable to the 
governed. The Economic Commission of West African States, of which Nigeria is a member, 
incorporated the concept in its 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Government, which 
states that “Member States undertake to fight corruption and manage their national resources in 
a transparent manner, ensuring that they are equitably distributed.”143  The latest tool in the 
transparency field has been the use of the Internet, to make the myriad of governance policy 
decisions accessible to members of the public with access to the Internet. This has been more 
pronounced in the north, but it is also catching up in the south. Services have been offered via 
the World Wide Web, or the net, cutting the red tape of bureaucracies worldwide.
144
 The 
Freedom of Information Act in various jurisdictions has also been employed, by civil society 
especially the press, to enhance transparency in public governance accountability.   
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1.7. Freedom of the Press 
Freedom of the press is a vital component of the accountability matrix. The 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees the right to freedom of expression and the press 
under section 39 of Chapter IV provisions on justiciable fundamental human rights.
145
  A free 
press amplifies the ability of civil society to make informed demands upon governance 
mechanisms in society.
146
 A virile press also amplifies struggles of civil groups in society aimed 
at influencing input and outcome processes of government policies that have a bearing on 
poverty alleviation.
147
 It took eight years of civil society advocacy for the Freedom of 
Information Act in Nigeria to become law on May 28, 2011.
 148
 This should enhance the role of 
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the Nigerian press, which has for almost a century played a critical role in ensuring transparency 
in colonial and postcolonial governance.                  
1.8. Fiscal Measures of Attaining Accountability in the Expenditure of Public Funds in 
Nigeria             
The Public Procurement Act Number 14 of 2007 came into effect on June 4, 2007, and the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act Number 31 of 2007 came into effect on July 30, 2007. Both 
enactments address the root causes of the lack of accountability in the management of public 
revenues in Nigeria, by political officeholders in leadership positions. President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua, on June 4, 2007, signed the Public Procurement Bill into law, after it had been 
passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, on May 17, 2007 and 
on May 30, 2007.
149
  In July 2007 President Yar’Adua signed the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(FRA) into law, and the statute established the Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC).
150
 
1.8.1. The Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007
151
                     
Section 1 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) estasblished the Fiscal Responsibility 
Commission, which is saddled under section 3 with certain functions. It shall, according to 
section 3: 
a.  Monitor and enforce the provisions of this Act and by so doing, promote the economic 
objectives in section 16 of the Constitution; 
b. Disseminate such standard practices including international good practice that will result 
in greater efficiency in the allocation and management of public expenditure, revenue 
collection, debt control and transparency in fiscal matters; 
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c. Undertake fiscal and financial studies, analysis and diagnosis and disseminate the result 
to the general public; 
d. Make rules for carrying out its functions under the Act; and 
e. Perform any other function consistent with the promotion of the objectives of this Act. 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act states that the Commission shall be independent in the fulfillment 
of its functions.
152
 Section 5 of the enabling act provides for: 
a. A chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive and accounting officer of the 
Commission; 
b. One member representing: i. The organized private sector, ii. Civil Society engaged in 
causes relating to probity, transparency and good governance, iii Organized labor 
c. A representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance of a level not below the rank of a 
director; and  
d. One member to represent each of the following six geographical zones of the country, 
that is North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East, South-West, and South-
South. 
This is in contrast to the eighteen-member American version announced by President Barack 
Obama on February 18, 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 
designed to lapse thirty days after the submission of its report on December 1, 2010. Its 
composition stipulated that there shall be 
a. Six members appointed by the President, not more than four of whom shall be from the 
same political party. 
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b. Three members selected by the Majority Leader of the Senate, all of whom shall be 
current Members of the Senate; 
c. Three members selected by the Minority Leader of the Senate, all of whom shall be 
current Members of the Senate; and 
d. Three Members selected by the Minority leader of the House of Representatives, all of 
whom shall be current Members of the House of Representatives.
153
  
Getting back to the permanent Nigerian Commission, no member of civil society known for 
championing good governance, transparency, and accountability in governance can be a board 
member.  Members of the commission are supposed to be persons of proven integrity with ten 
years of experience postgraduation. The president is empowered to appoint the chairperson and 
board members subject to Senate’s confirmation. Appointees from the six geographical areas of 
Nigeria and the chairman are full-time members of the board who will serve for only five years 
in a single term.            
 On April 14, 2009, the late President Yar’Adua inaugurated the board and declared that  
Fiscal responsibility is essential to creating a better, stronger, more prosperous nation for the next 
generation….It is important to remind you that our nation’s economic future and fiscal 
responsibility are directly linked. There is a tie between fiscal responsibility and financial 
prudence today and what society can enjoy tomorrow. Facing up to both the short and long-term 
fiscal challenges, therefore, will help put the nation on a path to lasting prosperity and a rising 
standard of living. If on the other hand, we fail to quickly address the preponderance of fiscal 
inefficiencies and wasteful spending in our systems, we will squander the only opportunity to get 
our finances in order, and I charge you not to afford to do that.
154
    
  In 2009, the Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC), during the conduct of its 
oversight functions under section 30(1) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) evaluated the 
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three-month periodic Budget Implementation Reports the minister of finance was mandated to 
submit to it. The FRC discovered that only 361.20 billion Nigerian naira (NGN), got utilized out 
of 796.92 billion naira budgeted for capital projects.
155
 This amounted to 45.32 percent 
performance on the part of the federal government of Nigeria in the implementation of capital 
projects in vital socioeconomic areas like poverty alleviation, education, and health care.
156
 
 In the next chapter, I demonstrate that this legislation has been ineffective in addressing 
the accountability deficit in public governance in Nigeria. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria’s 
finance minister, explained that the Fiscal Responsibility Act was copied from Brazil’s fiscal 
federalism model, and in 2012 on her second tour of duty as finance minister, she regretted that: 
“Unfortunately, by the time the bill was passed and signed into law, near the end of 2007, state 
governments had watered down some of the provisions they found restrictive, using 
constitutional-related arguments.”157    
1.8.2. The Public Procurement Act
158
   
A veritable means of stealing public revenues in Nigeria has been through the award of highly 
inflated contracts, shoddily executed contracts, and the use of substandard construction materials. 
The Public Procurement Act was heralded as an attempt to curb the use of public contracts to 
steal public revenue.  Section 1 of the Public Procurement Act established a National Council on 
Public Procurement, whose membership consists of: 
a. the Minister of Finance as Chairman 
b. the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice of the Federation 
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c. the Secretary to the Government of the Federation 
d. the Head of Service of the Federation 
e. the Economic Adviser to the President 
f. six part-time members to represent the Nigeria Institute of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, the Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, Nigerian Society of Engineers, Civil 
Society, the Media and the Director-General of the Bureau who shall be the Secretary of 
the Council          
Section 3 of the Act enacted the Bureau of Public Procurement, while section 4 of the Act lays 
out its objectives among others as “the harmonization of existing government policies and 
practices on public procurement and ensuring probity, accountability and transparency in the 
procurement process, the establishment of pricing standards and benchmarks…”  Section 5 of 
the Act enumerates its functions to create a database of federal contractors, and formulate 
policies and guidelines on public sector procurement. In addition, it serves to certify contracts 
and prevent fraud, as well as publicize its activities to the public.    
 The Bureau of Public Procurement claimed that it helped to save over two billion dollars 
during the 2007 to 2010 fiscal years and that it has filed eleven cases at the Federal High Court 
relating to fraudulent procurement transactions.
159
 But contrary to the terms of the Public 
Procurement Act, the National Council on Public Procurement has not been constituted to 
replace the Federal Executive Council of ministers, which currently awards contracts on behalf 
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of the federal government of Nigeria.
160
 This demonstrates the lack of political will of the ruling 
political elite to surrender contracts awards to a transparent process and focus on the formulation 
progressive policies. Clearly, the award of contract procedures that directly implicate 
socioeconomic policies of government need to be more transparent and less opaque to achieve 
efficient use of resources.                
1.9. New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
In July 2001, in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, the Organization for African Unity adopted the 
New African Initiative (NAI) document; in October 2001, it was transformed into the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the inaugural meeting of its implementation 
committee in Abuja, Nigeria.
161
 The document identified colonialism, corruption, inept 
leadership, and Cold War politics as the root causes for unaccountable governments across 
Africa.
162
 It promoted African development as an empowering process in self-reliance: “Africans 
must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own 
sustained upliftment.”163 NEPAD prides itself in being an African-owned and -managed 
transformation agenda for the Continent.     
 The long-term objectives of NEPAD are the eradication of poverty, and sustainable 
development and growth to stop African marginalization in a globalizing world.
164
 NEPAD’s 
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adopted the United Nations 2015 Millennium Development Goals.
165
 In order to achieve the 
lofty objectives and goals of NEPAD, African leaders are enjoined among a litany of 
responsibilities, to promote and protect “democracy and human rights in their respective 
countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and 
participatory governance at the national and subnational levels.”166 NEPAD has eight guiding 
principles of which the second aims to promote and protect human rights, democracy, and good 
governance.
167
 NEPAD operated as a program of the African Union up until January 2010, to 
realize the objectives of Africa’s development as well as facilitate African and regional 
integration, but in February 2010, NEPAD was incorporated into the AU structure as the 
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency.
168
        
 In January 2011, NEPAD adopted the National Resource Governance Program “based on 
a socio-economic assumption that the livelihoods of the poor would be enhanced through good 
governance of Africa’s natural resources.”169 Good governance is a core principle of NEPAD 
required for sustainable development.
170
 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is 
geared toward attaining “good governance and accountability in Africa.”171 It is premised on 
voluntary submission of African countries to a review process by fellow countries based on 
certain parameters of good governance.  
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a prime and credible model for good 
governance. A voluntary and novel monitoring instrument and direct offshoot of the AU 
Declaration, currently 31 AU member states have acceded to the Mechanism and opened up their 
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governance systems for review. The APRM focuses on four facets of governance, namely: 
Democracy and Political Governance; Economic Governance and Management; Corporate 
Governance; and Socio-economic Development. The mechanism is both a peer pressure on 
leadership and a shared learning of best practices in government among countries in order to 
accelerate progress towards Democracy and Good Political Governance that touch on the rule of 
law and equality of all before the law; individual and collective freedoms and the inalienable 
rights of individuals to participate in the choice of those who govern them.
172
  
NEPAD has a very narrow base in Nigerian civil society, with only a section of the media and a 
tiny percentage of intellectuals conversant with its activities.
173
 It enjoyed much publicity within 
the federal government of Nigeria, particularly under the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo.
174
  
  Civil society has a vital role to play in the APRM of NEPAD to entrench accountability 
in public governance in African countries, because a crucial weakness of the APRM mechanism 
is its voluntary nature.
175
 The 2008 APRM country review of Nigeria observed widespread 
poverty in spite of abundant government revenues; with 54 percent of the population living on 
less than $1 per day, and most Nigerians lacking access to potable water, electricity, and basic 
necessities of life.
176
 “It is the contention of the APR Panel that the lack of effective policy and 
programme implementation in Nigeria can be explained principally by the lack of strong political 
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will, coupled with weak accountability mechanisms.”177 Its report also established ineffective 
policies to tackle high infant and maternal mortality rates as well as chronic hunger, making the 
realization of the Millennium Development Goals of 2015 a tall order.
178
 It is very instructive to 
note that the country report recommended: “The enhancement of judicial enforcement of social, 
economic and cultural rights, as well as the right to development and the right to an environment 
conducive to health and development be part of the envisaged new Constitution.”179              
Conclusion                                   
The mechanisms of accountability like the rule of law, separation of powers, among others 
existing in Nigeria have been assimilated into Nigeria’s legal system. International measures, 
such as NEPAD and the international bill of rights have also been embraced. Legislative 
enactments such as the 2007 enactments of the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the Public 
Procurement Act also permeate the legal system, ostensibly to improve accountability in public 
governance in Nigeria.   
 On the whole, the various mechanisms of accountability discussed in this chapter suffuse 
the administrative mechanism of the Nigerian state, but in reality, there are gaps in the 
accountability process. In the next chapter, I analyze the accountability deficit of public 
governance in Nigeria, and I identify gaps in the public governance accountability process 
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leading to massive hemorrhaging of public resources that could have been utilized in 
implementing socioeconomic policies in the areas of education and health care.   
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                                              CHAPTER TWO        
                   NIGERIA’S ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT                                          
2.0. Introduction                          
The Chapter II provisions on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that “sovereignty belongs to the people of 
Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives all its powers and 
authority.”180 Chapter II further states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the 
primary purpose of government.”181 It then states that “The State shall abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuse of power.”182  In this chapter, using concrete examples, I show that these 
objectives have not been realized, and I prove conclusively that the accountability deficit in 
public governance in Nigeria is monumental.       
 Section 2.1 maps out the role of the military in the creation of an unaccountable Nigerian 
State reflected in military coups and the plunging into an abyss of a devastating civil war that 
resulted in over a million deaths. Section 2.2 embarks on an analysis of Nigeria’s health-care 
data, and section 2.3 analyzes data from the education sector in Nigeria; both sectors reveal a 
dire and desperate situation. Section 2.4 analyzes and conclusively proves the deleterious effects 
of corruption on socioeconomic rights in Nigeria. Section 2.5 contains case studies of the 
accountability profiles of some Nigerian state governors, and the comprehensive financial data 
analyzed conclusively shows that billions of dollars of oil revenues still get stolen yearly in 
Nigeria. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 examine two American cases, SEC v. Halliburton and KBR and 
United States of America v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft; prosecuted by the Securities and 
                                                          
180
 Section 14(2)(a) 
181
 Section 14 (2)(b) 
182
 Section 15(5) 
53 
 
Exchange Commission in the United States, these cases pertain to the negative impact of 
multinationals bribing the political leadership in Nigeria in order to win multibillion dollars 
contracts. I prove conclusively with content data analysis of the health and education sectors in 
Nigeria that socioeconomic policies of the Nigerian government are not accountable.    
 This dissertation argues that greater accountability in political governance will 
ameliorate the grim figures churned out in the past decade about the precarious nature of daily 
life for most Nigerians. British colonial authorities acceded to autochthonous wishes in 1954 to 
introduce a federal structure in Nigeria, which reached its glorious period from independence on 
October 1, 1960, to January 15, 1966, when the military aborted true federalism by commencing 
the series of bloody coups that plunged Nigeria into war from 1967 to 1970.
183
 Lawmaking is 
not a neutral exercise; it is embedded within the cauldron of competing socioeconomic forces 
and the forces that attain political power formulate laws to concretize their ideological beliefs.                          
2.1. The Role of the Military in the Creation of an Unaccountable Nigerian State                
Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960, with a parliamentary form of government akin 
to the British model, but with a federal structure unlike the British unitary format. Nigeria was 
comprised of three regions and a national parliament based in Lagos. This period was the golden 
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era of Nigerian history, when healthy rivalry to develop social infrastructure existed between the 
governments of the different regions. The Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria was established in the 
north and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was set in the east, while the west established the 
University of Ife.
184
    They were all focused on attracting the best scholars from all over the 
world and sending their best products to world-class universities for doctorate degrees in keeping 
“an international academic gold standard.”185 Five years into military rule and the civil war had a 
negative effect on the development of social infrastructure, including university education.
186
 
The legacy of military dictatorship for twenty-eight years out of fifty years of independence 
accentuated the creation of an unaccountable Nigerian state.
187
      
 Socioeconomic goods featured prominently in the few years after Nigerian 
independence―the political parties and their leaders were in a hurry to build schools,188 roads, 
and hospitals, and to industrialize the economy; all the things that Britain, the former colonial 
power, refused to do.
189
 By the time Britain left Nigeria, only the University of Ibadan existed as 
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a college of the University of London. This was at best an attempt to check American influence 
in its colonies.
190
 Obafemi Awolowo, in the thoughts he expressed on the Nigerian 
constitution,
191
 placed a great premium on education and health care, which he implemented 
during his tenure as the first indigenous premier of Western Nigeria, with funds from taxes and 
cocoa exports. He stated that “the rights to education and health are among the fundamental 
rights which each family regarded―and properly so―as inalienable.”192    
 Awolowo was the foremost Nigerian exponent of the right to free education at all levels 
in Nigeria.
193
 In his words, as the Nigerian finance minister: “The issue of free education is about 
the most controversial subject in Nigeria today. Perhaps the main cause of this controversy is that 
I happen to be the chief advocate of education at all levels.”194 He was also unrepentant about 
both the provision of clean pipe-borne water and a national minimum wage to create a well-
nourished citizenry in order to prevent ill-health.
195
 Awolowo believed that the provision of 
health care and education were among the key requirements an underdeveloped country needed 
to secure economic freedom to become prosperous.
196
 “Health facilities do not consist in the 
provisions of hospitals alone. They embrace the whole compass of preventive medical facilities, 
good food, good water, decent housing and a clean and wholesome environment.”197   
 The Nigerian state was held hostage by the military that ruled from 1966 to 1999, with 
an interlude of civilian rule from 1979 to 1983. Nigeria has failed to recover from the first coup 
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d’état of January 15, 1966.198 The coup d’état eventually resulted in the northern-led July 1966, 
countercoup, which resulted in a civil war from 1967 to 1970.
199
 The regime of Lieutenant 
Colonel Yakubu Gowon started with earnings of about £170 million in 1966/67 fiscal year, and 
by 1974/75, earnings rose to N5514.7 million,
200
 which was the equivalent of over $10 
billion.
201
 The stupendous increase in revenue did not lead to improvement in the quality of life 
of the average Nigerian, and the social infrastructure crumbled.
202
     
 The Gowon regime institutionalized corruption among military officers in government 
positions, so much so that ten out of twelve state governors were discovered to have amassed 
millions of dollars from public coffers,
203
 as discovered by the regime of General Muritala 
Mohammed, who paid with his life on February 13, 1976 for having the audacity to carry out 
such a probe.
204
   Between 1976 and 1986, at least $10-billion oil revenues were salted abroad 
by the Nigerian leadership.
205
   I will analyze in the following two sections the public health 
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worsening domestic inflationary situation (estimated to be rising at over 34 per cent per annum).  
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care and public education sectors in Nigeria listed under Chapter II provisions on Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.                                                       
2.2. Nigerian Health-Care Data Analysis                                      
The social objectives contained under Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria stipulates “adequate medical and health facilities for all 
persons.”206In 1988, a national health policy was decreed by the military aimed at achieving 
health care for all Nigerians, and this policy was revised in 2004 to provide through a functional 
referral system, primary, secondary, and tertiary health-care access for all Nigerians.
207
 In 2000, 
the World Health Organization ranked Nigeria 187 out of 191 other countries in its World Health 
Report.
208
 “Through a series of national development plans and annual budgets, modest progress 
was made, in the past. Over the past decade however, there have been major reversals on the 
gains of the health sector. Childhood immunization plummeted and life expectancy reportedly 
dropped to mid-40-years. Unfortunately, the strides in the sector have been much too slow. The 
country is largely challenged in achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.”209    
 The foregoing statement by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Health was a candid 
admission of the dire straits of the health status of most Nigerians. In 2010, 75 babies died out of 
1,000 live births, and 157 infants out of 1,000 children died before the age of five in Nigeria.
210
 
The maternal mortality ratio was 545 per 100,000 women, and only 37 percent of women who 
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gave birth in Nigeria had access to trained medical assistance.
211
 Nigeria’s health plan, 
formulated in the 2001 Abuja declaration, was to achieve a budgetary increase of 15 percent to 
the health sector, but by November 2010, budgetary allocation was “far below the 15% Abuja 
declaration which was signed by the Nigerian government.”212 Even the available budgetary 
allocation to the health sector at the “Local and state governments also demonstrate a critical 
lack of accountability.”213           
 The health-care financial burden of the average Nigerian in 2005 was 68.6 percent and in 
Northern Nigeria it was as high as 86 percent.
214
 The health-care infrastructure in Nigeria is in a 
precarious position; medical personnel perform a yeoman’s job on a daily basis trying to salvage 
the situation and offer succor to teeming patients. There are inadequate pharmacists, nurses, 
doctors, biochemists, nutritionists, and health technicians among the vast array of basic and 
necessary skills needed in a functional health-care program. Doctors in 2010, were 39,210 in 
number; nurses were 124,629; and midwives numbered 88, 796.
215
  Primary health care, on 
which most Nigerians, depend is bedeviled with inadequate medications, irregular payment of 
workers’ salaries, inadequate data and record keeping, and lack of capacity on the part of health-
care providers, as medical personnel are concentrated in urban areas.
216
 This reality is 
compounded by endemic poverty in Nigeria.
217
  
 Potable water supply to facilitate safe drinking water and sanitation to prevent outbreak 
of diseases is scarce. Yet Nigeria is blessed with abundant raw water that can be treated and 
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piped as potable water all year round. States and local government complain of highly irregular 
electricity to power inadequate and aging water treatment plants. The Integrated Early Childhood 
Development (IECD) policy on preventive health-care education for infants is laudable. It 
promotes a health culture of illness prevention among infants form zero- to three-year-old 
infants. “This implies the involvement of several service delivery sectors, such as health, water 
and environmental sanitation and nutrition agencies. At the care centres catering for children in 
the 0-3 years age group, caregivers are expected to receive as much training as possible from 
these agencies.”218 The policy is still in its infancy, and its impact is yet to be felt. “However, the 
child friendly school concept, which UNICEF is advocating for, is not comprehensively adopted 
by the various States in Nigeria. A majority of primary schools, especially in rural areas lack 
water, electricity and toilet facilities. For example, on average, there is only one toilet for 600 
pupils in the primary school system.” 219 In 2010, 84 percent of Nigerians earned less than $2 per 
day; life expectancy was fifty-one years.
220
        
 The 2012 figures from the office of the Ministry of Health indicate that 1 million out of 
5.3 million children born yearly in Nigeria die before they attain five years of age. Every day, 
528 newborn babies die in Nigeria, and annually 53,000 women die from childbirth or pregnancy 
complications in Nigeria, at the rate of 800 women per 100,000 who give birth. A data analysis 
of the maternal mortality rate in Nigeria indicates that the rate in the southwest is 165 per 
100,000, while in the northeast it is a mind-boggling 1,549 per 100,000. It is 1,026 in the 
northwest and 268 in the southeast.  The mortality rate of children under five years per 1,000 in 
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the northwest is 269, in the northeast 260, the southwest 176, and the southeast 103. The Health 
Ministry recommended affordable health-care access improvement and supply of skilled medical 
personnel, particularly in the rural areas, and provision of potable water and sanitation at the 
states and local government levels.
221
 The above figures indicate that Nigeria still has one of the 
worst maternal, newborn, and infant mortality rates in the world.      
 There are now belated efforts to meet the fourth and fifth of the United Nations 
Millennium Developments Goals of 2015,by facilitating child mortality reduction and maternal 
health improvement under a Nigerian National Integrated Maternal Newborn and Child Health 
Strategy.
222 
On November 5, 2002, Nigeria flagged of the National Food and Nutrition Policy to 
reduce iodine deficiency syndrome by half in 2010, and this was achieved.
223
 This shows that 
change is possible in Nigeria, as evidenced by 97 percent of Nigerians who now consume 
iodized salt.
224
 Iodine deficiency causes infant mortality, still birth, learning difficulties, 
cretinism, and miscarriage.
225
   
 “While progress towards achievement of health-related MDGS is still constrained by the 
limited national health system capacity, the recent efforts of the government at removing these 
bottlenecks need to be appreciated. The Federal Government has played a key role in facilitating 
developments at state level, particularly through the policy dialogue that has taken place at the 
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National Council of Health and through ministerial advocacy visits to the states.”226 In 2011, 
7.51 percent of the government expenditure went into health care.
227
 Adequate nutrition 
promotes good health, and on the average urban dwellers spend 70 percent of home expenses on 
food, while rural dwellers spend 75percent.
228
 Poverty contributes to the problem, as the ability 
to afford adequate nutrition promotes good health.  A constitutionally enforceable right to health 
care will subject government’s health policies to judicial scrutiny and will prod government 
policy-makers to formulate sound and effective health policies that will likely survive litigation 
challenges, or even be favorably accepted by the public.  
2.3. Nigeria’s Education Sector Analysis                     
The educational objectives contained under Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria stipulates that “Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring 
that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.”229 In furtherance of this 
policy on education, the Nigerian government enacted the Compulsory Free Universal Basic 
Education Act in May 2004, and it came into force on May 26, 2004.  Section 2 of the 
Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Act states that: “Every Government in Nigeria shall 
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provide free, compulsory and universal education for every child of primary and junior 
secondary school age. Every parent shall ensure that his child or ward attends and completes his 
primary school education; and junior secondary education.”  Section 3 of the Act provides that 
“services provided in public primary and junior secondary schools shall be free of charge,” and 
“a person who receives or obtains any fee contrary to the provisions subsection(1) of this section 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N10,000 or imprisonment 
for a term of three months or to both.” Section 4 of the Act provides that: “every parent shall 
ensure that his child receives full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude by 
regular attendance at school.”          
 Education is on the concurrent list of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, which includes 36 states and 774 local governments. This implies that both the federal 
and state governments can provide for primary, secondary, and tertiary education. There has 
been lack of coordination between the states and federal government in policy formulation and 
implementation in the operation of the educational objectives of the Constitution.
230
 In 2004, 
education had a share of 10.5 percent of the federal budget.
231
 In 2009, Nigeria’s education 
sector percentage of the federal budget was 7 percent and it decreased to 6.5 percent in 2010.
232
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 Nigerian universities require about 50,000 lecturers but only 30,342 are available.
233
 This 
problem is compounded by brain drain, which negatively impacts the quality of pedagogy.
234
 
According to the startling confession of the director of Tertiary Education at the Nigerian Federal 
Ministry of Education, the quality of data on higher education in Nigeria is unreliable, 
politicized, and in dire need of transparency.
235
 Revenue allocation permutations by local and 
states governments has colored data presentation in Nigeria.  “One of the critical issues affecting 
the quality of data relates to the political use to which data has been put over the years…Most 
state and local governments have multiple versions of data and decide which to 
present―depending on perception of its use.”236          
 Infant education from ages zero to three years old, the foundation of all learning, is not 
provided for under the Nigerian 2004 Universal Basic Education Act. A UNESCO publication 
on Nigeria, titled  “Early Childhood Care and Education” (ECCE) has rightly stated that this is a 
grave omission.
237
 Even the 2003 Nigerian Child Rights Act is silent on the above category of 
infant education. The Integrated Early Childhood Development (IECD) policy to remedy this 
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omission is still evolving.
238
 Nigeria’s population growth has remained high, resulting in 45 
percent of the country’s population being under the age of fifteen. Children are mandated by the 
2004 Universal Basic Education Act to be enrolled in primary school from ages six to eleven, but 
in 2005, 40 percent of them were not in school. Enrollments in primary schools have ironically 
increased over the years, but recruitment of teachers and provision of additional classrooms has 
not kept pace. This has led to overstretched facilities and overworked teachers. In some cases a 
teacher might teach a hundred children under trees due to inadequate classrooms.   
 A number of parents cannot afford the cost of textbooks and uniforms for their children 
as well as transportation to very distant schools. “Despite political commitment to trying to 
reverse years of neglect in the education sector and a significant increase of the Federal funding, 
investment in basic education is still low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries. For all these 
reasons, prospects of Nigeria achieving Education For All by 2015 remain frail.”239 In 2005, only 
56.7 percent of all Nigerians were literate.
240
 According to UNESCO, as of 2010, 42 percent of 
children in Nigeria between the ages of six to eleven were not enrolled in primary schools. Fifty-
five percent of girls and 60 percent of boys from ages six to eleven were enrolled in primary 
schools. In addition, 61percent of adults and 72 percent of the youth were literate.
241
   
 In 2007, about 20 percent of girls in northwestern and northeastern Nigeria attended 
primary school, which meant about 5 million girls between the ages of six and eleven were not in 
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school.
242
  UNESCO Education for All (EFA) profile on Nigeria in 2012 revealed that an 
astonishing 10.1 million children were not attending primary school and 26 percent of enrolled 
primary school pupils drop out. More alarming is the fact that almost 30percent of the youth 
cannot read and write properly. Forty million Nigerian adults can neither read nor write.  
 The 2012 EPA profile on Nigeria revealed that population growth and increase in 
enrollment figures at all levels of education impacted negatively “in ensuring quality education 
and satisfactory learning achievements as resources are spread more thinly.”243 This is also 
compounded by relatively low budgetary allocation to the education sector in spite of billions of 
dollars of oil and tax revenues generated annually by the Nigerian state. In 2008 only 2.9 percent 
of public spending was incurred on education.
244
 From 2004 to 2013, the UBE scheme envisaged 
the addition of 40,000 teachers annually for the first nine years of basic education, “to cope with 
the massive increase in enrolment as well as quality delivery of instruction and quality 
learning.”245 The education sector in Nigeria will be greatly assisted if education is vested with 
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constitutional enforcement as a fundamental right. This will allow litigants to subject Nigeria’s 
public education policies to judicial scrutiny within Nigeria and lead to the formulation of 
efficient but accountable policies on education in Nigeria.    
2.4. The Impact of Corruption on Socioeconomic Rights in Nigeria        
Nigeria earned at least $300 billion from oil revenues between 1982 and 2007, and poverty is 
still the lot of most Nigerians.
246
 Corruption has significantly hindered Nigeria’s socioeconomic 
growth and its citizens’ prosperity.247 Nigeria ranked 154 out of 179 countries evaluated in the 
2008 Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme; which 
was released on December 18, 2008.
248
  Nigeria ranked 156 out of 187 countries in the 2011 
HDI.
249
 Why do the majority of Nigerians continue to wallow in abject poverty, with the gains of 
the early years of independence reversed? The answer could be because of the conservative 
estimate of $380 billion claimed to have been lost to corruption and waste between 1960 and 
1999, according to Nuhu Ribadu, the former head of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC).
250
 Corruption has had a corrosive effect on accountable governance in 
Nigeria.
251
  The military ruled Nigeria from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1999, and oil 
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revenues were massively looted by its generals.
252
        
 The assumption of office of retired General Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, under the 
transitional civilian experiment to representative democracy raised a lot of hope about probity 
and accountability. This was due to the fact that Obasanjo had been actively involved in the 
global anticorruption movement as a member of the advisory board of Transparency 
International
253
 during the preceding years, and was earlier incarcerated by the kleptocratic 
General Abacha. These hopes were dashed from 1999 to 2007, with the brazen ostentatious 
display of wealth by “elected officials” from local government to state and national levels of 
government.            
 The influence of the czars of corruption led to the movement in 2006 of Finance Minister 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the Foreign Affairs Ministry and her resignation from government.
254
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Smugglers were also known to be very influential within the Obasanjo regime.
255
 President 
Obasanjo, according to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, was even lukewarm about reformation of the most 
corrupt government agency in Nigeria, the Nigerian Customs Service, despite having initially 
backed the use of a British company, Crown Agent, which had proven expertise in customs 
reforms.
256
 It is conservatively estimated by Western diplomats with access to classified financial 
intelligence reports that “Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4billion to $8billion per year to 
corruption over the eight years of the Obasanjo administration.”257 Government at all levels 
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range of customs reforms identified by both the first and second Obasanjo Presidential Task Forces on 
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Crown Agents in the pursuit of the above listed activities are not to take over the activities of the Nigerian 
Customs Sevice but to work in close collaboration with the NCS personnel with the aim of strengthening 
the Service.” I had just completed my presentation of the memo to the cabinet when seven hands shot up 
and cabinet member after cabinet member took the floor to criticize the memo and say it was unworkable, 
an unnecessary expense for consultants and so on. Based on this attack on the memo, the president 
concluded the discussion by saying that opposition within cabinet was such that the approvals sought 
within the memo could not be given and the memo should be withdrawn. It was a dramatic and painful 
end to an important set of reforms, and the only time I presented a memo to cabinet and failed to get it 
through. It was no less painful when I discovered later that the attack on the memo in the cabinet meeting 
had been carefully planned and orchestrated. This orchestration was carried out by some of the powerful 
forces within government and society, whose vested interests would be damaged by a reformed Customs 
Service.”  Ibid, at pp. 70-71. 
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refused to perform such basic constitutional roles as road repairs, elemental health care,  power 
generation, and maintaining primary and secondary schools despite huge unprecedented 
revenues.
258
  
 Former President Obasanjo, his vice president, Atiku Abubakar, and ministers established 
their own private universities while the federal universities were starved of funds. Hospitals 
became consulting clinics, also starved of funds and dependent on charitable nongovernmental 
organizations or United Nations outfits like UNICEF, WHO, and UNDP. The philosophy of 
Obasanjo’s cabinet was a vaunted disdain and destruction of public institutions, so that their 
private educational and health-care enterprises could make profits. In 2003, a watershed event 
took place when the acting auditor-general of the Federation published an audited account of 
federal ministries that revealed a huge misappropriation of almost N24 billion. The official was 
dismissed from service.
259
 Public uproar eventually led to his dismissal being commuted to 
retirement so that he could access his pension.   
 Power utilities have virtually collapsed despite $16 billion spent on power generation by 
the Obasanjo administration, it has since come to light that a great degree of fraud was involved 
in the process.
260
 One of the largest multinational firms that operated for over forty years in 
Nigeria, Michelin, had to shut down its huge plant in Port Harcourt due to enormous overheads 
incurred on generating its own power, and another major tire company, Dunlop has cut losses in 
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the past five years due to power constraints.
261
 It finally stopped production in 2009 and 
disengaged thousands of workers. Power goes off for a whole week at times and comes on for a 
few minutes or a few hours when available, despite compulsory monthly maintenance fees, in 
addition to charges for actual electricity consumption. The collapse of the power sector is 
reflected in the N1.022 trillion Nigerians spend annually on diesel to power their generating 
plants in order to keep their businesses running.
262
        
 Twenty-five percent of Nigeria’s gross domestic product has been lost to corruption.263 It 
is symptomatic of lack of accountability in public finances and “governance failure.”264  
Corruption remains a big problem in Nigeria:    
The organization of the Nigerian state has fostered corruption and rent distribution in ways that 
are detrimental to economic development. Weak central authorities are generally unable to 
exercise surveillance of state organizations or personnel. With no accountability to a clear 
principal, state agents have a permissive setting for corrupt activities and few injunctions to 
provide official services. This has resulted in multiple, competitive pressures for corruption and 
rents, along with the theft of state resources and the neglect of formal duties…Not only are 
public agencies arbitrary and venal, but they do not deliver effective outputs and are not held to 
standards of performance. Rather than confronting the problems of state weakness, governing 
elites have commonly utilized these conditions as an expedient means of distribution.
265
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2.5. Case Studies of the Accountability Profiles of Some Nigerian State Governors   
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009 Report, identified the raison 
d’être for socioeconomic rights implementation to be improving the quality of human life,266 and 
identified states’ budgets as a veritable tool for measuring the progressive realization of 
socioeconomic rights.
267
 General Comment 14,fourteen, issued on August 11, 2000, expounded 
upon the normative contents of Article 12 of the CESCR on the right to health.
268
 It clarified the 
difference between indicators that reflect achievement levels as opposed to benchmarks laying 
out targets for countries in light of their peculiar circumstances.
269
 “Having identified appropriate 
right to health indicators, States parties are invited to set appropriate national benchmarks in 
relation to each indicator.”270        
 Indicators and benchmarks reflect the seriousness of political leadership in meeting the 
socioeconomic needs of their constituencies.
271
 Hence, it becomes tragic when some Nigerian 
state governors steal billions of dollars of public revenues meant for socioeconomic development 
for their impoverished populace who pay taxes regularly.     
 The former governor of Edo State, Lucky Igbinedion, was tried for stealing N2.9 billion, 
and he was fined N3.5 million, while his company was fined N500 million for fraudulent 
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conduct during his eight-year term of office as the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)governor.272 
Bode George, a deputy chairman of the PDP was convicted in October 2009 over a N100 billion 
contract splitting scam.
273
 “Bode George was released from prison in February 2011. Far from 
being treated as a pariah because of his misdeeds, he was whisked away from his jail cell to a 
lavish welcome ceremony attended by prominent ruling party politicians including former 
President Obasanjo, then-Ogun State governor Gbenga Daniel, and then-minister of defence 
Ademola Olatokunbo.”274          
 Chief DSP Alamieyeseigha, a former PDP governor of Bayelsa State from May 1999 to 
December 2005, stole billions of naira from Bayelsa State funds and was convicted in 2007. 
After his impeachment from office in 2005, he was succeeded by his deputy, Goodluck Ebele 
Azikwe Jonathan, who became vice president of Nigeria on May 29, 2007, in the most fraudulent 
election ever conducted in Nigeria. (Goodluck Ebele Azikwe Jonathan was sworn in as Nigerian 
president on May 5, 2010, after the death of President Yar’Adua, and he assumed office as an 
elected president on May 29, 2011, after the April 2011 elections.) One of the properties 
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acquired by Alamieyeseigha with the stolen funds was Chelsea Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria, valued at 
N2.7 billion, which was handed over to Bayelsa State on July 14, 2009 by Farida Waziri, the 
then-chairperson of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.
275
  Alamieyeseigha had 
earlier jumped bail in London in November 2005, and he fled to Nigeria. In London 
Alamieyeseigha was docked for money laundering offences, and during his abortive application 
of sovereign immunity claim from criminal prosecution, certain facts were revealed.276 First, in 
December 2001, he deposited £420,000 into a HSBC bank account in London.277  Second, in 
March 2003, he expended £475,724 in buying a property at 68-70 Regents Park, London, and 
more shocking was the £920,000 in cash found in his London home.278  
 James Onanefe Ibori, the governor of Delta State from 1999 to 2007, is wanted in Nigeria 
by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for the theft of 9 billion, 200 million naira 
from the Delta State treasury.
279
 He fled from Nigeria in April 2010 to Dubai, where he was 
arrested in May 2010, and extradited to the United Kingdom to face charges of fraud and money 
laundering.
280
 Some accounts claim that he stole N450 billion from 1999 to 2007, when he ruled 
Delta State, and for assisting him to move £70 million through British banks, Christine Ibori-
Ibie, his sister, and Udoamaka Okoronkwo-Onuigbo, his mistress, were each sentenced to five 
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years imprisonment; in addition Theresa Ibori, his wife, and Bhadresh Gohli, his  lawyer, were 
also jailed for money laundering in the United Kingdom.
281
  
 Ibori was finally found guilty of fraud and money laundering totaling around £50 million 
by Judge Anthony Pitts of Southwark Crown Court, London,  and on April 17, 2012, he was 
sentenced to thirteen years in prison. Judge Pitts noted that Ibori was the “man of corruption 
lining his own and families’ pockets with single-minded devotion and determination.”282 The 
Financial Times estimates that Ibori stole close to £200 million.283 It was in the year 1991 that 
Ibori commenced the criminal phase of his life in Britain, and eight years later, he utilized his 
criminal expertise to commence the looting of Delta State funds from 1999 to 2007 in Nigeria, in 
alliance with his British contacts.
284
  The Department of International Department (DFID) of the 
British government in a press release stated that: “Ibori, a former governor of Nigeria’s Delta 
State, lived a life of luxury after he embezzled what the Met estimates to be $250 million 
(approximately £157 million) of Nigerian public funds―equal to £38 from every person living 
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in the state at the time of his crimes.”285 According to DFID’s research, the funds Ibori stole 
“could have provided books, uniforms and education for 400,000 girls or hand pumps to provide 
clean water for 450,000 households.”286 The last sentence of the press release assumed that there 
were no honest sectors of government in Nigeria, stating that: “No British aid to Nigeria is 
channeled through government institutions to protect our money from corruption, and to ensure 
that such aid reaches the beneficiaries for which any assistance in [sic] intended.”287 
 I will now examine the role of private international actors involved in the subversion of 
the accountability of Nigerian public officials, through the two cases of multinational companies 
prosecuted in the United States by the Securities and Exchange Commission.                  
2.6. SEC v. Halliburton and KBR                                          
Under United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
288
 proceedings on February 11, 
2009, Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) entered guilty pleas to a five-count criminal information 
in a federal court in Houston before U.S District Judge Keith P. Ellison and agreed to pay a 
$402 million criminal fine as part of a plea bargain agreement.
289
 This was the aftermath of 
KBR’s orchestration of a $180 million bribe dispensation scheme from 1995 to 2004, allegedly 
in favor of Nigerian government officials, which led to the award to KBR of four engineering, 
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procurement and construction (EPC) contracts for the Bonny Nigerian $6 billion liquefied 
natural gas.
290
  $150 million of the bribes were handled by an agent in Gibraltar, and the balance 
of $30 million by another agent in Tokyo.
291
        
 KBR and its former parent company, Halliburton, also agreed to settle the civil aspect of 
the suit filed by SEC relating to violation of antibribery provisions of the FCPA, and both 
agreed to pay $177 million in disgorgement of profits relating to books, records, and internal 
control violations that occurred during payment of the bribes.  SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro 
stated that:  “FCPA violations have been and will continue to be dealt with severely by the SEC, 
and other law enforcement agencies. Any company that seeks to put greed ahead of the law by 
making illegal payments to win businesses should beware that we are working vigorously across 
borders to detect and punish such illicit conduct.”292 The sanctions above represent the second-
largest fines ever paid by American firms since the inception of the FCPA in 1977.
293
 The 
former CEO of the above companies, Albert Jack Stanley, met with top Nigerian government 
officials and their representatives at least four times.
294
 The payments were to be concealed 
through sham contracts with an agent each in the United Kingdom and Japan.
295
  
 Nigerians have mounted pressure on the Nigerian government to release the names of its 
officials involved in the bribery scheme and prosecute them.
296
 In response to these pressures 
the Nigerian attorney general made a request of the United States through a Mutual Legal 
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Assistance Treaty (MLAT).
297
 $150 million of the $180 million was discovered by American 
investigators to be currently held in Swiss accounts upon inquiries made by Nigeria’s attorney 
general.
298
  OECD antibribery corruption proceedings in France involving the Halliburton case 
above, led to the conviction, a 300,000 euro fine and a three-year imprisonment sentence of Dan 
Etete, a former Nigerian oil minister under the Abacha dictatorship of the 1990s.
299
 Etete 
expended 15 million euros in bribery payment received from British Attorney Jeffrey Tesler 
(Abacha’s financial adviser) on purchase of properties in France from 1999 to 2000.300 Etete’s 
French accomplice, Richard Granier-Defferre, was jailed for a year and fined 150,000 euros.
301
 
On February 23, 2012, Albert Jack Stanley was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment by 
Judge Keith P. Ellison, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas for a 
decade-long scheme in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), for bribing 
Nigerian rulers to secure a $6 billion liquefied natural gas contract, which was inflated from the 
original $3 billion contract sum:  
Two of Stanley’s co-conspirators also were sentenced by Judge Ellison. Today, Jeffrey Tesler, 
63, a United Kingdom citizen and licensed solicitor, was sentenced to 21 months in prison, 
followed by two years of supervised release. Tesler was also ordered to pay a $25,000 fine and 
previously was ordered to forfeit $148, 964,568. Yesterday, Wojciech J. Chodan, 74, a United 
Kingdom citizen and former salesman at KBR’s U.K. subsidiary was sentenced to one year of 
probation and ordered to pay a $20,000 fine. Chodan was previously ordered to forfeit 
$726,885. Tesler and Chodan were indicted on Feb. 17, 2009, and subsequently extradited to the 
United States from the United Kingdom. On Dec. 6, 2011, Chodan pleaded guilty to count one 
of the indictments charging him with conspiring to violate the FCPA. On March 11, 2011, 
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Tesler pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of violating 
the FCPA.
302
     
                                             
2.7. United States of America v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
303
                         
Siemens became listed in the United States in 2001, and became subject to the FCPA. Siemens 
was the largest German engineering company with a global operation, and prior to the coming 
into the operation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention 
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions in Germany on February 15, 1999,
304
 Siemens regularly procured 
contracts all over the world, including in Nigeria, through bribery of government officials. 
Investigations into the bribery schemes of Siemens commenced in September 2000, with regard 
to bribery payments made to a former Nigeria dictator
305
 who stole billions of dollars of 
Nigeria’s crude oil earnings.          
 These investigations snowballed into concerted efforts by the American DOJ, SEC, and 
German authorities, which resulted in the discovery of a $1.36 billion slush fund employed by 
Siemens to bribe government officials globally in order to win contracts.
306
 According to Linda 
Chatman Thomsen, director of SEC’s Division of Enforcement: “This pattern of bribery by 
Siemens was unprecedented in scale and geographic reach. The corruption involved more than 
$1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the 
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Americas…our success in bringing the company to justice is a testament to the close, 
coordinated working relationship among the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice and other U.S. 
and international law enforcement, particularly the Office of the Prosecutor General in 
Munich.”307  Siemens agreed to pay a total of $1.6 billion in fines and disgorgement of profits in 
the United States and Germany, including $800 million in the United States, making it the 
largest combined sanction in an FCPA case since the FCPA Act was enacted in 1977.
308
                       
Conclusion                     
This chapter has focused on the lack of political will of successive Nigerian governments to 
implement socioeconomic rights provided for in their annual budgets and on the cancer of 
corruption that depleted and continues to deplete hundreds of billions of dollars of oil and tax 
revenues. This fact is buttressed by the two American cases analyzed in this chapter to 
demonstrate the corrosive effect of multinational oil corporations on the accountability of 
Nigerian political leaders.
309
 Nigeria’s underdevelopment has been accentuated by the military 
buccaneers Britain trained at Sand Hurst, who captured power in 1966 and plunged Nigeria into 
a civil war that claimed over a million lives. The military effectively aborted the welfare state 
that emerged from 1960 to 1966, when politicians were by and large communitarians in spirit 
and practice in line with the communal ethos that for centuries undergirded Nigeria’s 250 ethnic 
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nationalities.           
  The military distorted the welfare developmental trajectory of the Nigerian state to 
create a hybrid class of politicians comprised of retired military officers and their civilian 
collaborators, infused with the worst political tendencies. The Nigerian state, through its 
political elites, has burned the development bridge by means of grand-scale corruption, and they 
are stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Nigerian state, through its political and legal 
elites, must make a conscious effort to create an enabling environment for Nigerians to thrive 
and realize their full potentials and capabilities in life. That entails the provision of affordable 
and qualitative health care and top-rate education, electricity supply, and potable water supply to 
undergird a revitalization of the textile, agricultural, and construction sectors so that Nigeria can 
clothe, feed, and house its citizens. Existing mechanisms of accountability need to be 
strengthened in Nigeria, and their deficiencies need to be ameliorated and complemented by 
justiciable socioeconomic rights to achieve a desirable level of government accountability in 
Nigeria.         
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                                                 CHAPTER THREE        
                       SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN NIGERIA 
3.0. Introduction                                     
In this chapter, I will map out the current status and trajectory of socioeconomic rights in 
Nigeria’s legal regime. Section 3.1 traces how the military juntas in Nigeria aborted the people’s 
will to have socioeconomic rights entrenched as justiciable constitutional fundamental rights in 
the Nigerian Constitutions that were decreed by the military juntas.  Section 3.2 then proceeds to 
highlight the Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. Section 3.3 evaluates 
Nigerian socioeconomic jurisprudence, while section 3.4 analyzes the concept of locus standi in 
Nigerian jurisprudence. Section 3.5 examines the Supreme Court of Nigeria and socioeconomic 
rights. Section 3.6 interrogates the autochthonous constitutional framework which is inclusive 
and representative of a broad spectrum of the aspirations of Nigerians.   The chapter establishes a 
widespread support by Nigerians for constitutionally justiciable socioeconomic rights. Also 
discussed is why a constitutionally guaranteed relaxed right of access to courts in Nigeria is 
required to empower aggrieved citizens as litigants, to improve the accountability matrix of 
public governance.           
 The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is almost identical to the 1979 
Constitution, and were both drafted by military juntas of close affinity. The 1976 Constituent 
Assembly, heavily controlled by the military troika of generals Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, and 
Danjuma, which drafted the 1979 Constitution, “defined political power as ‘the opportunity to 
acquire riches and prestige, to be in a position to hand out benefits in the form of jobs, contracts, 
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gifts of money etc. to relations and political allies.”310 The army handed power to civilians in 
1979 and reclaimed power in 1983.
311
       
 Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution, which provides for nonjusticiable socioeconomic 
rights, must be amended and made justiciable in order to empower citizens to initiate court 
actions to make public policies accountable and geared toward development policies. Poor 
countries like Nigeria have a greater advantage than, say, the United States in funding public 
health care and education at a much cheaper labor cost, thereby enhancing individual capabilities 
to catalyze democratic, economic, and industrial development. Amartya Sen has for decades 
demonstrated this fact with China, Costa Rica, Kerala State in India, and Sri Lanka.
312
                 
3.1. Adoption of Socioeconomic Rights as Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
of State Policy in Nigeria                      
The paradigmatic shift that occurred in 1978 after twelve years of military rule was the 
emergence of a military ruling-class that decreed the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, modeled upon the executive presidential system of government, as opposed to the 
British model of parliamentary government that operated from 1960 to 1966, during the first 
republic. 
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 The 1979 Constitution also introduced Chapter II provisions on Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy, a euphemism for nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights.
313
 
It has been claimed that “there is no similarity between” Nigeria’s Chapter II provisions on 
directive principles and India’s.314 What is not disputable, according to one of the most 
outstanding justices ever to have served on Nigeria’s Supreme Court, is that no one can point to a 
theory upon which the 1979 Constitution was grounded.
315
       
 The problems that resulted from a “veil of ignorance”316―or otherwise stated, lack of 
altruism―which led the Nigerian military ruling class in 1978 to abandon the socioeconomic 
development impetus of the 1960-1966 first republic, will be examined briefly.
 
During the 
constitutional debates of 1978, there were Nigerians (who later birthed the 1979 Constitution), 
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who felt that a constitution that guaranteed civil and political rights but was devoid of 
socioeconomic rights did not meet the yearnings and aspirations of the average Nigerian. 
According to Bade Onimode and E. Osagie: 
It has even been argued that if the state may not be able to provide free education at all levels, 
right to a job, shelter and free medical care, these should not be justiciable rights. But surely in 
the past, freedom of expression, the press, assembly, etc were justiciable even when the majority 
of our population was submerged in a ‘culture of silence’ through illiteracy which denied them 
freedom of expression in official English, when the press was officially gagged and peaceful 
assembly denied.
317
  
On the other hand, contrary views were offered by the Nigerian Constitutional Drafting 
Committee (CDC) appointed by the military junta. The CDC was headed by F.R.A. Williams, 
and its views on socioeconomic rights in its report submitted to the junta in 1976 were that: 
By their nature, they are rights which can only come into existence after the government has 
provided facilities or them. Thus if there are facilities for education or medical services one can 
speak of the ‘right’ to such facilities. On the other hand, it will be ludicrous to refer to the ‘right’ 
to education or health where no facilities exist. If one has in mind the right of an individual to 
insist on the provision of these facilities then it is a ‘right’ which depends on the availability of 
resources and in the final analysis one is really referring to the obligation or duty of the 
government to provide the facilities. This is why majority of the members of the Committee feel 
that it is better and more realistic to make provision for economic and social rights in the portion 
of the Constitution dealing with fundamental objectives and directive principles rather than in the 
section dealing with fundamental rights. Most of the fundamental rights are in a sense, natural 
rights vested in every individual and to which he is entitled without any obligation or duty on the 
part of the government to provide facilities for their enjoyment. Thus, the rights to freedom of 
expression or to liberty of a person are rights which do not depend upon the provision of any 
facilities by the government. Moreover, all fundamental rights are, in the final analysis, rights 
which impose limitations on executive, legislative or judicial powers of government and are 
accordingly justiciable. By contrast, economic and social ‘rights’ are different.  They do not 
impose any limitations on governmental powers. They impose obligations of a kind which are 
not justifiable. To insist that that the right to freedom of expression is the same kind of ‘right’ as 
the ‘right’ to free medical facilities and can be treated alike in a constitutional document is, the 
majority of us feel, basically unsound.
318
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  The great biases majority of the CDC members harbored against socioeconomic rights 
are apparent in their lexicon. They failed to note that administration of justice, policing to secure 
civil liberties, and elections, for example, have huge budgetary consequences that even exceed 
allocation for health care and education. Note that with socioeconomic rights the CDC tags them 
not justifiable as opposed to civil and political rights that are justiciable (and justified). The 
above narrative reinforces Karl Klare’s position that “For present purposes it is enough to note 
that the very existence of this debate shows that rights discourse is socially constructed, that 
conceptions of rights are embedded within and framed by particular political and social 
visions.”319 More importantly, Henry Shue reinforces the point made earlier, that civil and 
political rights also demand positive action on the part of the state. According to Shue: “But such 
protection against the deprivation of subsistence is in all major respects like protection against 
deprivations of physical security or of other rights that are placed on the negative side of the 
conventional negative/positive dichotomy. I believe the whole notion that there is a morally 
significant dichotomy between negative and positive rights is intellectually bankrupt.”320 
Subsequently, in section 4.1, I demonstrate that the guarantee of civil and political rights require 
considerable budgetary expenditure.  
 3.2. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution Chapter II Provisions on Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy                                    
The provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria dealing with 
socioeconomic rights are listed under its Chapter II, which is captioned Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy. The economic objectives stipulate “that the economic 
system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of 
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production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group.”321 The economic 
objectives also require “that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, reasonable 
national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and 
welfare of the disabled are provided for all citizens.”322       
 Social objectives under the Nigerian Constitution
323
 states that: “exploitation of human or 
natural resources in any form whatsoever for reasons, other than the good of the community, 
shall be prevented.”  In terms of employment the social objectives stipulate the following:   
(3) The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that-               
(a) all citizens, without discrimination on any group whatsoever, have the    
 opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate    
  opportunity to secure suitable employment;               
(b) conditions of work are just and humane, and that there are adequate facilities for   
 leisure and for social, religious and cultural life;       
  (c)  the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded   
       and not endangered or abused;        
  (d) there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons…324 
It is pertinent to note that Nigeria is a far cry away from realizing the above lofty goals. This is 
not surprising, given the fact that they are nonjusticiable as opposed to civil and political rights 
that are justiciable under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Socioeconomic rights are not ranked as items of importance by those who hold the reins of 
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power in Nigeria at the federal, state, and local tiers of government. It would then appear illusory 
to advocate for Nigeria the Indian jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights discussed in chapter 5, 
which has incorporated nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights under the justiciable civil right to 
life.
325
 But note that access to court is relaxed in India, unlike the strict regime of access in 
Nigeria. Moreover, Indian Supreme Court Indian judges shed conservatism decades ago, unlike 
their Nigerian colleagues, although there have been some exceptions.  
 Educational objectives under the 1999 Constitution have largely been observed in the 
breach by the Nigerian State at the federal, state, and local tiers of government. Section 18 of the 
Constitution stipulates that: 
1. Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate 
educational opportunities at all levels. 
2. Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy; and to this end Government shall as and 
when practicable provide-                         
(a) free, compulsory and universal primary education;                     
(b) free secondary education;                       
(c) free university education; and                                 
(d) free adult literacy programme   
 Education has been one of the most neglected sectors of the Nigerian economy. Nigeria 
requires a highly skilled workforce to develop its economy and compete globally. Adding value 
to the crude oil and gas Nigeria exports, and utilizing such energy exports domestically to 
industrialize, requires using a labor-intensive massive manufacturing paradigm. Such a paradigm 
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requires a research- and development-driven education infrastructure.  The Appropriation Bill for 
2012 proposed by the Nigerian government does not reflect such a paradigm.
326
  
3.3. Nigerian Socioeconomic Jurisprudence                            
Judicial powers are vested in the courts by section 6 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
327
 
Republic of Nigeria, which in the same breath makes enforcement of Chapter II provisions on 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of the Constitution containing socioeconomic 
rights nonjusticiable. The judicial arm of government has acquitted itself creditably in the fifty 
years of Nigeria’s independence, and this dissertation shows this to be relevant in the realization 
of accountable governance through socioeconomic rights in Nigeria.
328
 Judicial decisions in 
Nigeria relating to socioeconomic rights are almost nonexistent due to their nonjusticiable 
nature. The few cases on socioeconomic rights have resulted from adjudication upon justiciable 
civil and political rights and legislation relating to Chapter II provisions of the Constitution.   
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 Constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights would empower the Nigerian judiciary 
to subject government policies to accountability tests, and Nigerian citizens would benefit from 
an added layer of judicial evaluation of public policies to promote their general welfare. The 
judiciary has always been an ally of the ordinary citizen in Nigeria, and its hands remain tied by 
the nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights provisions of the Nigerian Constitution.
329
 The 
Exclusive Legislative List under the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
conferred powers on the federal government to establish and regulate authorities “to promote and 
enforce the observance of the fundamental objectives and directives principles contained in the 
Constitution.
330
 This same provision was drafted into the 1999 Constitution as item 60(a) under 
the Exclusive Legislative List.  
 The development of Nigerian jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights has been hampered 
by their nonjusticiable nature, courtesy of section 6(6)(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, which states that 
6.(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this 
 section…                            
(c) shall not, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, extend to any issue or question as 
 to whether any act or omission by any authority or person  or as to whether any law or 
 any judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
 Principles of State Policy set out in  Chapter II of this Constitution.      
The above provision was a carbon copy of a similar provision in the Nigerian 1979 Constitution. 
The few decisions of the courts dealing with directive principles will be examined here; they 
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were mainly decided under the 1979 Constitution. In a Lagos High Court decision of July 18, 
1980, Justice Agoro observed that: 
In any event, it seems to me that the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the 
Constitution have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights under Chapter 
IV of the Constitution. If there is no infringement of any Fundamental Right there can be no 
objection to the State acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in Chapter II 
subject of course to the legislative and executive powers conferred on the State. See the Indian 
case of State of Madras v Champakam (1951) SCR 525.
331
   
In a subsequent Lagos High Court decision of August 22, 1980 the same verdict was reached that 
Chapter IV fundamental human rights provisions were superior to Chapter II provisions.
332
 The 
Court of Appeal, on July 22, 1991, for the first time categorized Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy as rights but devoid of enforcement. According to the 
president of the Court of Appeal, Justice NasirIt is common ground that citizens and aliens alike 
enjoy legal rights popularly called civil rights which are ordinarily enforceable and justiciable in 
our courts. Out of the civil rights some have been chosen and elevated to the level of 
Fundamental Rights and are protected and enforced under the Constitution…There are other 
rights which may pertain to a person which are neither fundamental nor justiciable in the courts. 
These may include rights given by the Constitution as under the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy under Chapter II of the Constitution.
333
    
  
 Nigeria operates a dualist legal system, as do most commonwealth former British 
colonies, and a treaty can only become binding when it is domesticated into the Nigerian legal 
system.
334
 In section 3.5, I show that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
been domesticated into Nigerian law.
335
 In a few decided cases its right to health care provisions 
have been utilized by prisoners as a secondary relief based upon a primary civil liberty claim. 
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Civil liberties have been employed by the judicial system to incorporate medical treatment of 
prisoners under the custody of prison authorities in Nigeria. For example, four mentally ill 
prisoners incarcerated at the notorious Kirikiri maximum security prison in Lagos, were held to 
have had their personal dignity violated and were ordered to be transferred to a psychiatric 
hospital by a Federal High Court in compliance with sections 7 and 8 of the Prisons Act.
336
 
Nigerian courts and lawyers utilized the civil liberties provisions of the Banjul Charter to 
effectively cushion the repressive decrees under military rule from 1983 to 1999. In 2003, a 
Federal High Court ruled that the federal government of Nigeria was mandated by Article 16(2) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to provide medical care to four prisoners 
who were HIV positive.
337
 Nigerian courts are definitely well equipped to evaluate whether 
socioeconomic policies of government comply with the requirements under a proposed 
constitutional amendment transforming nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of the 1999 
Constitution into justiciable socioeconomic rights. Nigerian courts have a remarkable record of 
jealously guiding existing justiciable civil and political rights provisions under Chapter IV of the 
previous 1979 and the existing 1999 Constitutions. 338       
3.4. Locus Standi                                                      
Ease of access to the court is vital for the enforcement of human rights. It has been much easier 
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for class action cases relating to socioeconomic rights to be filed against Nigeria at the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and at the Economic Commission for West Africa 
States Court of Justice than within Nigeria. This is because of the highly restrictive approach to 
right of access to the court in Nigeria, which is also compounded by the fact that socioeconomic 
rights are nonjusticiable under Chapter II provisions on Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.   
 The Nigerian Supreme Court case of Abraham Adesanya v. President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria has become the definite authority on right of access to court or locus standi 
in Nigeria. The decision was handed down by the Nigerian Supreme Court in 1981. The 
precedent established by the case, requires an individual to disclose an interest which is personal 
to him or her before such an individual can be granted locus standi in a court of law in Nigeria.
339
 
The decision has effectively shut the door against public interest litigation or class actions in 
Nigeria.
340
 Public interest litigation in India and class action in South Africa have utilized 
socioeconomic rights litigation to improve accountability of their governments in the allocation 
of scarce resources. The South African Constitution enables broad access to court and a more 
relaxed locus standi, as opposed to Nigeria’s Constitution.      
 Nigerian courts, unlike Indian and South African courts, have been very conservative in 
granting access to court, and a nexus entailing personal interest must be the foundation of any 
claim filed in court. “Locus standi is the foundation upon which any claim before the courts 
succeeds or fails. To establish locus standi, applicants must demonstrate sufficient interest in the 
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case and this must be personal interest ‘over and above’ those of the general public. This has 
been a major hurdle for groups desirous of bringing public interest cases before Nigerian 
courts.”341  Since 2010, Access to Justice, a nongovernmental organization in Nigeria, and the 
Section on Public Interest and Development (SPIDEL) of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) 
have both been in partnership at the forefront of efforts to introduce public interest litigation into 
Nigeria and reduce the locus standi threshold access to Nigerian courts.
342
 But leadership 
changes in the various sections of the NBA have led to a fizzling out of the SPIDEL initiative.
343
                   
3.5. The Supreme Court of Nigeria and Socioeconomic Rights                   
I highlighted earlier in section 3.3, that in the absence of justiciable socioeconomic rights in the 
Nigerian Constitution, lawyers made recourse to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights to secure the health of prisoners, as a subsidiary claim based on a primary claim of 
justiciable civil liberties. Under military rule, when civil liberties were suspended, lawyers 
employed the civil liberty provisions of the Charter to secure civil liberties. The Nigerian 
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inaugurated.html (accessed on March 18, 2012) 
94 
 
Supreme Court has always maintained the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution over domestic 
legislation and treaties entered into by the Nigerian State. This is premised on Section 1 of the 
1979 and 1999 Constitutions, which both state that “This Constitution is supreme and its 
provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria”; in subsection 3 it goes on to state that: “If any other law is inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and any other law shall to 
the extent of inconsistency be void.” This section will examine two of the most recent Supreme 
Court cases dealing with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Chapter II 
Provisions of the Constitution on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy.  
  The case relating to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Abacha and 
Others v. Fawehinmi,
344
 is important because it is a treaty that provides for both the protection of 
civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic rights; but it is limited in application because 
the facts of case did not have a bearing on socioeconomic rights, but dealt with the arbitrary 
arrest and detention of a human rights lawyer and activist, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, by agents of 
the military dictator, General Sanni Abacha on January 30, 1996. Nevertheless the Supreme 
Court analyzed the position of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the 1979 
Constitution in pari materia with the 1999 Constitution.  Ogundare, Justice of the Supreme 
Court, in his lead judgment on April 28, 2000, held that: 
Where, however, the treaty is enacted into law by the National Assembly, as was the case with 
the African Charter which is incorporated into our municipal (i.e. domestic) law by the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10 Laws of the 
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Federation of Nigeria 1990 (hereafter is referred to simply as Cap 10), it becomes binding and 
our courts must give effect to it like all other laws falling within the judicial powers of the courts. 
By Cap 10 the African Charter is now part of the laws of Nigeria and like all other laws the 
courts must uphold it. The Charter gives to citizens of member states of the Organization of 
African Unity (now African Union) rights and obligations, which rights and obligations are to be 
enforced by our courts, if they must have any meaning. It is interesting to note that the rights and 
obligations contained in the Charter are not new to Nigeria as most of these rights and 
obligations are already enshrined in our Constitution. See Chapter IV of the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions.
345
  It is very instructive that the Court refers to Chapter IV, which deals with 
Fundamental Human Rights relating to civil and political rights, and the Court makes no 
reference to Chapter II on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, 
which pertains to nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights.       
 Nevertheless the Court laid down the hierarchical status of the Nigerian Constitution vis-
à-vis treaties, especially the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in the following 
terms: 
No doubt Cap. 10 is a statute of with international flavour. Being so, therefore, I would think that 
if there is a conflict between it and another statute, its provisions will prevail over those of that 
other statute for the reason that it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to breach an 
international obligation. To this extent I agree with their Lordships of the Court below that the 
Charter possesses “a greater vigour and strength” than any other domestic statute. But that is not 
to say that the Charter is superior to the Constitution as erroneously with respect, was submitted 
by Mr. Adegboruwa, learned counsel for the Respondent. Nor can its international flavour 
prevent the National Assembly…from removing it from our body of municipal laws by simply 
repealing Cap. 10. Nor also is the validity of another Statute necessarily affected by the mere fact 
that it violates the African Charter or any other treaty. For that matter see: Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States 130 US. 581 where it was held that treaties are of no higher dignity than Acts of 
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Congress, and may be modified or repealed by Congress in like manner, and whether such 
modification or repeal is wise or just is not a judicial question.
346
    
Justice Ogundare’s position mirrors a large section of judicial opinion in Nigeria, and this is 
buttressed by the transcript of my interview with a retired justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Honorable Albert Gbadebo Oduyemi.
347
 An amendment to enact justiciable constitutionally 
enforceable socioeconomic rights under the Nigerian Constitution will enable Nigerian judges to 
adjudicate over infractions of its socioeconomic rights provisions.    
 The next case for consideration relates directly to the Chapter II provisions of the 1999 
Constitution, under a constitutional challenge brought by one of the thirty-six states that 
comprise Nigeria, against the federal government, with thirty-five states joined as interested 
parties.  In the year 2000, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act got passed into 
law in Nigeria and it became operative on June 13, 2000. On September 29, 2000, the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), a creation of the Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Act, was inaugurated by President Olusegun Obasanjo. The ICPC was 
set up pursuant to section 15(5) of the Chapter II provisions of the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Section 15(5) provides that: “The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.”       
 As highlighted elsewhere in this dissertation, socioeconomic rights are provided for under 
the Chapter II provisions of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Subsection 6(c) of the provisions on 
judicial powers, provides that judicial powers “shall not except as otherwise provided by this 
Constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority 
or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the 
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Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this 
Constitution.” Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution provides in subsection 2 that “The National 
Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative 
List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.” Item 60 on the Exclusive 
Legislative List enumerates: “The establishment and regulation of authorities for the Federation 
or any part thereof- (a) to promote and enforce the observance of the Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles contained in this Constitution.” The Ondo State government filed an 
originating summons on July 16, 2001, in the Supreme Court of Nigeria under the original 
jurisdiction clause of section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and sued the attorney general of the Federation, and the other thirty-five states were joined as 
interested parties.
348
 Two issues were formulated for determination, and two declarations were 
also sought, namely, 
1. A determination of the question whether or not the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act, 2000 is valid and as a law enacted by the National Assembly and in force 
in every State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (including Ondo State). 
2. A determination of the question whether or not the Attorney-General of the Federation 
(1st defendant) or any person authorised by him can lawfully initiate legal proceedings in 
any court of law in Ondo State in respect of any of the criminal offences created by any 
of the provisions of the said Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. 
3. A declaration that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, is not in 
force as law in Ondo State. 
                                                          
348
 Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 N.W.LR. Part 772, pp. 
222-474. 
98 
 
4. A declaration that it is not lawful for the Attorney-General of the Federation (1st 
defendant) or any person authorised by him to initiate legal proceedings in any court of 
law in Ondo State in respect of the criminal offences purported to be created by the 
provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000.
349
   
On July 1, 2002, upon the conclusion of the case, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Muhammudu 
Lawal Uwais, ruled  that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act was validly 
passed, but he annulled two sections of the Act. These were section 26(3), which violated the 
separation of powers doctrine and amounted to legislative usurpation of judicial powers; and 
section 35, which authorized indefinite detention violated the liberty provision of the 1999 
Constitution. In his analysis of section 15(5) of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Uwais (CJN) held that 
The ICPC is by the provisions of item 60 (a), to promote and enforce the observance of 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy as contained under 
Chapter II of the Constitution. The question is: how can the ICPC enforce the 
observance? Is it to use force? Is it to legislate or what? The ICPC cannot do either of 
these because the use of force or coercion in enforcing the observance will require 
legislation. The ICPC has no power to legislate. Only the National Assembly can 
legislate. The Constitution of India has similar provisions to ours on Directive Principles 
of State Policy in Part IV thereof. In the Indian case of Mangru v. Commissioners of 
Budge Budee Municipality (1951) 87 CLJ 369, it was held that the Directive Principles 
of State Policy require to be implemented by legislation, and so long as there is no law 
carrying out the policy laid down in a Directive neither the State nor an individual can 
violate any existing law or legal right under the color of following a Directive. See also 
the Shorter Constitution of India 12th Edition by Dr.D.D. Basu at pages 296-297.  Since 
the subject of promoting and enforcing the observance comes under the Exclusive 
Legislative List it seems to me…incidental or supplementary for the National Assembly 
to enact the law that will enable the ICPC to enforce the observance of the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. Hence the enactment of the Act 
which contains provisions in respect of both the establishment and regulation of ICPC 
and the authority for the ICPC to enforce the observance of the provisions of section 15 
subsection (5) of the Constitution. To hold otherwise is to render the provisions of item 
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60 (a) idle and leave the ICPC with no authority whatsoever. This cannot have been the 
intendment of the Constitution.
350
         
In his concurring judgment, Samson Odemwingie Uwaifo, justice of the Supreme Court 
observed that  
And comparing Fundamental Rights with Directive Principles, Basu makes reference to 
the Indian Supreme Court case of State of Madras v. Champakam (1951) S.C.R. 525 at 
531 where it was said that:                      
‘The Directive Principles of State Policy have to and run subsidiary to the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights. That is the correct way in which the provisions found in Parts III 
and IV have to be understood. However, so long as there can be no objection to the State 
acting in accordance with the Directive Principles set out in Part IV, but subject again to 
the Legislative and Executive powers and limitation conferred on the State under 
different provisions of the Constitution.’          
What I have managed to say from the foregoing shows that every effort is made to from 
the Indian perspective to ensure that the Directive Principles are not a dead letter. 
Whatever is necessary is done to see that they are observed as much as practicable so as 
to give cognizance to the general tendency of the Directives. It is necessary therefore to 
say that our own situation is of peculiar significance. We do not need to seek uncertain 
ways of giving effect to the Directive Principles in Chapter II of our Constitution. The 
Constitution has placed the entire Chapter II under the Exclusive Legislative List. By 
this, it simply means that all the Directive Principles need not remain mere or pious 
declarations. It is for the Executive and the National Assembly, working together, to 
give expression to anyone of them through appropriate enactment as occasion may 
demand. I believe this is what has been done in respect of section 15(5) by the present 
Act.
351
    
It would seem that the Nigerian government has not fully accepted the admonitions from Justice 
Uwaifo to “give expression” to Chapter II provisions of the Constitution. For instance, the social 
objectives contained under Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria stipulates that “Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that 
there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.”352 In furtherance of this 
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policy on education, the Nigerian government enacted the Compulsory Free Universal Basic 
Education Act in May 2004, and it came into force on May 26, 2004. But as I highlight in section 
4.4, the Nigerian government has shirked its responsibilities under the Compulsory Free 
Universal Basic Education Act, arguing that its provisions are nonjusticiable courtesy of the 
nonjusticiable status of socioeconomic rights under the 1999 Constitution. 
3.6. What Constitutional Framework Is representative of the Aspirations of Nigerians?   
The first decade of Nigeria’s present democratic experience under the 1999 Constitution has 
opened nationwide and widespread demands for constitutional amendments. One of the demands 
is for the abrogation of section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution, which debars the judiciary from 
adjudicating upon socioeconomic rights contained in the Chapter II provisions on Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. Further, there is also the urgent demand that 
socioeconomic rights must be made constitutionally justiciable to address the dire and precarious 
nature of socioeconomic rights in Nigeria.
353
       
 A document that authoritatively expresses the common will of the Nigerian people 
devoid of overbearing colonial influence or military coercion was the Memorandum Submitted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(f) free secondary education; 
(g) free university education; and 
(h) free adult literacy programme.  
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by the Delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria.
354
 The 
part relevant for the current analysis is titled “Social Objectives.” 355           
SOCIAL OBJECTIVES                      
7. In the field of education, it should be provided in the constitution:    
1. that within 2 years, post-secondary education of any kind whatsoever shall be free to all 
who are capable of pursuing, and benefitting from, this type of education; 
2. that free and compulsory primary education and free post-primary education shall be 
introduced throughout the Federation within 5 years; 
3. that a scheme for compulsory adult education, including functional literacy, the 
equivalent of primary and secondary education for adult, agricultural, commercial and 
industrial extension, and liberal adult education, shall be introduced within 5 years; 
4. that a scheme for the provision of suitable literature for literate adults shall be introduced 
within 5 years:            
Note: For the avoidance of misunderstanding, instructions to adults are usually given in 
the evening, after the day’s work; or at such other times as may be convenient to adults in 
a particular locality.   
8.  In the field of health, there should be provisions in the constitution to the following 
effect: 
1. that free medical treatment shall be available to all within 5 years;  
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2. that a scheme whereby the production of medical practitioners will reach, within fifteen 
years, a target of 1 doctor to at least 2,000 people, shall be introduced annually or 
quinquennially; and  
3. that within 5 years such preventive measures as will improve the health of the Nigerian 
communities, namely: improved sanitation, nutrition, inoculation against infectious 
diseases, such as tuberculosis, measles, typhoid, and smallpox, will be implemented.
356
  
The fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy Chapter II provisions of the 
1999 Constitution are similar to some of the above provisions. Constitutionally enforceable 
Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution will reflect the aspirations and yearnings of 
Nigerians, thereby representing the authentic will of the people.       
Conclusion                            
This chapter shows conclusively that there is widespread support in Nigeria for constitutionally 
justiciable socioeconomic rights. Nigerian courts, unlike Indian and South African courts, have 
been very conservative in granting access to court, and a nexus entailing personal interest must 
be the foundation of any claim filed in court. The common will of the Nigerian people devoid of 
overbearing colonial influence or military coercion was comprehensively expressed by the 1966 
Memorandum Submitted by the Delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional 
Proposals for Nigeria. The memorandum demanded in unequivocal terms constitutionalized and 
justiciable socioeconomic rights. Justiciable socioeconomic rights will certainly make 
government socioeconomic policies in Nigeria accountable under the scrutiny of a 
constitutionally empowered judiciary that can adjudicate over socioeconomic rights. This 
process will greatly complement existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria. A 
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constitutionally guaranteed and relaxed right of access to courts in Nigeria is also required for 
aggrieved citizens to contribute to the accountability matrix of public governance. 
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                                                   CHAPTER FOUR            
THE INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
     APPLICABLE IN NIGERIA 
4.0. Introduction                         
In this chapter I show the salience of socioeconomic rights at the United Nations, the  African 
Union, and the Economic Community of West African States that are applicable to Nigeria as a 
member of these international bodies. Section 4.1 briefly traces the theoretical debates on 
whether socioeconomic rights are fundamental rights, like civil and political rights. Section 4.2 
subsequently analyzes the General Comments jurisprudence of the committee set up by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Section 4.3 then proceeds to 
examine the socio-economic jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, and uses the famous SERAC decision against Nigeria on socioeconomic rights as a case 
study. Section 4.4 analyzes the socioeconomic jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
Economic Community of West African States   (ECOWAS) and Nigeria. The chapter concludes 
that the SERAC decision and ECOWAS Court of Justice jurisprudence on Nigeria conclusively 
shows that socioeconomic rights can complement existing mechanisms of accountability and 
ameliorate the accountability deficit of Nigerian public governance by subjecting socioeconomic 
policies of government to judicial scrutiny.                    
4.1. Socioeconomic Rights Examined                      
Theoretical debates about socioeconomic rights focus on a variety of challenging questions. 
Human requirements for gainful employment, wholesome food, mental and physical health, 
shelter, and clothing are natural needs just like breathing oxygen to survive. The poor, the young, 
the elderly and physically and mentally challenged individuals in any given society are 
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extremely vulnerable in meeting these basic needs. These are some basic human needs or 
entitlements that are collectively called socioeconomic rights contained in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, which came into force in 1976.
357
 
Legislation is one of the means of actualizing these rights.
358
 It behooves on the political and 
socioeconomic arrangements in a particular society to decide how these needs are met.
359
  
 Are needs necessarily met through rights entitlements?
360
 Political actions empower the 
judiciary to adjudicate over what some viewed previously as political matters.
361
  Maurice 
Cranston belongs to the school of thought that believes civil and political moral liberties are the 
real human rights, while socioeconomic needs are merely ideals and aspirations.
362
 For him, 
classifying socioeconomic needs as human rights “is to push all talk of human rights out of clear 
realm of the morally compelling into the twilight world of utopian aspiration.”363  In modern 
society, basic education is required at the minimum, to have a functional purpose, because 
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reading and writing skills are needed to get by in a globalized world. Most countries have 
adopted compulsory child education to keep children from being exploited and abused in the 
labor market.            
 Both negative duties and positive duties are required in the realization of socioeconomic 
rights. Positive and negative actions with budgetary consequences are equally needed to 
implement civil and political rights as well.
364
 This neutralizes the dominant myth of negative 
restraint on the part of the Leviathan State from invasion of individual liberties. Negative 
restraint of the state was always proposed by some scholars as the major requirement for the 
enforcement of civil and political rights.
365
 But in order to enforce civil and political rights, states 
need to fund elections, judicial services must be funded; security services must be funded to 
safeguard free speech and personal security.        
 There are those who classify socioeconomic rights, like Cranston above, as inferior to 
civil and political rights. This school of thought believes that grouping socioeconomic rights with 
civil and political rights under a bill of rights in a constitution would render all rights 
unenforceable, thereby devaluing already protected civil and political rights. For this class of 
thinkers, the strategy should be to make socioeconomic rights unenforceable and focus on needs 
of vulnerable members of society that could be met by executive policies backed by budgetary 
allocations in line with the separation of powers doctrine.
 
The judiciary should not be 
empowered to dabble in purely policy and budgetary considerations of the executive arm of 
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government, whose budget has been passed by the legislative arm.
366
 This is a strictly formalistic 
doctrine of separation of powers. This argument is rebutted in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of this chapter 
by the decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Economic 
Community of West African States Court of Justice. I also demonstrate, in the next chapter, the 
capacity of courts in the States of New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky, as well as in India, to 
adjudicate over the fidelity of socioeconomic policies of government with constitutional 
mandates. This capacity is further demonstrated by  the South African Constitutional Court,, 
discussed in chapter 6.          
 No state is neutral, and political arrangements in place are determined by the interests of 
the dominant political elite, which might not necessarily reflect the common will.
367
 Infusing 
positive duties into the matrix of the state’s arrangement is primarily a political decision.368 
Empowering the courts to guide the infusion process is one of the diverse tools for realizing 
socioeconomic development in any given society.
369
 The courts can also innovatively ameliorate 
poverty in society and empower the downtrodden to access the justice system through “taking 
suffering seriously.”370 “Taking suffering seriously,” a term coined by Professor Upendra Baxi, 
is the Indian approach to public interest litigation developed by its former chief justice, 
Honorable Justice P.N. Bhagwati.
371
 But Bhagwati “would prefer to call this enterprise as social 
action litigation rather than Public Interest Litigation.” 372 South Africa, just like Nigeria, has to 
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contend with taking poverty seriously.
373
 But the South African judiciary, unlike Nigeria’s 
judiciary, has been empowered to address poverty through justiciable constitutionally provided 
socioeconomic rights. South Africa’s highest court has formulated the reasonableness concept to 
evaluate the efficacy of government policies in the fulfillment of socioeconomic rights, 
especially with regard to the most vulnerable in society, the poor.
374
    
 African countries have had an ambivalent relationship with human rights in their quest 
for socioeconomic development.
375
 The negative effects of colonialism and neocolonialism in its 
shade of globalization have influenced the drafting of an autochthonous African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which places socioeconomic rights on the same level with civil and 
political rights.
376
Are there other ways of meeting basic human needs in society besides the 
rights entitlement path? Nigeria is an example of the above ambivalence, as its 1960 and 1963 
constitutions did not recognize basic needs. But the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian constitutions 
recognize them as nonjusticiable fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy.  
 During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States of America 
delivered his 1944 State of the Union address in the aftermath of over a decade of socioeconomic 
depression in his country and the horrors of an ongoing war. In his “New Deal,” he envisaged 
adding socioeconomic rights to the American bill of rights, which has remained unfulfilled to 
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this day.
377
 But various educational, health, and social security programs exist at both state and 
federal levels in the United States.
378
 The courts have even ruled against the exclusion of 
children of illegal immigrants from state-funded education.
379
 In his 1944 address, President 
Roosevelt stated that:   
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist 
without economic security and independence.                      
“Necessitous men are not free men.” People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff 
of which dictatorships are made.                  
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.                     
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of 
security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed. 
Among these are:                                                                                                                   
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of 
the Nation;                                 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;                            
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him 
and his family a decent living;                                               
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom 
from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;   
The right of every family to a decent home;                                                           
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;                 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, 
and unemployment;                                                
The right to a good education.                          
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move 
forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and 
well-being.
380
 
              
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious allied powers on June 26, 1945 appended their 
signatures in San Francisco to the Charter of the United Nations, and it came into force on 
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October 24, 1945.
381
 Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and a white-led South Africa were the only 
African countries represented in San Francisco, others were still colonies.
382
 In the nineteenth 
century, there had been international law abolition of slave trade, international law treatment of 
aliens. In the early twentieth century, the status of minorities was the focal point of international 
law and the International Labour Organization fought for the right of workers.
383
    
 The United Nations Charter is definitely not the origin of international concern with 
human rights law.
384
 To begin with, Louis B. Sohn persuasively establishes centuries-old 
international law traditions in Europe, dating back to the inception of international law, which 
privileged citizens of states, who indirectly benefited from the rule that a harm done to a citizen 
was done to its state, which could then claim reparation on behalf of the citizen.
385
    Article 1 of 
the United Nations Charter of 1945 states among its purposes, the promotion and respect for 
human rights.
386
 Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations mandates the organization to 
promote both civil and political rights, as well socioeconomic rights.
387
         
4.2. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights                 
January 3, 1976 was the day the thirty-fifth country ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which made the United Nations’ multilateral treaty come 
into force.
388
 Divisions still existed in 2006, when Article 14 of the Optional Protocol of the 
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ICESCR was being drafted with regard to the binding nature of extraterritorial international 
assistance and cooperation, where countries do not possess the resources to meet the 
socioeconomic needs of their citizens. This was a throwback to the unresolved extraterritorial 
international assistance and cooperation implications of Articles 2(1), 11, 15, 22, and 23 of the 
ICESCR.
389
 In Canada’s reading of Article 14, extraterritorial international assistance and 
cooperation was one of a nonlegal moral obligation. The interpretation of Article 14 of the 
Optional Protocol by the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden was: “that the State 
had the primary responsibility to implement its obligations.”390     
 On the other hand, South Africa, India, Nigeria, and the African team led by Egypt 
“emphasized again, the legally binding character of international assistance and cooperation.”391 
A similar controversy surrounds the socioeconomic provisions of Article 4 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, which is a carbon copy of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.
392
  The United 
Nations Human Rights Council adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on June 18, 
2008.
393
 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on 
December 10, 2008, and it was opened for signature in 2009.
394
 Nigeria acceded to the ICESCR 
on July 29, 1993, India on April 10, 1979, while South Africa signed on October 3, 1994.
395
  
 It must be noted that between 1981 and 2011, the Human Rights Committee of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) issued thirty-four general 
comments interpreting the normative contents of numerous articles of the CCPR.
396
 Some of 
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these comments have a direct bearing on socioeconomic rights. For instance, General Comment 
17, which interpreted Article 24 of the CCPR on the rights of the child, declared that “For 
example, every possible economic and social measure should be taken to reduce infant mortality 
and to eradicate malnutrition among children…”397 Similarly, General Comment 28 on Article 3 
of the CCPR issued on March 29, 2000, at the sixty-eighth session of the Human Rights 
Committee, stated that “The obligation of State parties to protect children (art. 24) should be 
carried out equally for boys and girls. State parties should report on measures taken to ensure 
that girls are treated equally to boys in education, in feeding and in health care…”398   
 On January 8, 1987, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations released a 
report of experts, which became one of the first set of modern normative baselines for countries 
to realize the socioeconomic rights listed in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The experts focused on 
problems encountered by developing countries in achieving socioeconomic rights. Their report is 
famously referred to as the Limburg Principles.
399
 The International Commission of Jurists; the 
Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights of University of Cincinnati, Ohio; the United States; 
and the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg in Maastricht, the Netherlands, jointly 
assembled the group of experts at Maastricht from June 2-6, 1986. They considered “…the 
nature and scope of the obligations of States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the consideration of States parties Reports by the newly constituted 
ECOSOC Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international co-operation 
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under Part IV of the Covenant.”400 There were twenty-nine experts from different parts of the 
world, with one from Africa, and with Asia and South America unrepresented.
401
   
 The different organizations that formulated the Limburg Principles, marked its tenth 
anniversary on January 22-26, 1997, with a follow-up meeting at Maastricht. The thirty-three 
experts were predominantly from Western Europe and the United States.
402
 They came up with 
thirty-two set of guidelines known as the Maastricht Guidelines.
403
 Interestingly the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website, where I accessed the Maastricht Guidelines, 
put up a disclaimer on its site with regard to the Guidelines.
404
 The Maastricht Guidelines 
highlighted the legal obligations of states parties to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, to respect, protect, and fulfill the enumerated rights just as with their 
civil and political rights legal obligations.
405
        
 Progressive realization of full enjoyment of socioeconomic rights dependent on judicious 
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and reasonable expenditure of available resources is the requisite state obligation of states parties 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. They must respect, 
protect, and fulfill the enumerated rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. The only exception to non-fulfillment of socioeconomic rights by a state is a 
proven lack of resources. The concerned state must prove that limited resources are hampering 
its best attempts to respect, protect and fulfill socioeconomic rights.  Accession to a treaty is 
recognized by the Vienna Convention on Treaties as one of the means by which a state becomes 
bound by the contents of a treaty.
406
 Nigeria, through accession on July 29, 1993, became a state 
party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
407
 Therefore, 
Nigeria is morally obliged to pursue policies that do not detract from the Covenant and strive to 
progressively realize socioeconomic rights within its territory through the judicious use of 
available resources. For a treaty to be legally binding upon dualist Nigeria, it must domesticate it, 
as I explained in the previous chapter.
408
 Nigeria has not domesticated the Covenant; therefore it 
is not legally bound by its provisions.
409
       
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was created in May 1986, and it 
is comprised of eighteen members nominated by states’ parties to the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) for a term of four years.
410
 Half of the 
membership seats were due to be filled in 2012, based on the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Resolution 1985/17 of May 28, 1985.
411
 The Committee is expected to meet for a 
minimum of three times in a year with alternating meetings in Geneva and New York offices.
412
 
The Committee also considers states’ reports under Articles 16 and 17 of the CESCR.413 Its 
forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions took place in 2010.
414
 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights from 1989 to 2009, issued twenty-one general comments clarifying the 
norms of various articles of the CESCR.
415
  The Committee has essentially played the role of 
norm clarification, as well as making clear what to expect from the socioeconomic rights 
provided for by the CESCR. Alston, a former chairman of the Committee elaborated upon the 
norm clarification role of the Committee.
416
  In addition, the thirty-five thematic Fact Sheets 
issued from June 1996 to August 2010, by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the United Nations in Geneva, have sought to clarify and publicize both civil and 
political rights as well as socioeconomic rights to a wider audience than lawyers, diplomats, and 
academics.
417
           
 General Comment 1 of 1989 addressed the reporting procedure of states’ parties’ 
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compliance with the provisions of the CESCR, and it formulated seven objectives necessary to 
attain compliance.
418
 The first objective required a state party within two years of the CESCR 
coming into force in its territory, to bring domestic legislation, rules, and procedure in tandem 
with provisions of the CESCR. The second objective is for the state party to monitor compliance 
and realization of the rights provided by the CESCR within its territory, by striving toward 
addressing regional and group deficiencies; and if national resources are inadequate, 
international assistance must be sought in data collection and remedial measures to attain 
maximum realization of socioeconomic rights by its citizens. The third objective is to develop a 
time-specific plan to remedy the deficiencies realized in the nonrealization of socioeconomic 
rights by the state party.           
 A fourth objective of the reporting process is to involve members   from a wide spectrum 
of representative interest groups in society, in the critique and formulation of proactive plans to 
remedy socioeconomic deficits in the state party. A fifth objective is to set goals or benchmarks 
on which to assess state performance: “Thus, for example, it is generally agreed that it is 
important to set specific goals with respect to the reduction in infant mortality, the extent of 
vaccination of children, the intake of calories per person…”419 The Committee emphasized a 
qualitative and quantitative progressive data-based realization of socioeconomic rights over a 
time scale, which demonstrates their evidentiary concrete realization in the assessment of a state 
party’s performance.420 The sixth objective is the identification of obstacles hindering a state 
party seriously committed to realizing socioeconomic rights from their effective realization, and 
the formulation of remedial policies to overcome the identified obstacles.
421
 The last objective is 
for state parties to share their varied experiences and improve on domestic and international 
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remedial policies to attain socioeconomic rights in their respective countries.
422
    
 General Comment 2, issued on February 2, 1990, interpreted Article 22 of the CESCR on 
international assistance, and it elaborated on a default mechanism of technical international 
assistance mobilized by the Economic and Social Council from the various bodies of the United 
Nations. Those bodies were also advised to follow the lead of the United Nations Development 
Program in factoring in human rights in the pursuit of economic growth and refrain from 
involvement with projects that would violate human rights. Rather they should be participate in 
programs and projects that promote and fulfill human rights.
423
 “As a matter of principle, the 
appropriate United Nations organs and agencies should specifically recognize the intimate 
relationship which should be established between development activities and efforts to promote 
respect for human rights in general, and economic, social and cultural rights in particular.”424      
 General Comment 3 dealt with the minimum core concept. Essentially this was an 
interpretation of Article 2(1) of the CESCR, which provides that:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.   
In its interpretation the Committee stated that from its decade-long experience as at 1990, there 
was a minimum core threshold a country must meet to fulfill the conditions of Article 2(1): 
In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
obligation to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.
425
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This interpretation of the minimum core concept would prove very useful to the Nigerian 
judiciary when socioeconomic rights become constitutionally enforceable in Nigeria. The 
Nigerian judiciary will be able to subject public socioeconomic policies to Constitutional 
requirements of accountability.         
 In extraterritorial terms, the Committee interpreted international obligations of States 
parties to the CESCR to mean:  
A final element of article 2(1), to which attention must be drawn, is that the undertaking given by 
all States parties is ‘to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical …’ The Committee notes that the phrase ‘to the 
maximum of its available resources’ was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both 
the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance. Moreover, the essential role of such specific 
provisions contained in articles 11, 15, 22 and 23. With respect to article 22 the Committee has 
already drawn attention, in General Comment 2 (1990), [discussed in section 4.5 below] to some 
of the opportunities and responsibilities that exist in international cooperation. Article 23 also 
specifically identifies ‘the furnishing of technical assistance’ as well as other activities, as being 
among the means of ‘international action for the achievement of the rights recognized.…426  
General Comment 3 is in tandem with the nonjusticiable economic objective of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution to “harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and 
an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy.
427
      
 General Comment 4, issued on December 13, 1991, interpreted the right to housing 
component of Article 11(1) of the CESCR.
428
 Housing is also a nonjusticiable economic 
objective under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
429
 But in the next section I will elaborate upon 
Nigeria’s housing obligations through the SERAC case. General Comment 5, issued in 1994, 
elaborated upon the application of the specific provisions of the CESCR to persons with 
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disabilities.
430
 The “welfare of the disabled” is also a nonjusticiable economic objective under 
the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
431
 General Comment 6 of 1995 deals with the economic, social, 
and cultural rights of elderly persons.
432
 “Old age care and pensions”  is also a nonjusticiable 
economic objective under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
433
 General Comment 7, issued in 
1997, examined Article 11(1) of the CESCR in respect of right to housing and freedom from 
forced evictions. The State must not engage in forced evictions.
434
 I will evaluate Nigeria’s 
obligations not to engage in forced evictions under the CESCR and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights in the next section on the SERAC case. “Moreover, this approach is 
reinforced by article 17.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which 
complements the right not to be forcefully evicted without adequate protection.”435 General 
Comment 8 of 1997 stated that unilateral, regional, and multilateral economic sanctions must be 
designed not to affect socioeconomic rights of citizens of targeted countries.
436
   
 General Comment 9 issued on December 3, 1998, goes to the heart of this dissertation: it 
addresses the domestic application of the CESCR. Nigeria would be at an advantage if it 
domesticated the CESCR into its domestic legal regime. But the section 6(6)(c) provision in 
Nigeria’s Constitution, which renders socioeconomic rights nonjusticiable, must be amended or 
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abrogated as analyzed in the previous chapter.
437
 States have a duty to give effect the provisions 
of the CESCR at the domestic level.
438
 The domestic legal order must enable citizens’ access to 
effective remedies in respect of violations of the CESCR.
439
 “Direct incorporation avoids 
problems that might arise in the translation of treaty obligations into national law, and provides a 
basis for the direct invocation of the Covenant rights by individuals in national courts. For these 
reasons, the Committee strongly encourages formal adoption or incorporation of the Covenant in 
national law.”440 Administrative remedies can be utilized to realize socioeconomic rights, and 
where they do not suffice judicial remedies can be employed.
441
   
 The debate over the relative ease of the judicial remedies in civil and political rights as 
opposed to the constraints of applying resource allocation implications of adjudicating 
socioeconomic rights is also addressed by General Comment 9, though it also refers to General 
Comment 3 above. It observed:  
It is sometimes suggested that matters involving the allocation of resources should be left to the 
political authorities rather than the courts. While the respective competences of the various 
branches of government must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts are 
generally already involved in a considerable range of matters which have important resource 
implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which 
puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible 
with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would 
also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in society.
442
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This clarification reinforces the argument of my dissertation that courts are well equipped to 
adjudicate over the constitutionality and soundness of government’s socioeconomic policies. The 
same competencies required in adjudication over civil and political rights that implicate 
budgetary expenditures also apply to adjudication over socioeconomic rights.    
 General Comment 11, issued on May 10, 1999, clarified Article 14 of the CESCR, on the 
provision of compulsory primary education; in addition, it referred to complementary provisions 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989, which entered into force on 
September 2, 1990. General Comment 11 bemoaned the failure of several states to formulate 
concrete plans for provision of free and compulsory primary education within two years of 
becoming parties of CESCR.
443
 It observed that: “The right to education, recognized in articles 
13 and 14 of the Covenant, as well as in a variety of other international treaties…is of vital 
importance. It has been variously classified as an economic right, a social right and a cultural 
right. It is all of these. It is also, in many ways, a civil right and a political right, since it is central 
to the full and effective realization of those rights as well. In this respect, the right to education 
epitomizes the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.”444  Article 10 of 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) guarantees equal treatment and 
opportunities in education for both female and male children.
445
  A child is defined as every 
human being under the age of eighteen by Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).
446
 Article 28 of the CRC mandates the provision of free and compulsory primary 
education for children.
447
 General Comment 11, implicates the noncompliance by Nigeria with 
the decisions of the Economic Community of West Africa States, discussed in section 4.4 below, 
which ordered Nigeria to implement the provisions of the 2004 Compulsory Free Universal 
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Basic Education Act and provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 
20, 1989, domesticated into Nigerian legal system.     
 General Comment 12, issued on May 12, 1999, articulated the right to adequate food 
component of Article 11 of the CESCR.
448
 It stated that only a few states have provided 
sufficient data to evaluate compliance and challenges needed to be addressed in realizing the 
right to adequate food.
449
 It then articulated the normative contents of the right to adequate food.  
The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community 
with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 
procurement. The right to adequate food shall therefore not be interpreted in a narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates it with a minimum package of calories, proteins and other 
specific nutrients. The right to adequate food will have to be realized progressively. However, 
States have a core obligation to take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger as 
provided for in paragraph 2 of article 11, even in times of natural or other disasters.
450
   
 Nine hundred and twenty-five million people in the world are undernourished.
451
 Hunger 
will still be a daily problem for six hundred million people by 2015, when the Millennium 
Development Goals are supposed to have been achieved, with the halving of hunger as one of its 
goals.
452
   Fact Sheet 34, issued in April 2010, by the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, also clarified the normative concept surrounding 
the socioeconomic right to adequate and regularly accessible food.
453
 “Suitable and adequate 
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food” is also a nonjusticiable economic objective under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.454 
 General Comment 13, released on December 8, 1999, further developed the normative 
contents of the right to education under Article 13 of the CESCR. The right to receive an 
education under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the CESCR was interpreted to imply availability and 
accessibility to all persons no matter the gender or group.
455
 It reiterated the pivotal and 
emancipatory catalytic role of education in the eradication of poverty and attainment of 
economic development.
456
  Schools and the programs they run would “…require buildings or 
other protection from all elements, sanitation facilities for both sexes, safe drinking water, 
trained teachers receiving domestically competitive salaries, teaching materials, and so on; while 
some will also require facilities such as a library, computer facilities and information 
technology.”457 This general comment buttresses my previous analysis, in section 2.3, of 
deficiencies in Nigeria’s education sector. My analysis of the American States’ jurisprudence on 
education, in the next chapter shows that justiciable socioeconomic rights enables judicial 
scrutiny to make public educational policies conform with constitutional mandates, thereby 
improving accountability of public governance.      
 General Comment 14, issued on August 11, 2000, expounded upon the normative 
contents of Article 12 of the CESCR on the right to health.
458
 It clarified the difference between 
indicators that reflect achievement levels as opposed to benchmarks laying out targets for 
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countries in light of their peculiar circumstances.
459
 “Having identified appropriate right to health 
indicators, States parties are invited to set appropriate national benchmarks in relation to each 
indicator.”460 Health care for millions of people, mired in poverty, is still an illusion.461 The right 
to health is linked with sanitation, potable water supply, and regular access to adequate food, 
among other enabling conditions.
462
 Health-care provision entails availability and 
accessibility.
463
 It is predicated upon “…safe and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation 
facilities, hospitals, clinics and other health-related buildings, trained medical and professional 
personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs…”464 The elimination 
of infant and maternal mortality also comes under the umbrella of the right to health under 
Article 12(2)(a) of the CESCR.
465
 Safety in the workplace and environmentally friendly modes 
of production are encompassed by the right to health.
466
      
 Fact Sheet 31, released in June 2008, by the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, also clarified the normative concept surrounding 
the socioeconomic right to health.
467
 “States must show that they are making every possible 
effort, within available resources, to better protect and promote all rights under the Covenant.”468 
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This is in tandem with my previous analysis in section 2.2 of the challenges in Nigeria’s health-
care sector, which will benefit from judicial scrutiny if health-care policies of government can be 
litigated upon.           
 General Comment 15 of 2002, issued on January 20, 2003, distilled the right to water 
from Articles 11 and 12 of the CESCR.
469
 It declared that the legal bases for the right to water 
were derived from the two articles. “The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. An 
adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk 
of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic 
hygienic requirements.”470 August 2010 witnessed the publication of Fact Sheet 35 on the right 
to water by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.
471
 
It observed that, conservatively, close to 900 million people lack access to water and 2.5 billion 
people lack water for sanitation purposes, which required a human rights approach to resolve the 
crisis.
472
 “While these numbers shed light on a worrying situation, the reality is much worse, as 
millions of poor people living in informal settlements are simply missing from national statistics. 
The roots of the current water and sanitation crisis can be traced to poverty, inequality and 
unequal power relationships…”473        
 General Comment 16, published on August 11, 2005, interpreted Article 3 of the CESCR 
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on equal enjoyment of the substantive rights in the Covenant by both men and women.
474
 “While 
expressions of formal equality may be found in constitutional provisions, legislation and policies 
of Governments, article 3 also mandates the equal enjoyment of the rights in the Covenant for 
men and women in practice.”475 States have three levels of legal obligations to implement 
equality, which translate to obligations to respect,
476
 to protect,
477
 and to fulfill.
478
 The tripod of 
respect, protection, and fulfillment have become well accepted in the human rights lexicon 
detailing states’ human rights obligations.479      
 General Comment 18, which was adopted on November 24, 2005, was issued on 
February 6, 2006, and it elaborated upon the respective right to work, safe work place and labor 
union association provisions of Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the CESCR.
480
 States parties to the 
CESCR have three-layered legal obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to work. 
“The obligation to respect the right to work requires States parties to refrain from interfering 
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directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of that right.”481 Protection dictates that states parties 
implement measures to stop the interference of third parties with workers’ right to work. 
Fulfillment entails the provision, facilitation, and promotion of the right to work.
482
 There must 
be access to effective administrative or judicial remedies for violations of the right to work.
483
  
Private actors are equally duty-bound, like state parties, not to violate the right to work.
484
  
 General Comment 19 of February 4, 2008, clarified the normative contents of the right to 
social security, provided for by Article 9 of the CESCR.
485
 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights expressed concern “…over the very low levels of access to social security 
with a large majority (about 80 per cent) of the global population currently lacking access to 
formal social security. Among these 80 per cent, 20 per cent live in extreme poverty.”486  The 
normative core of the right to social security has nine pillars. They are health care,
487
 disability or 
sick benefits,
488
 social security schemes for elderly persons,
489
 unemployment benefits,
490
 
employment injury,
491
family and child support,
492
paid maternity leave coupled with medical 
benefits,
493
 dignified support for persons with disabilities,
494
 and support for survivors and 
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orphans.
495
  Social security falls under the nonjusticiable economic objectives of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution.
496
        
 General Comment 20 of July 2, 2009, clarified the nondiscrimination provisions of 
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the CESCR.
497
 Elimination of formal discrimination in laws and 
policies must be matched substantively in practice.
498
 Discrimination is prohibited, and some 
listed examples are on the basis of race and color,
499
 sex,
500
 
language,
501
religion,
502
political,
503
national or social origin,
504
property status,
505
birth,
506
 
disability,
507
 age,
508
 and nationality; in particular, children of undocumented immigrants must 
have access to education, health care, and adequate food.
509
 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights expressed concern that: “Discrimination undermines the fulfillment of 
economic, social and cultural rights for a significant proportion of the world’s population. 
Economic growth has not, in itself, led to sustainable development, and individuals and groups 
of individuals continue to face socio-economic inequality, often because of entrenched historical 
and contemporary forms of discrimination.”510         
 General Comment  21 of December 21, 2009, articulated the right of everyone to take 
part in cultural life provided for by Article 15, paragraph 1, subparagraph a of the CESCR.
511
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The Committee considered “that culture for the purpose of implementing article 15(1)(a), 
encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-
verbal communication, religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, 
methods of production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food…Culture 
shapes and mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and political life of 
individuals, groups of individuals and communities.”512       
 On December 20, 1993, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/141 
established the office of the “High Commissioner for the promotion and protection of all human 
rights.”513 The office is located in Geneva, with a liaison office in New York.514 The key 
functions of the High Commissioner are to “To promote and protect the effective enjoyment by 
all of all civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.”515  In addition to above duties, the 
High Commissioner is “To promote and protect the realization of the right to development and to 
enhance support from the relevant bodies of the United Nations system for this 
purpose.”516General Assembly Resolution 48/141 requested “the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to report annually on his/her activities, in accordance with his/her mandate, to the 
Commission on Human Rights and, through the Economic and Social Council, to the General 
Assembly.”517 It must be noted that with effect from March 15, 2006, via United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251,
518
 the Commission on Human Rights transformed into the forty-
seven United Nations Member States Human Rights Council.
519
 The High Commissioner for 
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Human Rights has been issuing annual reports,
520
 and a few recent ones relevant to 
socioeconomic rights will be examined in this section. These annual reports have been in tandem 
with the emerging trend in the general comments of using indicators and benchmarks alluded to 
above “to monitor the progressive realization of economic and social rights.”521    
 On June 25, 2007, the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued the 2007 Report, 
which was deliberated upon from July 2 through 27, 2007, at the substantive Geneva session.
522
 
The 2007 Report emphasized that verifiable data backed developmental national programs. and 
strategies needed to  be set to implement socioeconomic rights.
523
 “In this regard, one important 
requirement is to ensure that strategies set realistic, achievable targets and that adequate funds 
are made available for their realization. In doing so, Governments must not only seek to make 
the most efficient use of often limited public resources, but also seek to mobilize private and 
community resources for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.”524 A 
minimum threshold of fulfillment/performance is expected from states, in the realization of 
socioeconomic rights, as highlighted elsewhere in this section of the dissertation. “The 
fulfillment of minimum core obligations must be a first priority on policy and budget decisions. 
Governments must make a best effort to ensure that limited resources are directed towards 
satisfying, at the very least, minimum levels of rights fulfillment, such as ensuring universal 
access to compulsory primary education free of charge, and that everyone has access to basic 
medical care and essential drugs.”525           
 The 2009 Report identified the raison d’être of socioeconomic rights implementation to 
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be the transformative emancipatory potential to improve the quality of human life.
526
 
“Implementation of economic, social and cultural rights implies transformative action oriented 
towards ensuring the full enjoyment of rights, or preventive action to prevent a potential 
violation or a remedial action to offer redress when rights have been violated. Monitoring 
implementation is an indispensable means to assess whether these required types of action are 
actually taking place and are sufficient, or are absent. Failure to adopt adequate transformative or 
preventive action may amount to a violation of the rights at stake.”527  
 The 2009 Report also identified states’ budgets as a veritable tool of measuring 
progressive realization of socioeconomic rights. The ratio or proportions of budgetary allocations 
of states to specific areas are indicative barometers of their socioeconomic commitments. States 
are enjoined to provide evidence based on verifiable data to establish levels of commitment to 
the realization of socioeconomic rights.
528
  
As for all human rights, achieving economic, social and cultural rights requires budget 
allocations and corresponding expenditures, in particular in regard to the positive obligations that 
they entail. The provision of educational services, the promotion and facilitation of the 
enjoyment of the right to food, the monitoring of the duties of employers regarding workers’ 
rights, for instance, necessarily require financial resources, sustainable over time. Therefore, the 
budget-as the instrument that determines the extent of the States’ resources, their allocation and 
prospective expenditures-is particularly relevant for the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The budget is a useful source of information to evaluate which normative 
commitments are taken seriously by the state, because it provides a demonstration of the State’s 
preferences, priorities and trade-offs in spending. For example, low apportionments in health 
care, education or social programmes when there are visible implementation gaps could show 
inadequate prioritization or insufficient estimation of the required funds to realize economic, 
social and cultural rights.
529
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 On April 26, 2011, the 2011 Report was released.
530
 The 2011 Report reiterated the 
repeated importance ascribed by the General Comments of the Committee on Economic and 
Social and Cultural Rights on “the need for State parties to adopt appropriate indicators and 
benchmarks in their national strategies and policies, including disaggregated statistics and time 
frames in order to allow effective implementation and monitoring of the rights under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”531 More importantly, the 2011 
Report recommended a paradigmatic shift from the use of “traditional, generic analysis of 
‘economic and social situations’ that fail to articulate a clear linkage with the human rights 
framework. In this context, methodologies which link statistical and other data to human rights 
standards are needed to capture the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights of 
individuals and the meeting of obligations by States, not only the overall economic or social 
situation.”532            
 To summarize, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has from 1989 to 
date clarified the contents of the CESCR through twenty-one general comments.
533
  The 
Committee has clarified the substantive socioeconomic rights provided for by the CESCR. The 
thirty-five thematic Fact Sheets issued from June 1996 to date by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations in Geneva, have clarified and publicized 
both civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic rights to a wider audience than lawyers, 
diplomats, and academics.
534
         
 This dissertation has focused on education and health care under the umbrella of 
socioeconomic rights; General Comments 3, 13, and 14 are germane to my research. General 
Comment 13 developed the normative contents of the right to education under Article 13 of the 
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CESCR. The right to receive an education under Article 13,, paragraph 2 of the CESCR was 
interpreted to imply availability and accessibility to all persons, no matter the gender or group 
they belong to. It reiterated the pivotal and emancipatory catalytic role of education in the 
eradication of poverty and attainment of economic development.
 
 Schools must be situated in 
habitable, well-equipped, and sanitary buildings to enhance pedagogy. General Comment 14 
expounded upon the normative contents of Article 12 of the CESCR on the right to health. It 
clarified the difference between indicators that reflect achievement levels as opposed to 
benchmarks laying out targets for countries in light of their peculiar circumstances. Health-care 
provision entails availability and accessibility. Health care for millions of people, mired in 
poverty, is still an illusion. The right to health is linked with sanitation, potable water supply, and 
regular access to adequate food, among other enabling conditions. General Comment 3 dealt 
with the minimum core concept of progressive realization of socioeconomic rights. A state 
claiming inadequate resources would meet its requirement if it could show that it made its best 
efforts in the utilization of all resources at its disposal in a timely manner, in an attempt to realize 
progressively socioeconomic rights. These general comments will prove to be useful in the 
Nigerian legal system when constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights become a reality 
and complement existing mechanisms of accountability.     
4.3. SERAC Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was bogged down by the abysmal human rights 
records of members like Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Francisco Marcias Nguema of Equatorial 
Guinea, and Jean Bokassa of Central African Republic.
535
 In April 1979, Bokassa led his troops 
to massacre about a hundred schoolchildren who had defied his ban on the use of school 
uniforms. The Franco-African summit of May 1979 in Rwanda confirmed Bokassa’s 
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involvement in the massacre.
536
 This was the background for the 1979 OAU Summit in 
Monrovia Liberia, where President William Tolbert of Liberia made a scathing “attack on 
Africa’s human rights record, and the unwillingness of his colleagues to speak out against human 
rights transgressions.”537  
 The speech galvanized his colleagues to mandate the OAU Secretary General to set up a 
panel of experts who drew up a charter of rights in Dakar, Senegal, between November 28 and  
December 8, 1979. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was eventually adopted 
on January 19, 1981, in Banjul, Gambia.
538
 (This dissertation will henceforth refer to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights as the Banjul Charter.) The Banjul Charter was enacted 
into law in Nigeria in 1983, under the civilian administration of President Usman Shehu Shagari, 
and it came into force on March 17, 1983.
539
 It enumerates  civil and political rights,
540
 right to 
property,
541
 as well as socioeconomic rights.
542
 Individuals’ duties to the family, nation, and 
African unity are also well detailed.
543
 The Banjul Charter established the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) to “promote human and peoples’ rights and 
ensure their protection in Africa.”544 Compliance with the decisions of the Commission has been 
a mixed record.
545
          
                                                          
536
 Ibid. at p. 93. 
537
 Id. 
538
 Ibid. 94-95. 
539
 Chapter 10. Laws of Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
540
 Articles 2-13. 
541
 Article 14. 
542
 Articles 15-24. 
543
 Articles 28-29. 
544
 Article 30; Heyns, Christof, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter,’ 108 
Penn St. L.Rev. (2003-2004), pp. 679-702.  
545
 Viljoen, Frans ‘A Human Rights Court for Africa and Africans,’ 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. (2004-2005),  pp. 
1-66; Viljoen, Frans and Louw, Lirette ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 101, No.1 (Jan., 2007), pp. 1-34; Murray, Rachael, ‘International Human Rights: Neglect of 
135 
 
 The Banjul Charter deviated from the ICESCR formula of progressive realization of 
socioeconomic rights. “The Charter does not make the ‘fulfillment’ of any of its provisions 
dependent on ‘available resources’ or ‘progressive realization.’”546 This is in contrast with 
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights evaluated 
under General Comment 3 in the preceding section. In June 1998 a protocol to the Banjul 
Charter was adopted by the member States of the OAU, which established the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, and it entered into force in January 2004.547  The OAU was 
transformed into the African Union at Lome, Togo, upon the adoption of the Constitutive Act of 
the transformed body.
548
         
 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights v. Nigeria
549
 decision of the Commission relating to socioeconomic rights 
violations in Nigeria will be the focus of this section. The SERAC communication was received 
by the Commission on March 14, 1996, and it alleged that the Nigerian military leadership and 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in a joint venture with Shell, while 
carrying out oil drilling in Ogoniland in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, had violated numerous 
provisions of the Banjul Charter. These were the rights to life, environment, disposal of wealth 
and natural resources, as well as implicitly the rights to food and shelter.
550
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thanked both organizations for bringing the communication as an actio popularis.
551
   
 Nigeria transited to civilian rule on May 29, 1999. At the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
of the Commission held in Cotonou, Benin, from October 26 to November 6, 2000, Nigeria 
submitted a note verbale, which admitted the allegations in the SERAC Communication.
552
 The 
note verbale indicated that remedial actions were being taken by Nigeria, which included the 
establishment of the first ever Ministry of Environment, the enactment of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission, and the setting up of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry.
553
     
 In its method of analysis the Commission evaluated the obligations of the Nigerian state 
on four levels of its duties to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill both civil and political rights 
and socioeconomic rights. The Commission stated that both positive and negative duties attach to 
the obligations of Nigeria.
554
 The Commission focused on the health-care and environmental 
obligations of Nigeria, as a treaty member of both the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
The right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under article 24 of the African 
Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore imposes clear 
obligations upon a government. It requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources. Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which Nigeria is a party, 
requires governments to take necessary steps for the improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene. The right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health enunciated in article 16(1) of the African Charter and the right to a general 
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satisfactory environment favourable to development (article [24])…obligate governments to 
desist from directly threatening the health and environment of their citizens. The state is under an 
obligation to respect these rights and this largely entails non-interventionist conduct from the 
state; for example, to desist from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or 
legal measures violating the integrity of the individual. 
555
  
Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that        
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental  health. 
2. State parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health 
of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. 
Article 24 of the Charter provides that “All people shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.” 
According to the Commission, a government’s obligations in terms of the rights to health and the 
environment entails crafting and implementing inclusive social policies that receive inputs from 
individuals in affected communities. 
Government compliance with the spirit of articles 16 and 24 of African Charter must also include 
ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, 
requiring and publicizing environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial 
development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to those 
communities exposed  hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities 
for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities.
556
  
It is very instructive that the Commission stated that “Governments have a duty to protect 
their citizens, not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement, but also by 
protecting them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties.”557 The 
Commission reiterated the nature of the duty: “This duty calls for positive action on the part of 
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governments in fulfilling their obligation under human rights instruments.”558 The Commission 
stated that this position was also buttressed by the practice of other regional human rights 
tribunals and highlighted in the famous Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision of 1988, 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, where the Court “held that when a state allows private persons 
or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized, it would be in 
clear violation of its obligations to protect the human rights of its citizens.”559   
 The Commission then noted that: “…despite its obligations to protect persons against 
interferences in the enjoyment of their rights, the government of Nigeria facilitated the 
destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such internationally 
established principles, the Nigerian government has given the green light to private actors, and 
the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the Ogonis. By any 
measure of standards, its practice falls short of the minimum conduct expected of governments, 
and therefore, is in violation of article 21 of the African Charter.”560             
  The Commission analyzed Nigeria’s violation of Article 11(1) on the right to housing 
provision of the ICESCR through General Comments 4 and 7, which I adumbrated in the 
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 Article 21- 
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised 
in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the 
obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable 
exchange and the principles of international law. 
4. State parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free 
disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and 
solidarity. 
5. State parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic 
exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples 
to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.  
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previous section.  The Commission analyzed the forcible eviction and destruction of the houses 
of inhabitants of the Niger Delta area by soldiers and operatives of Shell: 
The particular violation by the Nigerian government of the right to adequate housing as 
implicitly protected in the Charter also encompasses the right to protection against forced 
evictions. The African Commission draws inspiration from the definition of the term ‘forced 
evictions’ by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which defines this as ‘the 
permanent removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes 
…which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection.’ Wherever and whenever they occur, forced evictions are extremely traumatic. They 
cause physical, psychological and emotional distress; they entail losses of means of economic 
sustenance and increase impoverishment. They can also cause physical injury and in some cases 
sporadic deaths. Evictions break up families and increase existing levels of homelessness. In this 
regard, General Comment no 4 (1991) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights on the right to adequate housing states that ‘…all persons should possess a degree of 
security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and 
other threats…The conduct of the Nigerian government clearly demonstrates a violation of this 
right enjoyed by the Ogonis as a collective right.   
561
 
The Commission derived a right to food in the African Charter, upon which a host of other rights 
depend on to be realizable. 
The right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is therefore essential 
for the enjoyment and fulfillment of such other rights as health, education, work and political 
participation. The African Charter and international law require and bind Nigeria to protect and 
improve existing food sources and to ensure access to adequate food for all citizens. Without 
touching on the duty to improve food production and to guarantee access, the minimum core of 
the right to food requires that the Nigerian government should not allow private parties to 
destroy or contaminate food sources, and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves.  562 
The Commission subsequently found Nigeria in violation of Articles 2 (protection from 
discrimination), 4 (right to life), 14 (right to property), 16 (right to health), 18(1) (family life), 21 
(freedom over wealth and natural resources), and 24 (environmental rights) provisions of the 
Banjul Charter.
563
 It then appealed “to the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to 
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ensure protection of the environment, health and livelihood of the people of Ogoniland…” 564 It 
proceeded to recommend the cessation of military attacks, prosecution of security officials 
involved in atrocities, compensation and resettlement of victims, as well as environmental and 
social impact assessments for future oil mining operations.
565
      
  Dinah Shelton observed that the SERAC decision dependent on Nigeria’s compliance 
with the recommendations could have “an impact on human rights law and practice well beyond 
Africa.
566
 A more robust and critical analysis of the SERAC case is offered by Oloka-Oyango.
567
 
He raised the very important question of how to formulate an accountability standard to hold 
powerful nonstate global actors like Shell directly responsible for their operations that violate 
human rights.
568
  The gap still exists in international law regarding how to hold transnational 
nonstate actors directly responsible for human rights violations. The suggestion has been made to 
amend the Statute of the International Criminal Court to enable it to assume jurisdiction over 
egregious violations of human rights by transnational corporations like Shell perpetrated in 
Ogoniland, where operational base countries such as Nigeria have been unable or unwilling to 
prosecute them.
569
           
 Socioeconomic rights might contribute to the judicious use of state resources in Africa by 
improving the accountability of state officials in control of such resources. An additional layer to 
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the African human rights framework, which complements the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights is the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights. On June 10, 1998, its 
protocol of establishment was adopted and it came into force on January 1, 2004.
570
 Nigeria 
ratified the treaty on May 20, 2004, but has not domesticated it.
571
 In addition, Nigeria is not 
among the five African countries that made a declaration upon ratification that permits 
individuals and NGOs to file petitions.
572
       
 After the SERAC case, Nigeria, at the international level, has adopted the nonjusticiable 
status of socioeconomic rights under the 1999 Constitution, so that it does not have to comply 
with decisions of  the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States 
relating to Nigeria’s nonimplementation of the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act and breaches 
of the socioeconomic provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which 
has been domesticated into Nigerian legal system. Nigeria has failed to abide with the 
socioeconomic aspects of African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights treaty, which it 
willingly domesticated into its domestic legal regime in 1983. A constitutional amendment is 
therefore imperative to make socioeconomic rights justiciable under the 1999 Constitution, so 
that Nigeria will have no excuse not to comply with its treaty obligations under international 
human rights law. Justiciable socioeconomic rights will also complement existing mechanisms of 
accountability within Nigeria, and subject government’s socioeconomic policies to judicial 
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scrutiny at the domestic level.  Time is of the essence in reversing the downward spiral in the 
socioeconomic conditions of most Nigerians. In the next section I shall analyze decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States relating to Nigeria.             
4.4. The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and Nigeria 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on May 28, 
1975, with sixteen members, and aimed to create a common market and free movement of 
citizens; the withdrawal of Mauritania in 2001 reduced the membership to fifteen West African 
countries.
573
 The Court of Justice of ECOWAS was established in 1991.
574
 Article 4(h) of the 
revised ECOWAS treaty of July 24, 1993 states that one of the principles of ECOWAS is 
“accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development.”575  In 
furtherance of this principle article 34(2) of the 2001 Democracy and Good Governance Protocol 
to the ECOWAS treaty requires that: “Member States shall ensure accountability, 
professionalism, transparency and expertise in the public and private sectors.”576     
 Article 4(g) of the revised ECOWAS treaty of July 24, 1993, adopted and incorporated 
the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.577 This was further 
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reiterated by the constitutional convergence principles of the 2001 Democracy and Good 
Governance Protocol to the ECOWAS treaty, which states that “The rights set out in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other international instruments shall be guaranteed in 
each of the ECOWAS Member States; each individual or organization shall be free to have 
recourse to the common or civil law courts, a court of special jurisdiction, or any other national 
institution established within the framework of an international instrument on Human Rights to 
ensure the protection of his/her rights.”578        
 The 2001 Democracy and Good Governance Protocol to the ECOWAS treaty also 
proposed that “Protocol A/P.1/7/91 adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991 relating to the Community 
Court of Justice shall be reviewed so as to give the Court the power to hear, inter-alia, cases 
relating to violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national level 
have failed.”579 In January, 2005 the Court’s empowerment to adjudicate over human rights 
issues was finally effected.
580
 This was done through a new Article 9, which states that “The 
Court has jurisdiction to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any Member 
State.”581 Article 4 of the 2005 Protocol also introduced a new Article 10 into the Protocol of the 
Community Court of Justice, which simplified access to the Court by individuals in human rights 
matters. “Access to the Court is open to the following: …(d) individuals on application for relief 
for violation of their human rights; the submission of application for which shall: (i) Not be 
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anonymous; nor (ii) Be made whilst the same matter has been instituted before another 
international Court for adjudication.”582            
 The Court in 2009 confirmed its jurisdiction over human rights issues in a preliminary 
objection to its jurisdiction filed by the federal government of Nigeria in a case brought against it 
by the Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project. SERAP 
claimed that the Nigerian government had failed to provide basic education, deprived access to 
the people of Nigeria’s wealth and resources, as well as socioeconomic development in violation 
of its signatory obligations to Articles 1, 2, 17, 21, and 22 of the African Charter.
583
   
 The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over human rights issues despite objections raised 
by Nigeria: 
The court has jurisdiction over human rights enshrined in the African Charter and the facts that 
these rights are domesticated in the municipal law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria cannot oust 
the jurisdiction of the court. Second defendant’s  reliance on article 9(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the 
Supplementary Protocol of the Court to argue that the court does not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over human rights issues is misconceived as they failed to take cognizance of the 
entire provisions of article 9. In law, an enactment must be read as a whole. This court clearly 
has subject matter jurisdiction over human rights violations in so far as these are recognized by 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which is adopted by article 4(g) of the 
Revised Treaty of ECOWAS. As the plaintiff’s claim is premised on articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court does have subject matter 
jurisdiction of the suit filed by the plaintiff.
584
        
 It was also contended by the second defendant, the Universal Basic Education 
Commission (UBEC), a Nigerian government agency, that the right to education is not 
justiciable courtesy of Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. The Court observed that  
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The directive principles of state policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are not justiciable 
before this court as argued by second defendant and the fact was not contested by the plaintiff. 
And granted that the provisions under the directive principles of state policy were justiciable, it 
would be the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, being a matter solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. However, plaintiff alleges a breach of 
the right to education contrary to the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The right to education recognized under article 17 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and not a breach of the right to education contained under section II [sic] of the 
1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria.
585
    
 The Court then proceeded to analyze the international applicability of human rights 
treaties and the responsibilities of signatory nations:  
It is essential to note that most human rights provisions are contained in domestic legislations as 
well as international human rights instruments. Some of the fundamental human rights such as 
the right to life, have even been elevated to the status of jus cogens, peremptory norms of 
international law from which no derogation is permitted. Hence the existence of a right in one 
jurisdiction does not automatically oust its enforcement in another. They are independent of each 
other. Under article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, member states of ECOWAS, 
affirmed and declared their adherence to the recognition, promotion and protection of human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. the first defendant is a signatory to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and reenacted it as the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to assert its commitment to same. 
The first defendant is also a signatory to the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS and is therefore bound 
by their provisions.
586
       
 The Court concluded that plaintiff’s action was brought under Article 17 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which it was empowered to adjudicate upon, and not 
under the Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.  It ruled that  
It is trite law that this court is empowered to apply the provisions of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and article 17 thereof guarantees the right to education. It is well 
established that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are 
justiciable before this court. Therefore, since the plaintiff’s application was in pursuance of a 
right guaranteed by the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
contention of second defendant that the right to education is not justiciable as it falls within the 
directive principles of state policy cannot hold.
587
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The second defendant also contended that since the plaintiff had not suffered any 
personal injury, damage, or loss in relation to the claims filed, the plaintiff lacked locus standi to 
file the current suit. The plaintiff argued that flexibility as opposed to restriction was the 
contemporary international norm guiding standing in human rights litigation. The court agreed 
with the plaintiff and concluded that:                          
“The doctrine action popularis was developed under Roman law, in order to allow any citizen to 
challenge a breach of public right in court. This doctrine developed as a way of ensuring that the 
restrictive approach to the issue of standing would not prevent public spirited individuals from 
challenging a breach of public right in court.
588… A close look at the reasons above and public 
international law in general, which is by and large in favour of promoting human rights and 
limiting the impediments against such a promotion, lends credence to the view that in public 
interest litigation, the plaintiff need not show that he has suffered any personal injury or has a 
special interest that needs to be protected to have standing. Plaintiff must establish that there is a 
public right which is worthy of protection which has been allegedly breached and that the matter 
in question is justiciable. This is healthy development in the promotion of human rights and this 
court must lend its weight to it, in order to satisfy the aspirations of citizens of the sub-region in 
their quest for a pervasive human rights regime.
589
   
The Court then overruled and ordered a refusal of the preliminary objections.   
 In the December 14, 2012 decision of the ECOWAS Court, SERAP v. Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, similar objections raised above, got canvased by the Nigerian state.
590
  The claim 
regarded the failure of the Nigerian State to use its authority to fulfill its international obligations 
to regulate the oil extraction activities of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and foreign 
Western multinationals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in order to protect the quality of life, 
including right to food, health, livelihood, and environmental safety of the inhabitants of the 
region. The corporations were struck off as parties and leave was granted to the plaintiff to file 
an action against the president of Nigeria and the attorney general. The action claimed a violation 
of  Articles 1-5, 9, 14-17, and 21-24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
Articles 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.2(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; Articles 1, 2, 6, 7, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Political Rights; and Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The preliminary 
objections considered were as follows: first, whether the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
certain treaties, of which Nigeria was a state party. The second objection was that  the plaintiff 
lacked locus standi. And, thirdly, the inadmissibility of a report by Amnesty International was 
raised.          
 In relation to the first objection: “The Court notes that behind the thesis developed by the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria is the principle contained in its own Constitution that the economic, 
social and cultural rights, being mere policy directives, are not justiciable or enforceable.”591  
The Court noted that Nigeria was bound by the international treaties to which it was a party, and 
those were the instruments the Court would have recourse to, and not the Nigerian Constitution. 
It reasoned: “But it should also be noted that the sources of Law that the Court takes into 
consideration in performing its mandate of protecting Human Rights are not the Constitutions of 
Member States, but rather the international instruments to which these States voluntarily bound 
themselves at the international level, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”592  
 The Court further addressed the proposition so ingrained in Nigerian domestic 
jurisprudence, which is that the 1999 Constitution prevails over all local enactments 
domesticating or incorporating treaty agreements into Nigerian law. According to the Court: “As 
held by the jurisprudence of this Court, in the Ruling of 27 October 2009, SERAP v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, once the concerned right for 
which the protection is sought before the Court is enshrined in an international instrument that is 
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binding on a Member State, the domestic legislation of that State cannot prevail on the 
international treaty or covenant, even if it is its own Constitution.”593    
 The Court added that “This view is consistent with paragraph 2, Article 5 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which Nigeria is party to by 
adhesion since 29 July 1993 which provides: ‘No restriction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, 
regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.’”594 The Court then held that: 
“In these circumstances, invoking lack of justiciability of the concerned right, to justify non 
accountability before this Court is completely baseless.”595       
 It is instructive that the Court demolished the federal government of Nigeria’s defense of 
nonjusticiability of socioeconomic rights mandated by section 6(6(c) of the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. According to the Court: “It is thus evident that the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria cannot invoke the nonjusticiability or enforceability of ICESR as a means of 
shirking its responsibility in ensuring protection and guarantee for its citizens within the 
framework of commitments it has made vis-à-vis the Economic Community of West African 
States and the Charter.”596  The Court then ruled that it had “jurisdiction to examine matters in 
which applicants invoke ICCPR and ICESCR.”597 The Court addressed the issue of locus standi 
and ruled that SERAP had standing to initiate the suit.
598
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 With regard to the third objection dealing with the admissibility of a report by Amnesty 
International, the Court ruled it admissible “without prejudice to the authenticity of the 
report.”599 In its judgment the Court held that: “It is significant to note that despite all the laws it 
has adopted and all the agencies it has created, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was not able to 
point out in its pleadings a single action that it has taken in recent years to seriously and 
diligently hold accountable any of the perpetrators of the many acts of environmental 
degradation which occurred in the Niger Delta Region.”600 The Court further affirmed that “And 
it is precisely this omission to act, to prevent damage to the environment and to make 
accountable the offenders, who feel free to carry on their harmful activities, with clear 
expectation of impunity, that characterizes the violation by the Federal Republic of Nigeria of its 
international obligations under Articles 1 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.”601             
 The Court adjudged that the “Federal Republic of Nigeria, by comporting itself in the 
way it is doing, in respect of the continuous and unceasing damage caused to the environment in 
the Region of the Niger Delta, has defaulted in its duties in terms of vigilance and diligence as 
party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and has violated Articles 1 and 24 of 
the said instrument.”602              
 It then ordered the Federal Republic of Nigeria to 
i. Take all effective measures, within the shortest possible time, to ensure restoration of 
the environment of the Niger Delta; 
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ii. Take all measures that are necessary to prevent the occurrence of damage to the 
environment; 
iii. Take all measures to hold the perpetrators of the environmental damage 
accountable.
603
    
 
This decision clearly demonstrates that existing mechanisms of accountability operating within 
Nigeria would be greatly enhanced by justiciable socioeconomic rights under the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which would enable aggrieved litigants to 
subject government’s policies to judicial scrutiny. This will also subject the opaque relationship 
between the Nigerian government and powerful transnational nonstate corporations operating in 
the Niger Delta area of Nigeria to judicial scrutiny in the public law courts to account for 
egregious violations of socioeconomic rights as well as civil liberties. Nigeria, unlike its 1983 
domestication of the Banjul Charter, has not domesticated the human rights instruments of 
ECOWAS into its domestic legal regime, which might also explain its aloofness regarding 
decisions made by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
604
 
Conclusion                                      
The SERAC case, decided against Nigeria by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, conclusively establishes the fact that judicial intervention can make a difference and 
ameliorate the accountability deficit of public governance in Nigeria. It is important to note that 
ten years after the SERAC case above, which extracted accountability from the Nigerian 
government policies, domestic Nigerian jurisprudence on the nonenforceability of 
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socioeconomic rights has not changed.
605
 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights 
an& Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Nigeria & Universal Basic Education Commission and 
SERAP v. Nigeria cases, decided by the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), support the case for the amendment of the Nigerian Constitution to 
convert socioeconomic rights as directive principles of state policy to enforceable human rights. 
  The ECOWAS cases both show conclusively that the Nigerian government has been 
obstinately hiding under the cover of the nonjusticiability of socioeconomic rights proviso of 
section 6(6)(c) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, in order to shirk its 
socioeconomic rights commitments under the African Charter, which it has domesticated; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; as well as the ECOWAS 
Treaty and its protocols.  Constitutionally protected rights have always been vigorously defended 
and enforced by the Nigerian judiciary and bar association, even during military regimes. A 
constitutional amendment and relaxed access to court by litigants would neutralize the Nigerian 
government’s position that socioeconomic rights are constitutionally nonjusticiable and subject 
government’s socioeconomic policies to judicial scrutiny.    
 Constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights will subject Nigeria’s socioeconomic 
policies to international human rights law obligations and domestic constitutional mandates, 
thereby improving public governance accountability. More importantly, the forces in the 
Nigerian legal system that have utilized relaxed access to the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the ECOWAS Court of Justice would have their toolkit of existing 
domestic mechanisms of accountability complemented by constitutionally guaranteed 
socioeconomic rights, and knock off the bottom of persistent arguments by government lawyers 
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that the 1999 Nigerian Constitution recognizes socioeconomic rights as nonjusticiable 
fundamental principles and objectives of state policy. Nigerian governments have by and large 
respected domestic court judgments, including the despotic military regimes. Court judgments 
based on constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights under an amended 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria would also be respected and complied with by a Nigerian 
government that respects only constitutionally enforceable human rights.   
 Nigerian judges would be empowered to subject government policies to thresholds of 
accountability if socioeconomic rights are made constitutionally justiciable and the 
nonjusticiable clause is deleted from the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
606
 That is implicit in the 
full text of my interview with Honorable Albert Oduyemi, retired justice of the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal.
607
  Public interest litigation can only flourish in Nigeria if locus standi or access to court 
is also relaxed from its conservative restrictive nature in Nigerian jurisprudence. Very few 
Nigerians can access the international tribunals for enforcement of socioeconomic rights, and the 
availability of domestic remedies will regularly subject government socioeconomic policies to 
public scrutiny in the law courts.                       
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                                               CHAPTER FIVE                  
THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS  
5.0. Introduction                 
Section 5.1 of this chapter substantially focuses through the scholarship of American professors 
Mark Tushnet, Lawrence Sager, and Frank Michelman to learn how America has ameliorated the 
limitations of a constitutional tradition strongly opposed to constitutionalized socioeconomic 
through the use of ordinary legislation by both the federal government and the states, in order to 
provide welfare rights through welfare benefits in health and education.  I juxtapose the 
American experience with that of Nigeria, where socioeconomic rights are also not justiciable, 
but unlike in America, they are listed as fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy under Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This 
theoretically gives the Nigerian political class greater leeway to enact the provisions into 
ordinary legislation, just the way welfare rights have been legislated upon in the United States. 
But as I highlighted at the beginning of this dissertation, such legislation in Nigeria has not been 
respected by the Nigerian state, which still maintains that socioeconomic rights are 
nonjusticiable under the terms of the 1999 Constitution, even when it relates to legislation, which 
it  passed. I proceed, in section 5.2, to analyze the jurisprudence on education in the U.S. states 
of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York. I establish that education jurisprudence has improved 
accountability in public governance in these three states in the provision of free qualitative public 
education for their children.         
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 Subsequently, in section 5.3, I analyze the attempt of India’s Supreme Court 
socioeconomic jurisprudence to entrench accountability in government’s socioeconomic policies 
through public interest litigation. In section 5.4, I conduct a brief analysis of the transformative 
constitutions of Argentina and Colombia, both of which contain enforceable socioeconomic 
rights. In section 5.5, I show that a number of African countries have incorporated justiciable 
socioeconomic rights in their constitutions in the past two decades. I then conclude the chapter 
by stating that Nigeria can benefit immensely from the experiences of Argentina, Columbia, and 
India in improving accountability of public governance through the subjection of government 
policies to a minimum threshold of scrutiny by the judicial branch. Nigeria can benefit from the 
United States’ experience in the realization of educational and health standards through ordinary 
legislation and states’ constitutions, despite a strong aversion to the entrenchment of enforceable 
socioeconomic rights in the U.S. Constitution. India has also amended its constitution to make 
education an enforceable socioeconomic right for children up until fourteen years of age, while 
at the same time, the Indian Supreme Court has expanded the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
life to encompass a right to health care. All mechanisms of accountability, including 
constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights, must be available to ameliorate Nigeria’s 
accountability deficit in public governance.     
5.1. An Analysis of the American Constitutional Model in the Area of Socioeconomic 
Rights   The United States does not offer constitutionally protected socioeconomic rights, but 
rather ordinary legislation has been used by both the federal government and the states to provide 
welfare rights in areas like health, and education. The limitations on having nonjusticiable 
socioeconomic rights have in a sense been ameliorated in the United States, as we shall see in the 
analysis of the scholarship of Michelman, Tushnet, and Sager in this section. In Nigeria, 
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socioeconomic rights are not justiciable under both the 1979 and the current 1999 Constitutions. 
However, they are listed as fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, which 
theoretically gives the Nigerian political class a greater leeway than their counterparts in the 
United States to enact the provisions into ordinary legislation, just the way welfare rights have 
been legislated upon in the United States.        
 The ruling political party, the People’s Democratic Party, passed the Compulsory Free 
Universal Basic Education Act in May 2004, and it came into force on May 26, 2004; it must be 
noted that the same party has been in power in Nigeria since 1999, at the federal level and in 
most of the states.  Section 2 of the Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Act states that 
“Every Government in Nigeria shall provide free, compulsory and universal education for every 
child of primary and junior secondary school age. Every parent shall ensure that his child or 
ward attends and completes his primary school education; and junior secondary education.”  
Section 3 of the act provides that “services provided in public primary and junior secondary 
schools shall be free of charge,” and “a person who receives or obtains any fee contrary to the 
provisions subsection(1) of this section commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding N10,000 or imprisonment for a term of three months or to both.” Section 4 of the 
Act provides that “every parent shall ensure that his child receives full-time education suitable to 
his age, ability and aptitude by regular attendance at school.”    
 But the Nigerian People’s Democratic Party–led government, for example, has 
persistently objected to judicial enforcement of provisions of the 2004 Universal Basic Education 
Act and claims that education is merely a prerogative of government policy under the 
nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. The tendency of the Nigerian 
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government not to accord respect to Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria was addressed in section 4 of chapter 4, on decisions pertaining to Nigeria at 
the ECOWAS Court of Justice       
 According to Michelman, the institutional objection to justiciable socioeconomic rights 
can be addressed by making them nonjusticiable, to conform to the separation of powers 
doctrine. The indeterminacy or lack of precise contours of socioeconomic rights reservations 
expressed by constitutional contractarians, can be addressed by regarding them as directive 
principles as opposed to negative-based fundamental rights in a constitution. Michelman 
attributes this solution to John Rawls; directive principles will bring about a constraint of public 
reason and result in basic justice. Civil and political rights will be justiciable and socioeconomic 
rights will nonjusticiable directive principles attributes of social citizenship. This theory has not 
worked out in Nigeria, where Michelman’s  support for directive principles hold true in the 
wordings of the 1999 Constitution; the directive principles of state policy have been ignored by 
the political elites solely interested in feathering their personal nests and not interested in the 
welfare of the citizens of Nigeria. Michelman’s theory has been strongly debunked by the real 
world of the politics practiced by the People’s Democratic Party in Nigeria.  
The move to public reason eases the strain on constitutional contractarians who honestly 
believe that a political commitment to the state’s constant, good faith pursuit of social 
citizenship for all must be a term of any universally reasonably acceptable constitution. 
The case in which every parliamentarian and indeed every voter stands ready, in all 
sincerity, to explain and defend all their votes, on matters affecting the structural 
conditions of social citizenship, as expressions of their honest best judgments about 
which choice is most conducive to assurance of social citizenship for all, is a case of what 
Rawls would call fulfillment of the ideal of public reason. If citizens could have 
sufficient confidence that public reason in that sense prevails in public decision-making 
over matters affecting the structural conditions of social citizenship, then that confidence 
(combined with formal, legal guarantees of everyone’s enjoyment at all times of the core, 
basic negative liberties) might give every reasonable person a sufficient basis for 
accepting the legislative outcomes, whatever they turn out to be, of a democratic 
constitutional regime. And notice, then, the converse: If the facts on the ground are such 
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that citizens cannot reasonably maintain confidence in the effective constraint of public 
reason on political choices affecting the structural conditions of social citizenship, then 
the extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust. It fails to measure up to the moral 
demand for justice in politics, as political-liberal, constitutional contractarian thought 
conceives of that demand.
608
   
 The majoritarian or democratic objection to socioeconomic rights as a restraint on 
democratic choices is addressed by naming social rights as social citizenship to influence 
political public reasoning representative of the whole gamut of the political spectrum in society 
during the formulation of public policies: 
By contrast, a constitutionally declared right of everyone to the enjoyment of social 
citizenship would leave just about every major issue of public policy still to be decided. 
Its maximum (but maybe not trivial) effect on democratic decision making (the courts 
being kept away) would be a certain pressure on the frame of mind in which citizens and 
their elected representatives would approach the sundry questions of public policy always 
waiting to be decided. In Rawlsian language, the point of naming social citizenship a 
constitutional right would be to give a certain inflection to political public reason. Across 
a very broad swathe of public issues, such a naming would amount to a demand that 
those issues be approached as occasions of judgment―which choice will conducive to 
the social citizenship of everyone, on fair terms?―rather than as invitations to press and 
to vote one’s own naked interests and preferences.609   
Professor William Forbath disagrees with Michelman regarding leaving the determination of 
social citizenship to the political process, and I agree with Forbath,
610
 because the political 
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process excludes the ordinary citizens and is dominated by professional politicians who 
command more resources.             
 Forbath’s concern is vividly reflected by the political process under the 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, especially the nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions on 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. I proved in chapter 4 that the 
Nigerian government has persistently objected to judicial enforcement of the 2004 Universal 
Basic Education Act passed by its legislators. It regularly claims that education is merely a 
prerogative of government policy under the nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy. Nigeria’s experience buttresses Forbath’s disagreement with 
Michelman on leaving the determination of social citizenship to the political process.  
 Michelman’s “Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,”611 accurately mirrors the concerns of the ruling political elite in Nigeria’s First 
Republic from 1960 to 1966, when there were programs to abolish poverty and educate citizens 
free of charge. Unlike the U.S. legal system’s concern with providing protection against severe 
poverty, the politicians in Nigeria in the same period were legislating and implementing 
programs to make life abundant for the poorest Nigerians through good health and proper 
nutrition. According to Michelman, the problem to be solved is severe deprivation, and not 
inequality. He proffers a minimum welfare safety net as opposed to equalization of opportunities. 
For him, using discrimination claims to tackle severe deprivation are a mistaken and ineffective 
approach to tackling poverty in society.        
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 The Harper
612
 decision was about the invalidation of a poll tax condition for voting, and 
it was just a coincidence that the plaintiffs were poor, ditto the criminal law procedure cases of 
Griffin
613
 and Douglas.
614
   
Nowhere in Harper is there any occasion for inference that the poor are, in any more general 
sense, a judicially favored class or that de facto wealth discriminations are generally disfavored. 
The same is true of the ‘criminal procedure’ cases-Griffin v. Illinois, Douglas v. California, and 
their numerous spawn of decisions insisting that a state which subjects a man to criminal 
prosecution must make sure that he is not prevented by want of means from defending himself 
with full vigor, perseverance, and effectiveness. These can easily be explained as belonging to a 
family which treats as meriting special support the interest in strong opposition to the state’s 
prosecutorial thrusts. There is again no need to fabricate a no-pecuniary-discrimination 
doctrine.
615
            
 The [1868] Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stipulates in its first section 
that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”  For Michelman, the provisions do not amount to the recognition of a protection 
against severe deprivation, but rather a protection against discrimination. He states that: “Of 
course, the Court’s ‘egalitarian’ interventions are often occasioned by problems which would not 
exist but for economic inequality. Yet I hope to make clear that in many instances their purposes 
could be more soundly and satisfyingly understood as vindication of a state’s duty to protect 
against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty 
to avoid complicity in unequal treatment.”616      
 Michelman’s concern is not with minority discrimination but rather with severe 
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poverty.
617
 “Perhaps the best description of what ties these paragraphs together is provisional 
adoption, as inchoate legal doctrine, of a theory of social justice which prima facie seems 
capable of rationalizing an important group of equal protection decisions without positing 
equality or even handedness as the guiding value (or discrimination as the target evil).”618 He 
goes on state that the decisions of the courts would be better grounded in proof of severe 
deprivation in contradiction to the claim of inequality:  
…in shaping the statement of our claim so as to fit it to the locutions of the equal protection 
clause, we must find an “inequality” to complain about; and the only inequality turns out to be 
that some persons, less than all, are suffering from inability to satisfy certain “basic” wants 
which presumably are felt by all alike. But if we define the inequality that way, we can hardly 
avoid admitting that the injury consists more essentially of deprivation than of discrimination, 
that the cure accordingly lies more in provision than in equalization, and that the reality of injury 
and need for cure are to be determined largely without reference to whether the complainant’s 
predicament is somehow visibly related to past or current governmental activity.
619
   
 Hence, his thesis of a minimum safety net protection from severe deprivation: “The 
argument for minimum protection as applied to specific needs and occasions must, then, depend 
on the proposition that justice requires more than a fair opportunity to realize an income which 
can cover these needs or insure against them-requires, to be sure, absolute assurance that they 
will be met when as felt, free of any remote contingencies pertaining to effort, thrift, or 
foresight.”620 In Michelman’s thesis, there is no grand ambition to provide the poor with luxuries 
of the rich, except in the area of education: “Standing on a quite different ground is the relevance 
of what others have when the want in question is deemed specially significant―as education, for 
example, might be―because of its importance for success in competitive activities.”621   
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 Michelman makes the claim that American society is only willing to provide the basic 
minimum to satisfy just wants and not to equalize the poor with the rich.  
It is true that the remedy usually adopted in the Griffin-Douglas line of cases―furnishing ‘free’ 
to those classed as ‘indigent’ something for which the more affluent must continue to pay―may 
suggest that the grievance must have consisted of some form of ‘discrimination against’ the class 
of ‘indigents.’ But a little reflection will show that it makes at least as much sense to speak of an 
obligation on the part of organized society to ensure that everyone’s just wants are fulfilled-
which obligation is, in these instances, carried out by free provision to those and only to those 
who cannot satisfy their just wants out of their own means. Moreover, the common practice of 
limiting special assistance to those claiming indigency or inability to afford a lawyer, rather than 
employing a graduated schedule of partial subsidies geared to ability to pay, suggests strongly 
that fulfillment of just wants exhausts the system’s concern. The ‘equality’ which infects judicial 
rhetoric is not reflected in the social practice which the courts have so far deemed acceptable; 
with respect neither to the quality of legal services provided nor to the degree of financial 
sacrifice required is an equality goal seriously pursued.
622
    
Michelman cautions against the raising of false hopes in judicial rhetoric of addressing 
discrimination; as opposed to meeting the basic pecuniary needs of the poor. 
If the relevant insight concerning payment requirements must be given a doctrinal form of 
statement, the appropriate construction would seem to be something like: ‘It is no justification 
for deprivation of a fundamental right (i.e., involuntary nonfulfillment of a just want) that the 
deprivation results from a general practice of requiring persons to pay for what they get.’ Such a 
construction focuses the inquiry on the crucial variable-the nature and quality of the deprivation-
and thereby avoids the distractions, false stirring of hopes, and tunneling of vision which results 
from a rhetorical emphasis on acts of ‘discrimination’ that consists of nothing more than 
charging a price.
623
  
Michelman further cautions lawyers aiming at social reform, to formulate their claims 
regarding severe deprivation by excluding discriminatory claims so as not to alienate judges who 
are desirous of tackling severe deprivation in a society governed by the market economy:     
It must of course be conceded that one might find inaccurate or intolerable the premise, implicit 
in the forgoing remarks, that significant income disparities look to be a long-term fixture in 
American society. One might even believe that judicial action can be made an effective 
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instrument of income equalization (though surely it is not easy to imagine how courts could 
hasten the demise of relative deprivation in general except through treatment of severe 
deprivations in particular). Those who so believe may be justified-though I suspect they would 
be tactically ill-advised-in arguing whenever possible that a government’s unchallenged refusal 
to fulfill some want is unconstitutional because, among other vices, it “discriminates against the 
poor.” But other participants in the process of social reform through litigation ought, I believe, to 
be more discriminating. They might, at any rate, consider the possibility that judges who are 
especially sensitive to the overbreadth of that formulation will be deterred by its recital from 
recognizing claims that might have been acceptable if presented without invoking it. In sum, I 
believe we ought to hear the teachings of Harper
624
 and the Griffin-Douglass line with an ear 
resolutely deaf to superfluous rhetoric. We do better by the Court to regard it, not as nine (or 
seven, or five) Canutes railing against tides of economic inequality, which they have no apparent 
means of stemming, but as a body commendably busy with the critically important task of 
charting some islands of haven from economic disaster in the ocean of what continues to be 
known as free enterprise.”625           
 Several decades later, Michelman is no longer pushing for a constitutionally justiciable 
socioeconomic right for protection against severe deprivation, but rather he leans toward the 
symphony of nonjusticiability.
626
 Professor Forbath painstakingly traced this metamorphosis in 
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Michelman
627
 and the influence of research funding from the U.S. Office of Economic 
Opportunity on Michelman’s 1969 article, “Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”628 The symphony of nonjusticiability of directive principles has not 
played out well under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.   
 The Nigerian political process, for example, has persistently objected to judicial 
enforcement of provisions of the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act, and claims that education 
is merely a prerogative of government policy under the nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy. In section 4 of chapter 4, where I analyzed the impact of the 
jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice on Nigeria, I demonstrated and proved the 
stubborn tendency of the Nigerian government’s persistent refusal to accord respect to Chapter II 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.     
 Mark Tushnet is another American scholar concerned with severe deprivation in 
American society, and he is also supports directive principles of state policy that are 
nonjusticiable in alleviating economic deprivation, which he vividly demonstrated in his book 
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. He also recognized the absence of 
constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights in the United States, but explained that this has 
been tempered by ordinary legislation to provide some succor to the needy in society who cannot 
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afford socioeconomic goods.  Tushnet cited Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202 (1982), a Supreme Court 
decision to demonstrate that the court steps in to declare as unconstitutional socioeconomic 
legislation on free public education, which excluded children whose parents lacked immigration 
papers. He also referred to a federal court decision, League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995),  that nullified a 1994 California State law passed by 
voters under Proposition 187, which denied free public education to children whose parents 
lacked immigration papers.
629
 In Plyler the analysis of the Supreme Court revolved around the 
fact “that the children denied a free public education were likely to remain in the country for 
many years, and would be more productive contributors to the nation if they had an 
education…In Pyler the Court found no indication in the record that the burdens the children 
placed on the Texas economy were significant, and suggested that the outcome might differ if 
there had been such evidence.”630            
 Tushnet believes that American legislators have abdicated the constitutional compass to 
the courts and tailor legislation to avoid such legislation being struck down as unconstitutional 
by the judiciary.
631
 Tushnet cited Thayer’s seminal 1893 article, which advocated judicial 
restraint and deference to legislation, except the manifestly unconstitutional ones.
632
 According 
to Tushnet, the Supreme Court employs strict scrutiny when interpreting laws that affect the 
liberty bearing provisions of the American Constitution and adopts low scrutiny in the area of 
socioeconomic legislation. He cited as an example the case of (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970): “a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the 
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it 
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does not offend the…Constitution. The Court’s reason for giving low-level scrutiny to social and 
economic laws is that anything more would convert the Court into a general supervisor of the 
wisdom of everything a legislature enacts.”633        
 Tushnet believes that judges are influenced by the dominant political forces in society, 
thereby assimilating the values of dominant political forces, and he cited the influence of the 
New Deal political grouping era on judges.
634
 “All this means that judicial review is likely to 
simply reinforce whatever a political movement can get outside the courts. Sometimes, however, 
judicial review might make it harder for political movements to accomplish their objectives.”635 
He therefore cautions lawyers and political movements against putting all their eggs in the 
judicial basket as opposed to alternative modes of social mobilization.
636
  
We should not overestimate judicial review’s significance, however. The persistence of 
segregation after Brown, for example, cautions advocates to distinguish between the short term 
and the long term, and between material accomplishments and ideological ones. …This sort of 
caution is particularly important for lawyers, and for a public in the United States with its 
distinctive constitutional and legal culture. Lawyers are likely to overestimate the contributions 
we can make to social progress, for obvious and understandable reasons. Cautions about what we 
can actually accomplish help to deflate our sense that we are essential contributors to social 
change.
637
            
 Tushnet also recognizes the American “passion” with the concept of individualistic 
fundamental right.  
The U.S. constitutional and legal culture matters, too, because in that culture the simple 
statement by a court that someone has a right-in itself only an ideological victory-can too easily 
be taken, by the public if not by progressive lawyers and their allies, as a complete victory. It 
takes work, in our culture, to connect ideological; victories to material outcomes, to explain why 
Brown’s condemnation of school segregation is betrayed when African-American children still 
attend schools with almost no white children. The cautions remind us that such work continues to 
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be necessary.
638
 …Rights-claims are individualistic, nonetheless, not because of something 
inherent in the concept of rights, but rather because of the historical development of the language 
of rights. The central image of “rights” in our culture is, as Mackinnon’s critique suggests, of a 
sphere within which each of us can do what he or she pleases. This image, in turn, reinforces the 
distinction between law and politics. Politics is the domain of pure
639
will or preference, not 
subject to discussion and deliberation except as each individual chooses to be influenced by 
others. Rights-or law-protect the domain in which political preferences are formed. If, however, 
a critic believes that making politics truly social is an important task, it might be important as 
well to fight an ideology, the ideology of rights, that leads people to think of themselves as 
disconnected from others in important ways.
640
             
 
 Tushnet also cautioned about the Supreme Court’s judgment going against the grain of 
the majority Caucasian populace in America and illustrated the point with the school segregation 
case in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955):  
Brown is important in another way. Whatever its effects were, we know that it did not transform 
the material conditions in which most African-Americans live. African-American participation in 
the national political process has not produced public policies that have eliminated 
discrimination and the disproportionate poverty affecting the African-American community. The 
reason is that a national majority believes that such policies would be too expensive. The point to 
note here is that judicial review has not addressed these problems either. Again following the 
election returns, the Supreme Court has shifted gears. It now uses the rules it developed to assist 
African-Americans to strike down affirmative action programs. Perhaps this is a more complex 
case of the Court predicting the future, as the Court seems more opposed to affirmative action 
than cultural elites and more even than the American people, who reveal in polls more even 
ambivalence about affirmative action than the Court’s decisions express.641    
 As a solution to the above problem, Tushnet looks at the British and Dutch models, 
where socioeconomic programs have been achieved under ordinary legislation. The judiciary in 
Britain, for example, employs administrative law proceedings of the ultra-vires doctrine to 
correct inadequacies in implementation of government programs, unlike the constitutional 
remedies approach in the United States.
642
 Tushnet recognizes the phobia and deep aversion of 
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both the U.S. Supreme Court and a majority of constitutional scholars to constitutionalized 
socioeconomic rights which amount to “...courts running everything―raising taxes and deciding 
how the money should be spent. Some people think we have all too much of that today, but the 
problem they see would be worse if we constitutionalized social welfare rights.”643   
    
 Tushnet sees a way out in Article 45 of the Irish Constitution, which makes its 
nonjusticiable “Directive Principles of Social Policy” enforceable only by the legislature. He also 
seeks a solution in the German model, where public assistance has been recognized as a 
constitutional right by the Constitutional Court, but the legislature has the prerogative to design 
and implement such assistance. He cites the incorporation of the above models in Lawrence 
Sager’s vital but ignored 1978 article, “The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms.”  In summary, just as international human rights documents dictate, legislators must be 
guided by the directive principles of a country’s constitution dealing with the welfare of the 
people.
644
  
As that indicates, Sager saw the Constitution in the courts’ shadow. Underenforced constitutional 
norms are, simply, ones the courts do not enforce. But, Sager argued, they were just as fully 
“constitutional” as the ones the courts did enforce. What does that mean? International human 
rights documents typically acknowledge that the degree to which any nation can effectively 
provide social welfare rights depends on the nation’s economic development. The Irish phrase 
“Directive Principles of Social Policy” points us in the right direction. Constitutional social 
welfare rights direct legislators to implement their provisions. As Sager put it, public officials-
legislators and executive officials-had a duty to make their “best efforts” to carry out the 
Constitution’s directives.645   
Tushnet has a feeling that liberal constitutionalists have not shown concrete sympathy 
toward the plight of the poor in U.S. society, as they have done with more elitist abortion issues.  
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In arriving at this conclusion, he was greatly influenced by Mark Graber’s “The Clintonification 
of American Law:  Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory.”646  Tushnet’s analysis 
in the previous paragraphs, point toward the adoption of the Irish constitutional model of 
nonjusticiable directive principles as a way out of addressing poverty in America.     
 Mark Tushnet’s “Weak Courts, Strong Rights” exhibits his concern about delivering the 
socioeconomic goods in American society and other societies battling with severe deprivation 
where socioeconomic goods are not constitutionally protected as fundamental rights. He sees a 
way in having socioeconomic goods provided for through directive principles of state policy akin 
to what obtains in Nigeria. His thesis must be adjusted to take into consideration deviant 
behavior, like the political elites who have ignored the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.      
  Tushnet examines the classical political science model expounded by Robert Dahl in 
1957, and built upon by Barry Friedman and Robert Bennett. This political science model maps a 
longtime dialogue between the executive, judicial, and legislative arms, which eventually leads 
to the appointment of Supreme Court judges sympathetic to the ruling political elite after the 
transition or retirement of old judges. “In the end, the dominant coalition comes to live with 
strong-form review because it finds it pointless to argue the purely theoretical question of strong-
versus weak-form review once it has taken control of the Court.”647 A shorter time frame is 
offered by social movement scholars. Tushnet analyzed the scholarship of Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel on the influence that social movements exercise on judgments of the Supreme Court, 
whose justices as members of society are not hermetically sealed off from how social movements 
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change contemporary societal views about the U.S. Constitution. This model does not depend on 
appointment of sympathetic judges or packing the bench with allies in contradistinction to the 
political science model above. “Like that model, though, the social movement model takes the 
story to end when the courts come into line.”648 Tushnet also examines the shortest dialogue, 
“switch in time” model underpinned by metaphorical “moments” offered by Bruce Ackerman. 
Under this model, a galvanized society enacts legislation through its leaders, which in turn is 
annulled by the judiciary upon a constitutional petition. At this moment, a more galvanized 
society seeks to take over the court and the court in the face of strong social mobilization against 
its judgment, capitulates to popular opinion.
649
          
 Tushnet identifies U.S. judicial review as a strong form but sees the Supreme Court 
exercising a weak form of judicial review in the area of socioeconomic welfare legislation when 
it concedes to the wisdom of the legislature. He buttresses this view with the decision in 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
650
  But nevertheless he goes on to identify the 
“political questions doctrine,” which insulates certain activities of the legislature from judicial 
review, for example, the impeachment of judges. “The political questions doctrine does not mean 
that Congress is totally unconstrained by the Constitution in the areas it identifies. Rather, it 
means that Congress conclusively determines what the Constitution means in those areas.”651  
 Tushnet claims that weak forms of judicial review encourage regular conversation 
between the judiciary and the legislature on interpreting constitutions.
652
 This model, according 
to him, has been labeled as experimentalist by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel.
653
 “To what 
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extent do decision makers orient themselves towards a nation’s constitutional tradition?”654  This 
is a very important question raised by Tushnet, but I have strong reservations about Tushnet’s 
belief in the altruistic nature of legislators in the United States of America.
655
 “Bruce Peabody’s 
recent survey of the views of members of the U.S. Congress indicates that its members do pay 
attention to the Constitution more often than academic skeptics think.”656      
 Tushnet does not seem to be confident about the emergence of a culture where greater 
weight would be given to a court’s opinion than that of the government under the model of weak 
judicial review.  
Advocates of weak-form review insist on the beneficial effects of embarrassment in shaping a 
culture of rights. They favor weak-form review rather than mere press criticism because they 
believe that experience has shown the inadequacy of the latter as a tool to control 
government….The difficulty lies in creating a culture in which the courts’ statements have some 
weight, but only because people believe that the courts’ institutional characteristics increase the 
likelihood that the constitutional interpretations they offer are more reasonable than the 
reasonable ones offered by the government. If courts’ judgments have more weight than that, one 
might as well adopt strong-form judicial review….experience with weak-form judicial review is 
too recent to support confident judgments about the possibility that weak-form systems will 
indeed create such cultures.
657
   
Tushnet redevelops faith in the weak-form of judicial review in the last two chapters of 
his book, “Weak Courts, Strong Rights”.658 Tushnet agrees with the thesis of Robert Hale in his 
1923 seminal article that the state delegates power in the form of private property.
659
 He tries to 
explain the U.S. state action doctrine through an expressive methodology that factors in 
constitutional history or legal culture and ideology, on one hand, and “that state action doctrine is 
about judicial rather than legislative definition of the effects of the background rules of property, 
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contract, and tort,”660 on the other hand.  Tushnet tries to explain the phobia of an omnipresent 
state in U.S. culture as the reason for the durability of the mentality of holding the state at bay 
through the state action doctrine. In his words,  
In the U.S. legal culture, the concern, already mentioned, that an expansive state action doctrine 
has totalitarian overtones plays an important part. The underlying intuition is that there is 
something more problematic, more threatening to liberty, from government action than from 
action by private parties. The government might be more threatening because it can inflict more 
harm than private actors, or because it can inflict a different and more troubling kind of harm. On 
examination though, neither argument seems particularly strong, suggesting an expressive 
analysis of the doctrine provides greater insight than alternatives.
661
    
Tushnet demonstrates the restraint on state power through the employment of state action 
doctrine by the Supreme Court in the case of Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1906). Here, the 
Supreme Court annulled a New York statute that limited operational hours of bakers.
662
 In the 
earlier Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. (1883), the Supreme Court held that discrimination in the 
private sphere that did not emanate through state action could not be legislated against by 
Congress.
663
  Miller v. Schoene 276 U.S. 272 (1928) is used by Tushnet to demonstrate that the 
background rules of common law did not provide “a neutral baseline of private rights,” which 
made the Supreme Court jettison the Lochner liberty of contract doctrine’s pretension of 
“protecting individual power against collective power.”664       
 The Lochner liberty of contract period was replaced by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
commitment to social welfare rights, which Tushnet references Cass Sunstein as calling “The  
Second Bill of Rights:FDRs Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than 
Ever”constitutionally committed to social welfare rights.665 The ambivalence of American 
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society to welfare rights is explained by Tushnet: “We have repudiated Lochner in its core 
applications, and yet it remains with us in the state action doctrine. The reason is that Americans 
accept the modern regulatory state, which is why we have repudiated Lochner, but we are not 
entirely comfortable with it, which is why we retain the state action doctrine.”666 The state action 
doctrine is underpinned by the concept of federalism, which limits federal legislation and federal 
judicial power and enables states’ legislatures acting for the majority “to regulate private 
decisions as they choose.”667           
 U.S. constitutional law is predicated on the deference by the judiciary to the legislature, 
in matters relating to socioeconomic issues. Because legal reasoning could not resolve policy 
judgments which socioeconomic issues entailed under the dichotomy between public and private 
divide. But civil and political rights could easily be addressed by legal reasoning tools employed 
by the judiciary.
668
 In applying the foregoing analysis to socioeconomic rights, Tushnet adopts 
Duncan Kennedy’s view that “policy and politics” determine the role of socio-economic rights in 
wealth creation and distribution in American society.
669
 “The contemporary social welfare state 
implicitly incorporates the critique of the idea that the economic realm is free from state power 
by permitting social welfare redistributions. However, the contemporary liberal objection to 
mandated social welfare rights remains in the shadow of Lochner because it holds that questions 
regarding the distribution of wealth are among the most political and controversial and thus must 
be left to democratic processes for their resolution.”670      
 Tushnet feels that the assertions by American scholars that the U.S. constitutional model 
has been adopted widely by other nations is wrong, and he refers to Sager’s Justice in 
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Plainclothes as an example of such recent scholarship.
671
 Tushnet recommends the Irish model 
of nonjusticiable “Directive Principles of Social Policy.”672 “In this way the Irish model of 
declaratory but otherwise nonjusticiable rights―analogous to the British Human Rights 
Act―may turn out to be the best, because it at least allows for the permanent articulation of the 
view that social and economic rights should be strong.”673      
 Clearly then, Tushnet recommends a constitutional model of nonjusticiable directive 
principles in line with the Irish model. But another reading of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution dictated positive action of the states to protect liberties of emancipated slaves 
who had hitherto suffered from the inaction of same states to protect their recently acquired 
liberties; this implies that positive rights can be read in the U.S. Constitution.
674
    
 Governments in Nigeria, including military regimes, have always obeyed judicial 
decisions on justiciable constitutional provisions. The tendency of the Nigerian government not 
to disrespect Chapter II provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
was addressed in section 4 of chapter 4 on decisions on Nigeria at the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice. I earnestly believe that socioeconomic rights will only be respected by the Nigerian 
government when they are made justiciable through an amendment of the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Justiciable socioeconomic rights would complement and fortify 
existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria and subject government’s socioeconomic 
policies to judicial scrutiny.    
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 Sager is another American scholar concerned with severe deprivations in U.S. society; he 
is interested in how to maneuver around the constitutional constraints of a U.S. constitutional 
order that does not recognize socioeconomic goods as constitutionally protected fundamental 
rights. But he makes the point that through ordinary legislation the United States strove to 
ameliorate the plight of the needy in society and that the courts have stepped up to the plate to 
enforce such rights. Sager acknowledges polycentric considerations of lack of judicial capacity 
in welfare rights adjudication more properly resolved by other parts of the democratic process, 
and when welfare rights are legislated, the judiciary now plays a secondary role of policing the 
just implementation of the legislated welfare rights.
675
   
 Sager’s point of departure from Tushnet’s analysis above, is that Tushnet’s thin 
constitution is too thin to guarantee a good society desirous of embedded constitutional norms of 
nonjusticiable social rights. Political dialogue is also limited in this model.
676
 In addition, 
Tushnet’s thin constitution does not accommodate a rearrangement of the political economy so 
that a hardworking person “will be able to provide herself and her family with minimum food, 
shelter, education, and medical care,…There is no space in Professor Tushnet’s thin Constitution 
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for any such view.”677          
 In Justice in Plainclothes, Sager demonstrates his deeply felt concern about growing 
poverty in American society, and he tries to proffer solutions and admonishes Americans not to 
give up on the battle against severe deprivation. He disagrees with the instruction-taking 
originalist literal agency model of interpretation of the American constitution, which foists the 
ironclad ancient wisdom of the framing generation upon a modern and different age of 
constitutional law.
678
 According to Sager, the originalists would prefer that the ancient wisdom 
of the framing generation dictate present-day constitutional practice.
679
 Sager debunks the 
instruction-taking approach with his analysis of the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Sager states that “The Ninth Amendment puts the instruction taking view of constitutional 
practice in gridlock.” The Ninth Amendment states that “The enumeration in the Constitution of 
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Sager 
goes further to state that “The Ninth Amendment, in turn, is best understood as responding to the 
worst fears of those who loved liberty but had doubts about the wisdom of including what 
ultimately became the Bill of Rights in the Constitution: that no simple list of the liberties of a 
free people could do justice to justice, and that, by the principle of expression unius est exclusion 
alterius, a bill of rights would do more harm than good.”680     
 Sager pitches his tent with the partnership model of constitutional interpretation.
681
 “The 
partnership model is open to (indeed, depends upon) the belief that collaboration between a 
popular constitutional decision-maker which paints in broad strokes and a judicial constitutional 
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decision-maker which fills in these strokes with close and reflective details is reasonably well 
suited to the enterprise of securing the fundamentals of political justice. This is the justice-
seeking account of our constitutional practice and I believe it to be the best account of that 
practice.”682  Sager ascribes certain thinness to constitutional law in the realm of political justice. 
“Constitutional case law is thin in this important sense: The range of those matters that are 
plausible candidates for judicial engagement and enforcement in the name of the Constitution is 
considerably smaller than the range of those matters that are plausibly understood to implicate 
serious questions of political justice. This moral shortfall is one of the most durable and salient 
features of constitutional life, one that begs for explanation.”683     
 Even though Sager believes that the Supreme Court has largely been flexible in 
addressing injustice, he thinks poverty has not been addressed by the Court.
684
  
But economic justice for the suffering poor has never secured a firm place on the Court’s 
constitutional agenda. Even the Warren Court in its most aggressive moments approached the 
question of economic justice with oblique caution. Throughout, the feeling has not been one of 
reluctant fidelity but rather of active judgment that recognizes sharp limitations on the reach of 
constitutional principle or, in the alternative, on the reach of judicially accessible constitutional 
principle. The sense that seems pervasive in modern constitutional adjudication and most 
commentary is that judicial enforcement of economic justice would inappropriately congest 
popular political choice. Something more than mere inertia is needed to explain how a justice-
seeking Constitution could treat as a virtue the durable, systematic refusal to respond to the 
claims of the suffering poor.
685
     
 Sager locates the answer to the above puzzle in his theory of judicial underenforcement. 
“The very existence of the political question doctrine concept in our constitutional jurisprudence 
thus reflects a partial recognition of the idea of judicial underenforcement.”686 Sager’s thesis of 
underenforcement, dictates that the executive and legislative branches are given the prerogative 
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to formulate policies and programs. The judiciary subsequently intervenes, for instance, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, through cases like Shapiro v. 
Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County 415 U.S. 250 (1974), 
and Saenz v. Roe 526 U.S. 489 (1999). According to Sager,  
Like the earlier right to travel cases, Saenz makes much sense if understood as the invalidation of 
an unjust categorical exclusion from the benefits of a state-established safety net―if understood 
in other words, as an instance of the secondary judicial protection of the constitutional right to 
minimum welfare. So understood, these cases of judicial enforcement of the right to minimum 
welfare are secondary in this sense: The judiciary steps in only after the programmatic choices of 
strategy and responsibility have been made and polices the resulting programs against the 
possibility of unjust categorical exclusions.
687
 … Basic welfare payments and public education at 
the elementary and secondary levels ought to be understood as constitutional entitlements, the 
primary provision is the constitutional responsibility of non-judicial governmental bodies. Once 
the broad structural features of programs providing the entitlements are in place, the judiciary 
can respond constructively in a number of ways. Assuring that appropriate process protects the 
beneficiaries of these entitlements is a compelling feature of the judiciary’s secondary role with 
regard to such entitlements.
688
        
Jones v. Alfred Mayer 392 U.S. 409 (1968), where the Supreme Court found Congress 
empowered by section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to legislate the 
protection against racial discriminatory practices of real estate operators, is seen by Sager as an 
example of institutional partnership and a demonstration of the underenforcement thesis to attain 
constitutional justice: “Jones v Alfred Mayer is a quintessential case of partnership between the 
Supreme Court and Congress in the enterprise of securing constitutional justice; it is also an 
important instantiation of the underenforcement thesis. The only wrinkle on the general theme of 
underenforcement in Jones is that here underenforcement is operating not at the level of rights 
definition but at the level of remedy for an acknowledged constitutional wrong.”689   
 Sager utilizes the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer and three of his colleagues at the 
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Supreme Court in Alabama v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356, 382 (2001), pertaining to section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to demonstrate his underenforcement thesis:   
There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exercise 
of its Section 5 authority to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court’s institutional 
limitations. Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the 
magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy…unlike courts, Congress 
directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and 
to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to behavior that is callous or 
unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members of 
Congress can directly obtain information from constituents who have firsthand experience with 
discrimination and related issues. Moreover unlike judges, Members of Congress are elected. 
When the Court has applied the majority’s burden of proof rule, it has explained that we, i.e., the 
courts do not ‘sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy 
determinations’…. To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress’s 
legislative power is to stand the underlying principle-a principle of judicial restraint-on its 
head…690     
What is striking about Sager’s in-depth analysis is his emphasis on striving for the 
practical goal of poverty alleviation through the institution best suited for such an ambitious 
project, the legislature. That legislative capacity was identified by Sager’s extracts from Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, which appears above. This capacity was brought to the fore during the New 
Deal era. The judiciary already had its hands full in adjudicating upon the liberty-bearing 
elements of the Constitution, which aim at empowering citizens, through the political process, in 
having a say in the kind of baseline entitlements necessary for a suitable standard of living.
691
 
By distinguishing the adjudicated Constitution from the full Constitution, we can make sense of 
our constitutional practices as a whole: We can explain the durable gap between constitutional 
case law and political justice, how our justice-seeking constitutional practices can ignore 
desperate poverty and entrenched racial and gender disadvantage. We can also explain the odd fit 
between generous congressional authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and the far more 
narrow spontaneous judicial reading of that amendment, and make attractive sense out of many 
of the Supreme Court’s apparently anomalous engagements with the needs of the poor and the 
handicapped. What emerges is a picture in which we understand ourselves to be obliged-
constitutionally obliged-to address the injustice of poverty and entrenched racial and gender 
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disadvantage, but see the primary addresses of this obligation as elected officials rather than 
judges.
692
        
Congress and the various states’ legislatures have been active in U.S. history in setting 
baseline poverty alleviation programs for education, health care, and social security. The New 
Deal era was a great watershed in the annals of safety-net measures in the United States.  
These immediate times aside, we have at least aspired to secure the right to minimum welfare. 
There has been a pervasive social and political recognition of the need for a safety net, and 
efforts to implement a base of public support that satisfies the limited promise of that metaphor. 
Public or publicly supported education has not flourished in our time, but neither emphatically, 
has it perished, we would, I strongly hope and believe never retreat from our sustained 
commitment to a free basic education. Even in the face of our inability to rationalize the 
distribution of medical care, most if not all urban centers provide a network of public hospitals or 
some other mechanism by which the most urgent medical needs of the poor are met.
693
   
  
 Sager’s judicial underenforcement theory of the U.S. Constitution clearly does not see the 
advantage to the Constitution having justiciable socioeconomic rights; he would rather have the 
legislature enact ordinary socioeconomic legislation, to be implemented by the executive. Any 
discriminatory or unconscionable formulation and implementation of the ensuing programs 
would then be addressed by the courts utilizing the liberty-bearing provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution. Sager is candid in admitting the huge challenges of poverty and access to health 
care prevalent in the United States.    
 Sager’s thesis for the United States, of having the legislature enact ordinary 
socioeconomic legislation to be implemented by the executive and moderated for fairness by the 
judiciary, has been extremely difficult to implement in Nigeria. U.S. courts are not hindered by 
Nigeria’s Constitutional provisions, which exclude the Nigerian judiciary from adjudicating 
upon socioeconomic rights. I establish this fact in the next section, with the education 
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jurisprudence from Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York. I have established the fact that in 
Nigeria, ordinary legislation that provides for compulsory basic education has not been 
implemented by the government, which claims education belongs to the nonjusticiable 
provisions of the Constitution on fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy. 
Therefore, it has refused to comply with decisions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, which 
ordered implementation of legislation on compulsory basic education.    
 I argue, therefore, that constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights will greatly 
complement existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria to address the accountability 
deficit in public governance in Nigeria. The socioeconomic challenges of Nigeria are not the 
same as those of the United States, which has utilized a Constitution for over two centuries and 
developed institutions and constitutional practices unlike Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution modeled 
upon the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Nigerian Supreme Court Justice 
Kayode Eso advised that the uniqueness of Nigeria’s experience should guide “…the problems 
of interpretation and application of the Nigerian Constitution...”694  I will attempt to show, in the 
next section, the capacity of courts in adjudicating upon the socioeconomic right of education in 
three states in the United States, and ensuring the soundness of the government’s educational 
policies of fidelity to constitutional provisions in those states’ Constitutions.695                                                                                                                                      
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5.2. Education Jurisprudence in Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York States    
An understated aspect of U.S. constitutional law is the role of the Constitutions of the fifty states 
in the guarantee of socioeconomic rights and the active role of their courts in enforcing them.
696
 
A more nuanced scholarly approach, which accurately reflects the dual nature of U.S. 
constitutional law, is now on the ascendancy.697 American scholars who have complained about 
the failure of the national Constitution to protect socioeconomic rights have found such 
protection in Canada, Europe, and South Africa. “Curiously, these scholars have usually 
neglected to look within the United States to the various state constitutions that, in fact, establish 
positive rights.”698           
 In the rest of this section, I will analyze the education clauses in the Constitutions of 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York.  The Constitution of Kentucky provides that: “The 
General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common 
education throughout the state.”699 In Rose v. Council for Better Education,700 decided on June 8, 
1989, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, while interpreting a claim regarding an infringement of 
the above provision on education, held that the issue of standing requires a substantial interest in 
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a case and it depends on the facts of each particular case.
701
 But the Court exhibited a relaxed 
and broad view of standing when it ruled that in constitutional matters:  
However the absence of, or the failure to create a proper class, in no way changes the decision of 
the trial court or, for that matter, of this Court, with respect to the issue of the constitutionality of 
Kentucky system of common schools. If a statute (or in this case, a system established by 
statutes) is not constitutionally valid, the existence or non-existence of a class of litigants is 
immaterial. The constitutional issue has been raised by the Council, the individual school 
districts and by those individual students properly before this Court. The system is no more nor 
no less susceptible to constitutional challenge because of the lack of a class action.
702
  
This position of the Supreme Court is vital in enabling litigants’ access to court, when the state 
has infringed the socioeconomic right of education guaranteed by the State of Kentucky 
Constitution.             
 In dealing with the complaint of infringement of the above provision on education by the 
state, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that: “Since the Constitution acknowledges the 
importance of education to this Commonwealth and since the establishment and maintenance of 
a system of common schools is a mandated duty of the General Assembly, it is part and parcel of 
this overall goal that the system have the twin attributes of uniformity and equality.”703  In 
essence, a court constitutionally empowered can rule on the parameters that ensure the soundness 
of a government educational policy, and this is exactly what the Kentucky Supreme Court 
distilled in the parameters “of uniformity and equality.”     
 On the issue of separation of powers and judicial ruling on the constitutionality of 
legislation or the threat of judicial legislation, the Supreme Court held that  
It is textbook law that enactments of the General Assembly have a strong presumption of 
constitutionality…. It is also textbook law that where legislative discretion is present, the 
judiciary will be reluctant to interfere….The separation of power doctrine of the Kentucky 
Constitution underpins and buttresses these legal theories…In this context, we review the 
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question before us. The ultimate issue is whether the system of common schools in the 
Commonwealth established by the General Assembly, with respect to the mandate of Section 
183, is in compliance with the constitution. Specifically we are asked―based solely on the 
evidence before us―if the present system of common schools is “efficient” in the constitutional 
sense. It is our sworn duty, to decide such questions when they are before us by applying the 
constitution. The duty of the judiciary in Kentucky was so determined when the citizens of 
Kentucky enacted the social compact called the Constitution and in it provided for the existence 
of a third equal branch of government, the judiciary. The issue before us…the constitutionality of 
the system of statutes that created the common schools…is the only issue. To avoid deciding the 
case because of “legislative discretion,” “legislative function,” etc., would be a denigration of 
our own constitutional duty. To allow the General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) 
to decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable….The judiciary has the 
ultimate power, and duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and 
sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely 
the function of the judiciary to do so. This duty must be exercised even when such action serves 
as a check on the activities of another branch of government or when the court’s view of the 
constitution is contrary to that of other branches or even that of the public.”704   
The Supreme Court of Kentucky holding clearly demonstrates that when courts are empowered 
to adjudicate on socioeconomic rights of education, they can ensure that government’s policies 
conform to constitutional provisions.        
 The Court held that the school system in Kentucky was inefficient, and that the 
legislature must device means of adequately funding the system while making it accessible to 
children from both poor and rich families, while at the same monitoring legislative remedies 
continuously.
705
  
Having declared the system of common schools to be constitutionally deficient, we have directed 
the General Assembly to recreate and redesign a new system that will comply with the standards 
we have set out. Such system will guarantee to all children the opportunity for an adequate 
education, through a state system. To allow local citizens and taxpayers to make a supplementary 
effort in no way reduces or negates the minimum quality of education required in the statewide 
system. We do not instruct the General Assembly to raise taxes. It is their decision how best to 
achieve efficiency. We only decide the nature of the constitutional mandate. We only determine 
the intent of the framers. Carrying out that intent is the duty of the General Assembly.
706
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The Supreme Court then affirmed the seven requirements of an efficient school system 
formulated by the trial court and stated that public schools must be free.
707
 
A child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under our Constitution. The 
General Assembly must protect and advance that right. We concur with the trial court that an 
efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child with at least 
the seven following capacities: 
1. sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a 
complex and  rapidly changing civilization; 
2.   sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to 
make informed choices; 
3. sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand 
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; 
4. sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness;  
5.  sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural 
heritage; 
6. sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational 
fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and  
7. sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to 
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the 
job market.
708
    
 
The order of the Court was suspended from June 9, 1989 to 1990, to enable the General 
Assembly pass a remedial statute. According to the Court: “Because of the enormity of the task 
before the General Assembly to recreate a new statutory system of common schools in the 
Commonwealth, and because we realize that the educational process must continue, we withhold 
the finality of this decision until after the adjournment of the General Assembly, sine die, at its 
regular session in 1990.”709 The Kentucky General Assembly subsequently passed the Kentucky 
Education Reform Act of 1990, which increased taxation revenues by over $1 billion to increase 
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funding for education.
710
         
 The New Jersey State Constitution, enacted in 1947, states that “The Legislature shall 
provide for the maintenance and support of free public schools for the instruction of all the 
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”711 In the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey case of Abbott v. Burke,
712
 decided on June 5, 1990, the constitutionality of the New 
Jersey Public Education Act of 1975, with regard to the above article on education for children, 
was the issue under determination. The Court held that: 
 From this record we find that certain poorer urban districts do not provide a thorough and 
efficient education to their students. The Constitution is being violated. These students in poorer 
urban districts have not been able to participate fully as citizens and workers in our society. They 
have not been able to achieve any level of equality in that society with their peers from the 
affluent suburban districts. We find the constitutional failure clear, severe, extensive, and of long 
duration. We cannot find on this record, however, that there is any constitutional violation in the 
other districts.
713
   
This decision clearly demonstrates that at the state level in the United States, courts are 
empowered and equally have the capacity to adjudicate on the socioeconomic right of education. 
In Abbott, that is exactly what the Supreme Court did when it aligned the educational policies of 
New Jersey to be in tune with the state’s constitutional provisions. The Court then ordered that  
The Act must be amended, or new legislation passed, so as to assure that poorer urban districts’ 
educational funding is substantially equal to that of property-rich districts. “Assure” means that 
such funding cannot depend on the budgeting and taxing decisions of local school boards. 
Funding must be certain, every year. The level of funding must also be adequate to provide for 
the special educational needs of these poorer urban districts and address their extreme 
disadvantages. We leave it to the Legislature, the Board, and the Commissioner to determine 
which districts are “poorer urban districts.”714  
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Clearly then, courts can play a vital role in ensuring fidelity of socioeconomic policies of 
government with justiciable socioeconomic rights provided in a constitution.   
 The Constitution of the State of New York states that “The legislature shall provide for 
the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this 
state may be educated.”715 The highest appellate court in the State of New York, the Court of 
Appeals of New York, on June 23, 1982, in a case that challenged the funding policy of 
education in New York State, interpreted the Article as having: 
 ...mandated only that the Legislature provide for the maintenance and support of a system of 
free schools in order that an education might be available to all the State’s children. There is of 
course, a system of free schools in the State of New York. The Legislature has made 
prescriptions (or in some instances provided means by which prescriptions may be made) with 
reference to the minimum number of days of school attendance, required courses, textbooks, 
qualifications of teachers and of certain nonteaching personnel, pupil transportation, and other 
matters. If what is made available by this system (which is what is to be maintained and 
supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the constitutional mandate is 
satisfied.
716
   
Clearly, this is evidence of how a constitutionally empowered court can ensure that educational 
policies of a government conform to a constitutionally provided right to education.  
 The Court had earlier observed that in the legislative history of the article on the 
provision of free education “What appears to have been contemplated when the education article 
was adopted at the 1894 Constitutional Convention was a State-wide system assuring minimal 
acceptable facilities and services in contrast to the unsystematized delivery of instruction then in 
existence within the State.”717 The Court also stated that: “The circumstance that public 
education is unquestionably high on the list of priorities of governmental concern and 
responsibility, involving the expenditures of enormous sums of State and local revenue, enlisting 
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the most active attention of our citizenry and of our Legislature, and manifested by express 
articulation in our State Constitution, does not automatically entitle it to classification as a 
‘fundamental constitutional right’ triggering a higher standard of judicial review for purposes of 
equal protection analysis.”718          
 The courts also can give a stamp of approval to government policy on education policies 
that uphold and conform to a constitutional mandate of free education. This, in essence, was 
what the Court of Appeals of New York did when it ruled that:  
Interpreting the term education, as we do, to connote a sound basic education, we have no 
difficulty in determining that the constitutional requirement is being met in this State, in which it 
is said without contradiction that the average per pupil expenditure exceeds that in all other 
States but two. There can be no dispute that New York has long been regarded as a leader in free 
public education. Because decisions as to how public funds will be allocated among the several 
services for which by constitutional imperative the Legislature is required to make provision are 
matters peculiarly appropriate for formulation by the legislative body (reflective of and 
responsive as it is to the public will), we would be reluctant to override those decisions by 
mandating an even higher priority for education…719   
The Court held that the fiscal policy in the funding of education by the State of New York was 
adequate and it would only have ruled against the policy if it was obviously grossly 
inadequate.
720
 It held that “the present statutory provisions for allocation of State aid to local 
school districts for the maintenance and support of elementary and secondary public education 
are not violative of either Federal or the State Constitution.”721     
 The Court of Appeals of New York, on June 15, 1995, formulated a template for the 
definition of basic education in the case of Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New 
York.
722
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“That Article requires the State to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education. 
Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to 
enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and 
serving on a jury. If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources made available 
under the present are adequate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential 
skills, the State will have satisfied its constitutional obligation as we stated in Levittown
723
 The 
State must assure that some essentials are provided. Children are entitled to minimally adequate 
physical facilities and class rooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit 
children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of 
learning such as desks, chairs, pencils and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also 
entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, 
writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to 
teach those subject areas.
724
    
This case is a clear demonstration of the capacity of the courts to shape the formulation of 
effective policies on education by governments that will operate in total fidelity with a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to education.           
 In the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York,
725
 decided on June 26, 
2003, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed the appellate court decision and upheld the 
trial court’s decision, which earlier held that the City of New York did not provide sound basic 
education and infringed the education article of the State of New York’s Constitution.  
The State argues that poor student performance is caused by socioeconomic conditions 
independent of the quality of the schools and better remedied with investment in other resources. 
The Appellate Division agreed, reasoning that because of “demographic factors, such as poverty, 
high crime neighborhoods, single parent or dysfunctional homes, homes where English is not 
spoken, or homes where parents offer little help with homework and motivation…more spending 
on education is not necessarily the answer, and…the cure lies in eliminating the socio-economic 
conditions facing certain students (295 A.D.2d at 16). This is partly an argument about why 
students fail, which we have rejected in the discussion of outputs. But it is also a distinctively 
constitutional argument in the sense that choosing between competing beneficial uses of funds is 
a legislative task. This is in fact, the argument that Judge Simons made in his solitary dissent in 
CFE (86 N.Y.2d at 342-343). Had we accepted the argument, we would have saved everyone 
considerable effort and expense by dismissing the case on the spot. We did not do so. Decisions 
about spending priorities are indeed the Legislature’s province, but we have a duty to determine 
whether the State is providing students with the opportunity for a sound basic education. While it 
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may be that a dollar spent
726
 on improving “dysfunctional homes” would go further than one 
spent on a decent education, we have no constitutional mandate to weigh these alternatives. And, 
again, we cannot accept the premise that children come to New York City schools ineducable, 
unfit to learn.
727
     
 The Court also rejected the state’s argument that its budgetary expenditure on New York 
City compared favorably with other large cities like Los Angeles, and hence was adequate. It 
ruled that budgetary volume by itself, does not guarantee that a sound basic education would be 
received by students. The Court held that the education expenditure must consider local costs, 
the requirements of students, and “quality of inputs and outputs.”728 In other words, it is not only 
the amount of resources spent that matters, but clearly both the amount and the efficiency with 
which the resources are spent to achieve the constitutional mandate. The Court further held that: 
“the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common 
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” This also proves the capacity of 
courts to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of socioeconomic policies of government, such as 
education, provided they are empowered to adjudicate upon such matters.     
 The Court of Appeals of New York also demonstrated the capacity of courts to formulate 
remedial orders in the area of socioeconomic policies of government on education. In this case it 
did this when it analytically revised the trial court’s remedial orders imposed on New York City.  
Given all of the jurisprudential constraints discussed above, we begin our review of the trial 
court’s directives by rejecting the provision that the remedy be statewide, and that variations in 
local costs be taken into account. Courts deal with actual cases and controversies, not abstract 
global issues, and fashion their directives based on the proof before them. Here the case 
presented to us, and consequently the remedy, is limited to the adequacy of education financing 
for the New York City public schools, though the State may of course address statewide issues if 
it chooses. Second, we recognize that mechanisms in place, including No Child Left Behind and 
the SURR process, may already to some extent function as a system of accountability. They are 
not foolproof, and neither is tied to the definition of a sound basic education. Nevertheless, the 
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State should be able to build on existing criteria to identify the schools in greatest need and set 
measurable goals for their improvement. Third, we are not prepared to say as a constitutional 
matter that a new system must ensure the City “sustained and stable funding.” The language of 
this directive may appear unobjectionable, but in the context of the trial court’s decision it 
implies a need for fundamental change in the relationship between New York City schools and 
their local tax base. The school districts in New York City, Buffalo, Yonkers, Syracuse and 
Rochester-unlike every other district in the State—are “fiscally dependent”: they lack the 
authority to levy property taxes to support education.
729
   
The Court of Appeals of New York clearly demonstrated a mastery of polycentric 
considerations, as shown in its above analysis, and it proves that courts can adjudicate upon 
socioeconomic rights and formulate a just holding. This it further evinced when it observed that: 
At the same time, the State has suggested that reforms tending to concentrate responsibility with 
the Mayor of New York City may prove beneficial, and we do not know that a “sustained and 
stable funding” requirement addressing fiscal dependency would necessarily fit together with 
such reforms. Accordingly, while the trial court’s directive is understandable we do not make it 
mandatory. Fourth, as the foregoing implies, the trial court properly indicated that reforms may 
address governance as well as the school funding system. Various factors alleged by the State as 
causes of deficiencies in the schools…and rejected by us on the ground that the State has 
ultimate responsibility for the conduct of its agents and the quality of education in New York 
City public schools…may be addressed legislatively or administratively as part of the remedy. 
We do not think such measures will obviate the need for changes to the funding system, but they 
may affect the scope of such changes.
730
   
The Court of Appeals of New York also refused to dabble in the inner workings of the 
executive and legislative branches when it stated that “Finally, we know of no practical way to 
determine whether members of the political branches have complied with an order that the 
funding process become as transparent as possible, and we therefore decline to incorporate such 
a directive into our order. No one, however, disputes the trial court’s description of the existing 
education funding scheme as needlessly complex, malleable and not designed to align funding 
with need”731 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of New York highlighted the constitutional 
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duty imposed on the executive and legislative branches to fulfill provisions of the Constitution of 
New York State on education.  
Thus the political process allocates to City schools a share of state aid that does not bear a 
perceptible relation to the needs of City students. While we do not join the trial court in ordering 
that the process be made as transparent as possible, we do agree that the funding level necessary 
to provide City students with the opportunity for a sound basic education is an ascertainable 
starting point. Once the necessary funding level is determined, the question will be whether the 
inputs and outputs improve to a constitutionally acceptable level. Other questions about the 
process…such as how open it is and how the burden is distributed between the State and City are 
matters for the Legislature desiring to enact good laws.
732
    
 In crafting a remedy the Court of Appeals of New York was concerned about the 
accountability of the executive and legislative reform to achieve the constitutional mandate of 
access to a sound education. It also suspended its order from taking effect on June 26, 2003 and 
postponed the effective date of the order to July 30, 2004, to enable the legislative and executive 
branches to craft an effective policy to attain sound education in New York City.  
In view of the alternatives that the parties have presented, we modify the trial court’s threshold 
guideline that the State ascertain “the actual costs of providing a sound basic education in 
districts around the State.” The State need only ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound 
basic education in New York City. Reforms to the current system of financing school funding 
and managing schools should address the shortcomings of the current system by ensuring, as part 
of that process, that every school in New York City would have the resources necessary for 
providing the opportunity for a sound basic education. Finally, the new scheme should ensure a 
system of accountability to measure whether the reforms actually provide the opportunity for a 
sound basic education. The process of determining the actual cost of providing a sound basic 
education in New York City and enacting appropriate reforms naturally cannot be completed 
overnight, and we therefore recognize that defendants should have until July 30, 2004 to 
implement the necessary measures.
733
        
 The Court of Appeals of New York also emphasized that it was not making policy but 
interpreting and enforcing the rights of litigants whose constitutional right to a sound education 
in New York City had been violated.  
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Courts are, of course, well suited to adjudicate civil and criminal cases and extrapolate legislative 
intent. They are, however, also well suited to interpret and safeguard constitutional rights and 
review challenged acts of our co-equal branches of government …not in order to make policy 
but in order to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. that is what we have been called 
upon to  do by litigants seeking to enforce the State Constitution’s Education Article….Indeed, a 
sound basic education back in 1894, when the Education Article was added, may well have 
consisted of an eighth or ninth grade education, which we unanimously reject. The definition of a 
sound basic education must serve the future as well as the case now before us.
734
     
       
 The above cases clearly offer lessons for the adjudication of socioeconomic rights with 
regard to the right to a sound education, when provided by a constitution.  They prove that courts 
have the capacity to adjudicate upon socioeconomic policies of governments in the area of 
education and make such policies align with constitutional mandates.                                              
5.3. India’s Chapter IV Directive Principles of State Policy 
India gained independence in 1947, after two centuries of British colonial rule. In 1949, a 
government official identified India’s major domestic problem as that of socioeconomic 
development, and its foreign policy as one of championing decolonization and racial equality.
735
  
India looked to the Irish Constitution and borrowed its directive principles of state policy with 
regard to nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights, and made civil and political rights justiciable.
736
 
Socioeconomic rights are contained under Chapter IV Directive Principles of State Policy of the 
India Constitution of 1950.
737
 Article 37 states that provisions of Chapter IV “shall not be 
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in 
                                                          
734
 Ibid. at 931. 
735
 By an Indian Official, ‘India as a World Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Jul., 1949), pp.540-
550.   
736
 de Villiers, Bertus, ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Indian 
Experience’,  8  S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. (1992), pp.29-49 at p.2; Sharma, Gokulesh, Human Rights and 
Social Justice: Fundamental Rights vis-à-vis Directive Principles, (New Delhi:Deep and Deep 
Publications, 1997), p.48 
737
 The Constitution of India, full text available at the website of the Ministry of Law and Justice 
(Legislative Department), India: http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-indexenglish.htm 
(accessed on February 22, 2012).  
193 
 
the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in 
making laws.”738            
 India operates a written constitution, a federal form of government, and a common law 
tradition inherited from England. It has great challenges with poverty, corruption, and huge 
income disparities. India is representative of a general trend in developing countries of striving 
toward poverty reduction, economic development, and social justice via “a political process that 
holds leadership accountable.”739 The Indian courts have sought to utilize civil and political 
rights to incorporate socioeconomic rights. For example, the right to life constitutional provision 
has been extended to incorporate socioeconomic rights of nutrition and health care. In the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, India has become the health mecca for middle-class Nigerians 
desirous of affordable surgeries, due to the appalling state of the Nigerian public health sector.
740
  
 Under the current leadership of the Congress Party, the Indian government has devoted 
billions of dollars or over two percent of its gross domestic product to assist poor citizens who 
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make up to forty percent of India’s total population.741 But in a recent report the World Bank 
claimed that corruption is hampering the Indian poverty alleviation project.
742
 Child labor has 
been a recurring problem accentuated by poverty in India.
743
 India’s Supreme Court has sought 
to alleviate the plight of the poor in society through the Indian Constitution.
744
 India has also 
expanded access to justice for the poor through a concept of the peoples’ court, “Lok Adalat.”745  
 Courts have long been recognized as the last hope of the common person, and they have 
served as a bulwark against excesses of the state. They have also been instrumental in enforcing 
the supremacy of the constitution in India.  Courts, therefore, play an influential role in shaping 
policy decisions of the legislative and executive arms of government.  Such policies impact 
negatively or positively on members of society.      
 In 1993, the Supreme Court of India declared in the challenge to states’ regulation of 
private school fees, in the case of Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
746
 that   
The citizens of this country have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from 
Article 21 (Right to life). This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and parameters 
have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. In other words every child/citizen of this 
country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years. Thereafter his 
right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State.
747
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In 2002, India amended Article 21 of its Constitution by adding paragraph A.
748
 This 
amendment made education a justiciable constitutionally protected fundamental right for 
children of six to fourteen years of age.
749
 This reflects the general apathy of the executive arm 
of government toward judicial declarations, which has led to the issuance of mandatory court 
orders requiring supervision and timelines by the Indian court machinery.
750
  
 The early years of the Indian Supreme Court were a period of conservative 
jurisprudence.
751
 The catalyst for judicial activism was the emergency rule of 1975 to 1977, 
when civil and political rights were violated on a massive scale in India.
752
 This led to the 
emergence of an activist Supreme Court, introducing the concept of Public Interest Litigation “to 
enable easier access to justice to the vast majority of underprivileged and deprived sections of 
society and as a tool for achieving social justice.”753 It shed its conservatism in its Kesavananda 
Bharati v. State of Kerala decision, in which it held that fundamental rights and directive 
principles of state policy complement one another.
754
 “Public interest litigation, sometimes 
known as class action law suits or representative actions, can reduce legal costs by the 
application of a single remedy to all relevant cases. But this can have the effect of changing 
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priorities and therefore public policy, a development likely to be opposed by governments.”755  
In 1978, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court imbued the right to life 
provision of Article 21 with an added substantive requirement of justness, fairness, and 
reasonableness, and its future decisions linked it with environmental, nutrition, emergency health 
care, legal aid, and labor rights.
756
     
How far has this revolution gone? India is served by a ratio of 1 judge to 100 thousand 
citizens, and still harbors 170 million extremely poor people, referred to officially as “scheduled 
castes.”757 Sudarshan cautions against placing the greater burden of social transformation on the 
judiciary, but rather, members of civil society, legislative and executive institutions of 
democracy must collectively bear the burden of eradicating poverty, while courts can alleviate 
democratic shortfalls.
758
   
The lower courts, or subordinate judiciary as they are called in India, have a large 
proportion of cases that have been pending for a decade or more. It is not surprising... that 
much of the literature that paints a positive view of India’s judiciary is focused on the 
Supreme Court, located in the country’s capital, New Delhi, and the High Courts, located 
in the state capitals. The people who have access to these courts are necessarily elites, 
although some of the members of this elite group do act on behalf of the poor and 
disadvantaged people, and seek to secure their rights and entitlements.
759
   
5.4. Socioeconomic Rights in Argentina and Colombia                          
It is pertinent at this stage to recognize that Argentina, which experienced military rule, and 
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Columbia, which underwent a civil war, both promulgated transformative constitutions with 
enforceable socioeconomic rights. Despite the fact that Argentina, Colombia, and South Africa 
provided the Nigerian military junta with examples of transformative constitutions containing 
justiciable socioeconomic rights, Nigeria decreed into existence the 1999 Constitution that only 
provided for justiciable civil and political rights, with socioeconomic rights as fundamental 
objectives and directive principles of state policy. This was a continuation of the military’s 
opposition to socioeconomic rights, which it demonstrated two decades earlier when, it decreed 
the 1979 Constitution into existence on similar terms. On the other hand, South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution made socioeconomic rights justiciable, and its people have benefited from the 
jurisprudence of its Constitutional Court on socioeconomic rights. “South Africa’s courts have 
taken an account of the fact that the justiciability of socio-economic rights is never an ‘either-or’ 
question, but always only a matter of degree.”760 I analyze South African socioeconomic 
jurisprudence in the next chapter.        
 Argentina recognized socioeconomic rights under its 1949 Constitution, which was 
abrogated in 1955 when President Peron was deposed in the coup d’état of 1955; but the 1853 
Constitution was resurrected, and in 1957 it was infused with socioeconomic rights relating to 
the rights of workers, supported with social insurance and modeled on “industrial democracy.”761 
The Supreme Court of Argentina has established a record of enforcing socioeconomic rights, 
which has impacted positively on the accountability of government’s socioeconomic policies. 
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In 2000, the Supreme Court confirmed in Asociacion Benghalensis a lower court’s decision that 
ordered the national government to grant timely and appropriate medical treatment, including the 
allocation of required drugs, to all patients affected by HIV/AIDS. The court enforced the state 
duty as described in a national law and as framed in the right to health care, now included in the 
Constitution. This put a limit on the political discretion of the executive.
762
   
  The watershed moment for Argentina was in 1994, when the two major political parties 
in Argentina amended the 1853 Constitution, which allowed President Menem an extra term in 
office, based on the condition that the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the American 
Convention on Human Rights were granted constitutional hierarchy and added to the existing 
Bill of Rights in the 1853 Constitution.
763
        
  Argentina operates a monist constitution that makes international treaties it is a party to 
be automatically operative in domestic courts, and Section 75(22) of the Argentine Constitution 
grants international treaties a higher status than domestic enactments.
764
 Since the 1940s, Court 
decisions in Argentina have been enforcing labor rights.
765
 The Argentine courts have also 
enforced social security rights for over forty years.
766
  Health rights came under the jurisdiction 
of the Argentine courts in the 1990s, and its “Supreme Court has held that the right to health 
creates positive―and not only negative―obligations for the state.”767 The creation of the post of 
the ombudsperson twenty years ago in Argentina at the federal and provincial levels has 
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facilitated the enforcement of socioeconomic rights, and they have “locus standi to initiate legal 
actions in cases of alleged collective violations of fundamental rights.”768      
 Another example is Colombia, whose 1886 Constitution had a frugal bill of rights 
without justiciable socioeconomic rights, but change came with the 1991 Constitution formulated 
by the Constituent Assembly of 1991. Over forty 40 percent of the Constituent Assembly’s 
members did not belong to the parties that had dominated Columbia for over a century, namely 
the Conservative and Liberal parties.
769
 Members of the Constituent Assembly who had never 
been in power were political parties of former guerrilla fighters, a leftist party, parties 
representing students, children, and Christians who were not Catholics, and indigenous parties. 
They mobilized a consensual approach in the deliberations of the Assembly to formulate a 
constitution to expand democracy in order “to confront a generalised state of political corruption 
and violence.”770 As a result,  
In that framework, it is not surprising that the ideological orientations of the 1991 Constitution 
were radically different from the former Constitution, and included the incorporation of a rich 
charter of rights accompanied by new and effective judicial mechanisms for their protection, the 
broadening of participation mechanisms, and the imposition of equality duties and social justice 
upon the state. The 1991 Constitution’s objective was to introduce a new model of society and to 
transform Colombia’s reality. It is, using Teitel’s word, a ‘forward looking’ rather than 
‘backward looking’ Constitution.771       
 
The 1991 Colombian Constitution contains civil and political rights, socioeconomic rights, and 
third-generation or collective rights, and it makes international treaties including the ILO 
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Conventions legally binding; all these rights cannot be suspended during a state of emergency. A 
special organ, the Constitutional Court was also created to interpret and apply the provisions of 
the 1991 Constitution. The 1991 Colombian Constitution “also designed a special constitutional 
procedure for constitutional claims that makes access to constitutional justice much easier and 
not so costly. This certainly favours some kind of judicial activism regarding human rights, 
which had less legal grounding in the former constitution.”772 The lessons from Argentina and 
Colombia are that socioeconomic rights improve the accountability of governments. A brief 
analysis of some African countries that provide socioeconomic rights follows. 
5.5. Some African Countries That Provide for Socioeconomic Rights                     
Kenya’s 2010 Constitution provides for justiciable socioeconomic rights under its Chapter 4, 
titled Bill of Rights.
773
 Chapter 4 declares that: “The Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s 
democratic state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies.”774 It further 
provides for socioeconomic rights of health, education, housing, and social security.
775
 In a 
section setting out the applicability of the bill of rights, socioeconomic rights are qualified by the 
availability of resources and it is the duty of the state to establish the lack of resources.
776
 
 Benin’s 1990 Constitution guarantees socioeconomic rights.777 It provides that “The 
human person is sacred and inviolable. The state has the absolute obligation to respect it and 
protect it. It shall guarantee him a full blossoming out. To that end, it shall assure to its citizens 
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equal access to health, education, culture, information, vocational training, and employment.”778 
The 1975 Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe, in its September 10, 1990 amendment, 
provides for socioeconomic rights under its third part, named Title 3.
779
 It provides for the right 
to health care, coupled with “the duty to defend it.”780 The Constitution also provides that 
primary education is free and compulsory, while “the state gradually promotes the possibility of 
equal access to the other levels of education.”781         
 The 1991 Constitution of Burkina Faso, amended in 1997 and 2000, still recognizes 
socioeconomic rights in its Chapter IV.
782
 It recognizes and promotes the right to health.
783
 
“Every citizen has the right to education. Public education is secular. Private education is 
recognized. The law establishes the condition of its exercise.”784 The 1991 Constitution of 
Gabon, amended in 1997, provides for socioeconomic rights.
785
 It provides that “The state, 
subject to its resources shall guarantee to all, notably to the child, the mother, the handicapped, to 
aged workers and to the elderly, the protection of health, social security, a preserved natural 
environment, rest and leisure.”786  It also provides for the right to education. “The support to be 
given to children and their education constitute, for parents, a natural right and duty which they 
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shall exercise under the surveillance and with the aid of the state and public entities.”787   
 Togo’s 1992 Constitution, which is currently in force, provides for socioeconomic 
rights.
788
 It recognizes and promotes the right of its citizens to health care.
789
 In the area of 
education, the Togolese “state shall recognize the right of all children to education and shall 
create conditions favorable to this end. Education is mandatory for children of both sexes until 
the age of 15 years. The state shall act progressively to assure that public education be free of 
charge.”790 The Cape Verde’s 1992 Constitution contained socioeconomic rights under its third 
section, named Title III.
791
 It envisages the gradual realization of the right of everyone to social 
security.
792
 The Constitution also provides for the progressive realization of everyone’s right to 
health care.
793
 Primary education is also free and compulsory under the Constitution, while a 
scheme of scholarships would gradually be provided to cater for the needs of indigent citizens to 
access other levels of education.
794
 The Constitution was amended in 1995, 1999, and 2010.
795
 
But socioeconomic rights were still retained by the various amendments.
796
   
 Mali’s January 12, 1992 Constitution, amended in 1999, provides for socioeconomic 
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rights.
797
 “Education, instruction, training, employment, housing, leisure, health and social 
protection constitute some of the protected rights.”798 The Constitution also provides that: 
“Public education is mandatory, free and non-religious.”799 Madagascar’s 1992 Constitution, 
which was amended in 1995 and 1998, retained socioeconomic rights in its amendments.
800
 “The 
state recognizes to each individual the right to the protection of his or her health, starting from 
conception.”801 Primary education is compulsory and public education is “free and accessible to 
all.”802           
 Seychelles’s 1993 Constitution, amended in 1996, retained socioeconomic rights.803 It 
guarantees the right to health care.
804
 The Seychelles Constitution also guarantees the provision 
of “compulsory education, which shall be free in state schools, for such minimum period, which 
shall not be less than ten years, as may be prescribed by law.”805 Niger’s 1999 Constitution 
contains socioeconomic rights, just as does the December 1992 Constitution.
806
 It provides that 
“Each person shall have the right to life, health, security, physical well-being, education, and 
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instruction according to conditions established by law.”807      
 Namibia’s 1990 Constitution contains some justiciable socioeconomic rights under its 
Chapter III provisions on fundamental human rights and freedoms and another set of 
nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights under its Chapter XI provisions on Principles of State 
Policy.
808
 Chapter III provides for the right to education, while it stipulates free and compulsory 
primary education.
809
 Chapter XI provides for a cluster of socioeconomic rights grouped under 
the “promotion of the welfare of the people.”810 But it states that “The principles of state policy 
contained in this chapter shall not of themselves be legally enforceable by any Court, but shall 
nevertheless guide the Government in making and applying laws to give effect to the 
fundamental objectives of the said principles. The Courts are entitled to have regard to the said 
principles in interpreting any laws based on them.”811       
  Ghana’s 1992 Constitution divides socioeconomic rights under justiciable fundamental 
human rights and nonjusticiable directive principles of state policy.
812
 It guarantees the right to 
free and compulsory basic education under its Chapter 5 provisions on fundamental human rights 
and freedoms.
813
 Progressive realization of access to free secondary and tertiary education is also 
listed in Chapter 5.
814
 Chapter 6 provisions on directive principles of state policy also provides 
for free and compulsory basic education, as well as progressive realization of access to 
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secondary and tertiary education.
815
 The Directive Principles of State Policy are supposed to 
guide the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in the performance of their 
duties as well policy formulation.
816
 Chapter 6 mandates the president “to report to Parliament at 
least once a year all the steps taken to ensure the realization of the policy objectives contained in 
this Chapter and, in particular, the realization of basic human rights, a healthy economy, the right 
to work, the right to good health care and the right to education.”817    
 The Malawian 1994 Constitution also divides socioeconomic rights under Chapter III 
provisions on Fundamental Principles, which are directory in nature, and justiciable 
socioeconomic right to education under Chapter IV provisions on Human Rights.
818
 Mauritius 
does not recognize socioeconomic rights in its 1968 Constitution, which is still in force.
819
 But 
Mauritius provides free education at all levels to its citizens, courtesy of the Education Act of 
1996.
820
 This was originally provided for by the Education Act of December 28, 1957.
821
              
Conclusion                                
Nigerian leadership has not respected the legislative approaches to the realization of education 
and health care. This is unlike the tradition at the federal and states levels in America, where 
despite a strong aversion to constitutional provision of socioeconomic rights, ordinary legislative 
                                                          
815
 Ibid. Article 38. 
816
 Ibid. article 34(1). 
817
 Ibid. article 34(2). 
818
 Full text available at: 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/malawi/malawi_constitution.pdf (accessed on 
February 14, 2013).  
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 Full text available at: http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/webattorney/file/revisedlaws/C/PART%20I%20-
%20THE%20CONSTITUTION1.pdf (accessed on February 14, 2013). 
820
 The Development of Education: National Report of Mauritius by the ministry of Education and 
Scientific Research September 9, 2004, 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/International/ICE47/English/Natreps/reports/mauritius.pdf (accessed on 
February 14, 2013). 
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 Article 35 provides that: “All Government schools and all schools in receipt of a regular grant in aid 
from Government funds shall be open to pupils of any race or religion.” Full text available at: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/educationsite/file/Education%20Act%201957.pdf (accessed on February 
14, 2013).  
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enactments have been made to entrench concrete primary and high school education, despite 
persistent poverty. The education jurisprudence of the States of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New 
York demonstrate the capacity of the courts to adjudicate over socioeconomic rights and shape 
government policies to conform to constitutional provisions.     
 India faces challenges of huge levels of poverty and astronomical inequalities in wealth 
with a few percentage of its population commanding most of the economic resources. But the 
Supreme Court in India has striven to concretize in real terms the wordings of the “Directive 
Principles of State Policy,” exhorting the Indian state to realize socioeconomic rights. Its first 
step was to simplify access to courts by poor litigants through the public interest litigation 
concept. The Court then expanded the ambit of justiciable Fundamental Rights of civil and 
political rights, especially the right to life to entail provisions of adequate nutrition and health 
care. Education, as a socioeconomic good in 1993, was also brought under the rubric of the right 
to life component of the civil and political rights’ enforcement umbrella by the Indian Supreme 
Court, which remarkably, led to a constitutional amendment in 2002 by the addition of paragraph 
A to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution on the right to life provision.  Article 21(A) made 
education a justiciable fundamental right for children of six to fourteen years of age.   
 Nigeria has so much to learn from the Argentine, Colombian, and Indian constitutional 
experiences, where there are ongoing conscious efforts by the judiciary, executive, and 
legislature to improve accountability in public governance. African countries closer to Nigeria, 
particularly its neighbors, Benin and Niger, have also incorporated justiciable socioeconomic 
rights into their constitutions in order to attain accountability in public governance in regard to 
socioeconomic policies. Through constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights, Nigeria can 
improve accountability in public governance that formulates socioeconomic policies that 
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engender economic development. All available mechanisms of accountability, including 
constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights, must be employed to continuously ameliorate 
Nigeria’s accountability deficit in public governance.                                  
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                                                       CHAPTER SIX                                
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S REASONABLENESS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
6.0. Introduction   
In this introduction, I will present a brief background to the 1996 South African Constitution, 
and then proceed to critically evaluate the most prominent socioeconomic rights decisions of the 
South African Constitutional Court. South Africa was, and still is, a deeply divided society, 
having experienced colonialism by Europeans and subsequent racial-economic discrimination by 
European settlers who grabbed the land and economic resources of the indigenous black 
population. The unbanning of the major black liberation movement, the African National 
Congress (ANC), by President de Klerk in February 1990, and the release of ANC’s leader, 
Nelson Mandela, as well as other political detainees, set in motion a national debate over the 
ideal constitution to redress past centuries of injustice suffered by black South Africans, Asians, 
and those of mixed heritage.
822
 A constitutional bridge was needed from a culture of authority 
under apartheid to a culture that would guarantee accountable governance.
823
 Most participants 
agreed on the necessity of civil and political rights, but there were mixed feelings over the status 
of socioeconomic rights.          
 The ANC intelligentsia’s Draft Bill of Rights favored justiciable socioeconomic rights, 
while some ANC sympathizers favored the Indian version of socioeconomic rights as 
nonjusticiable directive principles of state policy.  On the other side, were right wingers, and 
pillars of apartheid who latched onto the Reagan and Thatcher neoliberal view that only civil and 
                                                          
822de Vos Pierre, ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and Economic Rights in 
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution,’ South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 13, (1997), pp. 67-101; 
Klug, Heinz, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Klug, Heinz, The Constitution of South Africa:  
Contextual Analysis, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).  
823
 Mureinik, Etienne, ‘A Bridge to Where?  Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’, 10 S. Afr. J. on Hum. 
Rts. (1994), pp.31-48.  
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political rights should be in the constitution, while socioeconomic rights belongws to 
manifestoes of political parties and executive policies of government.
824
 In opposition to the 
neoliberals, in 1992, Haysom stated that “Our laws have for decades prescribed compulsory 
education for whites, granted a right to pension for persons of old age and prohibited 
environmental degradation. Our courts have had no difficulty in enforcing these laws merely 
because they dealt with socio-economic matters or involved a positive duty on the state to 
provide resources.”825  
 Professor Etienne Mureinik was wary about the positive duties emanating from 
justiciable socioeconomic rights, and was only willing to concede negative duties of restraint and 
rendering of account by the executive to the judiciary. The judiciary should only be able to strike 
down unjustifiable programs, but the executive retains its independence to formulate policies, for 
instance, to provide health-care services.
826
 For him civil and political rights still needed to take 
firm root in South Africa: “If we qualify them before they exist, they may well be stillborn.”827 
Professor Dennis Davies urged caution in making socioeconomic rights justiciable owing to 
polycentric considerations that render them ideal for the executive and legislative arms of 
government to tackle.
828
 He went on to recommend the Indian example of socioeconomic rights 
as nonjusticiable directive principles provisions in the Constitution.
829
 This fits in with the view 
of Cass Sunstein, one of the American scholars frequently quoted in South African law journals 
                                                          
824
 “It argue[d] that the judges are unaccountable and inherently conservative, that the courts are not a 
democratic institution and should not be vested with any power over parliament. This majoritarian 
position asserts more than a simple parliamentary sovereignty, but that judges should especially not have 
the authority to prioritise government expenditure, for example, by compelling government to build a 
clinic from funds designated for housing. The majority is subject to the rule, the final word of 
unaccountable ‘wise men’. Haysom, Nicholas, ‘Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-
Economic Rights’, 8  S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. (1992), pp.451-463 at pp. 455-456. 
825
 Ibid. at p.458. 
826
 Mureinik, Etienne, ‘Beyond  A Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution’, 8  S. Afr. J. 
on Hum. Rts. (1992), pp.464-474.   
827
 Ibid. at p. 469. 
828
 Davies, D. M. ‘The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except 
as Directive Principles’,   8 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. (1992), pp. 475-490 
829
 Ibid. at p. 486-488. 
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during the transition from apartheid to majority rule.In 1993, while analyzing ideal contents of 
Eastern Europe constitutions after the fall of communism, Sunstein advised that they should 
contain justiciable civil and political rights. “If the constitution tried to specify everything to 
which a decent society commits itself, it threatens to become a mere piece of paper, worth 
nothing in the real world.”830 But socioeconomic rights should not be justiciable, and a 
constitution should only “set out general aspirations for public officials and for the citizenry at 
large.”831 Sunstein, in his seminal piece in 1991, asserted that “Judicial decisions are of limited 
efficacy in bringing about social change.”832  According to him, the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision of the Supreme Court of the United States only became effective in 1964, 
when the executive and legislative branches of government intervened.
833
     
 Davies also recognizes that the adjudication process is not insulated from politics.
834
 The 
same point was made in an analysis of appointments to the judiciary during apartheid, when 
affirmative action was employed to displace English-speaking lawyers and judges with 
Afrikaans speakers.
835
  For this dissertation, the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996
836
 are its Preamble, sections 7(2) (respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfill duties of the state), 8 (vertical and horizontal application), 24 (environment), 25 
(property), 26 (housing), 27 (health care, food, water, and social security), 28 (children’s rights), 
29(education), 35(2)(e) (treatment of detainees), 38 (enforcement of rights), and 39 
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 Sunstein, Cass, ‘Against Positive Rights: Why social and economic rights don’t belong in the new 
constitutions of post-Communist Europe’, 2 E. Eur. Const. Rev. pp.35-38 at p. 36. 
831
 Ibid. at p. 38. 
832
 Sunstein, Cass, ‘Three Civil Rights Fallacies’, California Law Review, Vol.79, No.3 (May, 1991),  
pp.751-774 at p. 765. 
833
 Id. 
834
 Davis, Dennis, ‘Democracy and integrity: Making Sense of the Constitution’, 14  S. Afr. J. on Hum. 
Rts. (1998), pp.127-145, at p.143. 
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 Chaskalson, Arthur, ‘Reshaping the structures of justice for a democratic South Africa’, in Norton, 
Michelle, (ed.), Reshaping the Structures of Justice for a Democratic South Africa: Papers of a 
Conference organized by the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, October 2003, Pretoria, 
(Vlaeberg: National Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1994), pp.13-24, at pp.22-23. 
836
 Act 108 of 1996. 
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(Interpretation clause).
837
 The South African Constitution is a transformational document aiming 
to correct a long period of injustice. 
Differently formulated, the question is whether transformative constitutionalism is a 
viable project for South African judges and lawyers (and by extension, judges and 
lawyers working within other legal regimes). By transformative constitutionalism I mean 
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (…in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through non-violent political 
processes grounded in law.
838
   
The track record of the South African Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence on 
socioeconomic rights will now be examined. This chapter will analyze four of the first sets of 
cases considered by the Court, and some more recent cases.  
6.1. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal                     
In Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal,
839
 the plaintiff needed kidney dialysis, but 
his heart ailment was used to eliminate him from the pool of those who were being considered 
for kidney dialysis. This was based on the limited numbers of dialysis machines; those most 
likely to benefit from kidney transplants and treatment were ranked before others with additional 
ailments that tended to reduce the chances of survival.  The Court ruled that due to lack of 
available resources, the government was not compelled to provide health care for Soobromoney. 
Right to health care, according to the Court, depended on availability of adequate resources. “In 
Soobramoney, the standard was one of simple rationality.”840 The decision exhibited great 
deference to the executive branch, and did not venture to evaluate the policy adopted by the 
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 Brand, Dannie, ‘Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution’, inBrand, 
Dannie and Heyns, Christof (eds.) (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2005), pp.1-56. 
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 Klare, Karl E. ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’, 14 S. Afr. J. on Hum. 
Rts.(1998), pp. 146-188, at p.  150 
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 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 8. 
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 Brand, Dannie, ‘Socio-Economic Rights and Courts in South Africa: Justiciability on a Sliding Scale’, 
in Coomans, Fons, (ed.), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic 
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health authorities in not expanding availability of dialysis for the likes of Soobramoney. This 
was a utilitarian decision requiring the executive to sacrifice an individual for the general good. 
The Court should have directed the immediate treatment of Soobramoney and ordered the 
executive to drastically expand dialysis treatment to cover the likes of Soobramoney. The 
government would have been forced to redirect resources on arms acquisition or money saved 
from reduced mismanagement of funds to the health sector.
841
  Interestingly, in the next case 
below, the Constitutional Court, in a paradigmatic shift, shed its utilitarian approach and ruled as 
unreasonable a housing policy that addressed the needs of the general populace, but excluded the 
most vulnerable in society―the poor and homeless.  
6.2. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom             
The present case went a step further than Soobramoney, and the Constitutional Court shed its 
utilitarian toga. The case dealt with the right of access to housing guaranteed under the 
Constitution. In a groundbreaking decision, the Constitutional Court introduced the concept of 
reasonableness into socioeconomic rights jurisprudence.
842
 This was the case filed by Irene 
Grootboom, 510 children, and 390 adults.
843
 These were homeless people who had for years 
been on the government waiting list for housing. They had moved into private land and built 
shelters that were bulldozed and burned upon an eviction order procured by the landlord.  The 
Court reiterated the fact that sections 39, 231, to 235 of the Constitution obliges it to consider 
international law as an interpretative guide, particularly when certain international law principles 
are binding upon South Africa.
844
 It proceeded to analyze the minimum core concept formulated 
in General Comment 3, paragraph 10 of  1990, earlier issued by the ICESCR Committee, based 
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Providing an Institutional Court for the Poor: 1995-2004’, in Gargarella, Roberto; Domingo, Pilar and 
Roux, Theunis (eds.), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for 
the Poor? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006),  pp.107-125, at pp.114-116. 
843
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
844
 Ibid. paragraph 26. 
213 
 
on more than ten years of considering states’ reports submitted to it in its norm-clarification role 
of the contents of the ICESCR.
845
        
 Judge Yacoob concluded that “Minimum core obligation is determined by generally 
having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the 
right in question. It is in this context that the concept of minimum core obligation must be 
understood in international law”846 Justice Yacoob then proceeded to give a catalog of reasons 
why the Constitutional Court did not have the informational capacity of the ICESCR Committee 
to apply the minimum core concept to evaluate the right of access to housing in South Africa. 
According to the Constitutional Court:  
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realisation of the right 
of access to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and opportunities for the 
enjoyment of such a right. These will vary according to factors such as income, unemployment, 
availability of land and poverty. The differences between city and rural communities will also 
determine the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately 
depend on the economic and social history and circumstances of a country. All this illustrates the 
complexity of the task of determining a minimum core obligation for the progressive realization 
of the right of access to adequate housing without having the requisite information on the needs 
and the opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. The Committee developed the concept of 
minimum core over many years of examining reports by reporting States. This Court does not 
have comparable information.
847
   
Justice Yacoob then expressed his reservations about the minimum core concept premised on 
information deficiency and shied away from determining the minimum content of a right of 
access to adequate housing. He opted to apply a reasonableness test of the South African 
government’s housing policy in relation to “the right to have access to adequate housing.” 
The determination of a minimum core in the context of ‘the right to have access to adequate 
housing’ presents difficult questions. This so because the needs in the contexts of access to 
adequate housing are diverse: there are those who need land; others need both land and houses; 
yet others need financial assistance. There are difficult questions relating to the definition of the 
minimum core in the context of a right to have access to adequate housing, in particular whether 
the minimum core obligation should be defined generally or with regard to specific groups of 
peoples. As will appear from the discussion below, the real question in terms of our Constitution 
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is whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right afforded by section 26 are 
reasonable. There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the 
content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the State are 
reasonable. However, even if it were appropriate to do so, it could not be done unless sufficient 
information is placed before a Court to enable it to determine the minimum core in any given 
context. In this case, we do not have sufficient information to determine what would comprise 
the minimum core obligation in the context of our Constitution. It is not in any event necessary 
to decide whether it is appropriate for a Court to determine in the first instance the minimum 
core content of a right.
848
          
The Court formulated a multilayer test in ascertaining the reasonableness of the South African 
government’s housing policy in fulfilling the right to housing guaranteed under the Constitution:   
The measures must establish a coherent public housing programme directed towards the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within the state’s available 
means. The programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right. The precise 
contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and 
the executive. They must, however, ensure that the measures they adopt are reasonable. In any 
challenge based on section 26 in which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive 
obligations imposed upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative and 
other measures taken by the state are reasonable. A court considering reasonableness will not 
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the 
measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of 
possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these would 
meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this 
requirement is met.
849
   
6.3. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others               
The third case for consideration dealt with the interpretation of access to health care under 
section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the Minister of Health and 
Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No. 2). 
850
 The facts were that government 
restricted the provision of nevirapine, a drug for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
of the HIV virus, to select research health centers, despite the fact that there were adequate 
supplies to cover all health facilities. Section 27 of the 1996 South African Constitution provides 
that 
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27. Health care, food, water and social security                                   
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-                            
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;                                      
(b) sufficient food and water; and                                           
(c) social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance.                                                                    
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available    
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights.                                       
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.                                                         
The Court addressed the minimum core proposal put forward by first and second amici to serve 
as a test for government’s health policy in fulfilling the right to access to health-care services. 
Paragraph 10 of General Comment 3 of the ICESCR Committee, which treated minimum 
obligations of a state party to the ICESCR, was then evaluated by the Court.
851
 Textual 
differences between the provisions of the Convention and the South African Constitution were 
also evaluated.
852
 Judge Yacoob’s analysis of the minimum core in paragraph 33 of Grootboom, 
which I discussed above, was relied upon by the Court, in the proposition that the minimum core 
might be relevant in relation to the test of reasonableness. Especially with regard to measures 
required of the state under section 26(2), but not as an independent right, to a minimum core of 
the right of access to housing under section 26(1).
853
 The Court then outlined a purposive 
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interpretation of sections 26 and 27, and cited Grootboom’s quotation from Soobramoney’s 
case
854
 to contextualize the obligations of the state. 
The state is obliged to take reasonable measures progressively to eliminate or reduce the large 
areas of severe deprivation that afflict our society. The courts will guarantee that the democratic 
processes are protected so as to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness, as the 
Constitution requires in section 1. As the Bill of Rights indicates, their function in respect of 
socio-economic rights is directed towards ensuring that legislative and other measures taken by 
the state are reasonable. As this Court said in Grootboom: ‘[i]t is necessary to recognise that a 
wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations.
855
  
Just as it decided in Grootboom, the Constitutional Court claimed that it was institutionally 
deficient to collate the data required for ascertaining the minimum core of a right of access to 
health care and efficient utilization of public revenues. 
It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters the courts are not institutionally 
equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining 
what the minimum core standards called for by the first and second amici should be, nor for 
deciding how public revenues should most effectively be spent. There are many demands on the 
public purse. As was said in Soobramoney: The State has to manage its limited resources in 
order to address all these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt an holistic 
approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular 
individuals within society.
856
  
 
The Court then laid out its reasonableness formula as follows: 
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and 
economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained 
and focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its 
constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such 
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determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive functions 
achieve appropriate constitutional balance.
857
  
The Court, thus, effectively deferred to the legislative and executive branches of government, 
and closed the slight glimmer of hope offered by Judge Yacoob in Grootboom of applying the 
minimum core concept to fortify and set a baseline for the Court’s reasonableness test formula in 
making socioeconomic policies of government accountable. It also refused to entertain the 
possibility of interpreting the contents of the right of access to health care when it ruled that  
We therefore conclude that section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-standing 
and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations mentioned in 
section 27(2). Sections 27(1) and 27(2) must be read together as defining the scope of the 
positive rights that everyone has and the corresponding obligations on the state to ‘respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill’ such rights. The rights conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) are to 
have ‘access’ to the services that the state is obliged to provide in terms of sections 26(2) and 
27(2).
858
 
In its evaluation of the South African government health policy, using its reasonableness test 
formula, the Constitutional Court held that 
Government policy was an inflexible one that denied mothers and their newborn children at 
public hospitals and clinics outside the research and training sites the opportunity of receiving a 
single dose of Nevirapine at the time of the birth of the child. A potentially life-saving drug was 
on offer and where testing and counseling facilities were available it could have been 
administered within the available resources of the state without any known harm to mother or 
child. In the circumstances we agree with the finding of the High Court that the policy of 
government insofar as it confines the use of Nevirapine to hospitals and clinics which are  
research and training sites constitutes a breach of the state’s obligations under section 27(2) read 
with section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.
859
  
The Court then laid out the implications of its findings: “Implicit in this finding is that a policy of 
waiting for a protracted period before taking a decision on the use of nevirapine beyond the 
research and training sites is also not reasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the 
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Constitution.”860 The government was ordered to remove the restrictions on the availability of 
nevirapine and subjected its administration on each mother to medical superintendent.
861
 But the 
Court refrained from assuming a supervisory jurisdiction.
862
    
 It is striking to note, as highlighted above, that, the Court refused to interpret what, 
essentially, the right to health means in Article 27(1); rather, it couples Article 27(1) with the 
duty of the state dependent on availability of resources in Article 27(2) to give effect to the right. 
“This detracts significantly from the capacity of courts to serve as significant institutions where 
deliberation concerning the meaning and implications of constitutional rights and values 
occurs.”863 Nevertheless, whenever the South African government faces a claim against it of 
failure to implement socioeconomic rights, the standard of reasonableness doctrine mandates the 
South African government to prove that its policies and programs are geared toward attaining its 
socioeconomic constitutional obligations.
864
 This was greatly expounded in the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Minister of Health and others v. Treatment 
Action Campaign and others examined in section 6.2.  
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6.4. In Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development and Others     
In Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Others v. 
Minister of Social Development,
865
 the concept of reasonableness was through a purposive 
formula, employed by the Constitutional Court, to give a broader meaning to the word 
“everyone” contained in section 27(1) of the Constitution of South Africa with regard to social 
security benefits to encompass not only citizens but also permanent residents.         
 According to Justice Mokgoro: 
The socio-economic rights in ss 26 and 27 of the Constitution are conferred on ‘everyone’ by 
ss(1) in each of those sections. In contrast the State’s obligations in respect of access to land 
apply only to citizens. Whether the right in s27 is confined to citizens only or extends to a 
broader class of persons depends on the interpretation of the word ‘everyone’ in that section. The 
applicants relied on s25 of the Constitution, as well as various other rights in the Bill of Rights to 
argue that ‘everyone’ in s27 included non-citizens and therefore also (for the purposes of this 
case) permanent residents.
866…This Court has adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation 
of rights. Given that the Constitution expressly provides that the Bill of Rights enshrines the 
rights of ‘all people in our country’ and in the absence of any indication that the s27(1) is to be 
restricted to citizens as in other provisions in the Bill of Rights the word ‘everyone’ in this 
section cannot be construed as referring only to ‘citizens.’867  
The Court then restated the meaning of its reasonableness doctrine as follows:  
A Court considering the reasonableness of legislative or other measures taken by the State will 
not enquire into whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted 
or whether public resources could have been better spent. A wide range of possible measures 
could be adopted by the State to meet its obligations and many of these may meet the 
requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement would 
be met.
868
  
The Court also expounded on the import of context whenever the doctrine of reasonableness is to 
be employed:                            
In dealing with the issue of reasonableness, context is all important. We are concerned here with 
the right to social security and the exclusion from the scheme of permanent residents who, but 
for their lack of citizenship, would qualify for the benefits provided under the scheme. In 
considering whether that exclusion is reasonable, it is relevant to have regard to the purpose 
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served by the social security, the impact of the exclusion on permanent residents and the 
relevance of the citizenship requirement to that purpose. It is also necessary to have regard to the 
impact that this has on other intersecting rights. In the present case, where the right to social 
assistance is conferred by the Constitution on ‘everyone’ and permanent residents are denied 
access to this right, the equality rights entrenched in s9 are directly implicated.
869
     
The Court held that the denial of permanent residents social security benefits was not a 
reasonable legislative enactment, and the legislature was ordered to add to the word “citizens” 
the clause “or permanent residents.”870                       
Justice Mokogoro reasoned that: 
In my view, the importance of providing access to social assistance to all who live permanently 
in South Africa and the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access has, far 
outweighs the financial and immigration considerations on which the State relies. For the same 
reasons, I am satisfied that the denial of access to social grants to permanent residents who, but 
for their citizenship, would qualify for such assistance, does not constitute a reasonable 
legislative measure as contemplated by s27(2).
871
   
6.5. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v. 
 City of Johannesburg and Others                         
In another case, the Constitutional Court considered an appeal against the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, which ordered an eviction. The case involved the right to housing in 
relation to the pending eviction by authorities of the City of Johannesburg of 400 occupants of 
unsafe buildings within the inner city who had no alternative accommodation. This was the case 
of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v. City of 
Johannesburg and Others.
872
 The constitutional validity, of section 12(6) of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977, which empowered such eviction, 
was also considered by the Court in tandem with section 26(3) of the Constitution. Justice 
Yacoob, who delivered the lead judgment, observed that the City of Johannesburg had not 
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engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the 400 occupants faced with eviction.
873
 He ruled that  
               
Section 26(3), like all provisions of the Bill of Rights, deserves a generous construction. The 
section prohibits eviction of people from their home absent a court order that must be made after 
taking into account all the relevant circumstances. It means in effect that no person may be 
compelled to leave their home unless there exists an appropriate court order. The provisions of 
s26(3) would be virtually nugatory and would amount to little protection if people who were in 
occupation of their homes could be constitutionally compelled to leave by the exertion of the 
pressure of a criminal sanction without a court order. It follows that any provision that compels 
people to leave their homes on pain of criminal sanction in the absence of a court order is 
contrary to the provisions of s26(3) of the Constitution. Section 12(6) provides for this criminal 
compulsion and is not consistent with the Constitution. Continued occupation of the property 
should not be a criminal offence absent a court order for eviction.
874
    
Section 12(6) of the National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act of 1977 was 
then declared as inconsistent with the Constitution, and “must be read as if the following proviso 
has been added at the end of it-‘This subsection applies only to people who, after service upon 
them of an order of court for their eviction, continue to occupy the property concerned.’”875  
6.6. Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others 
Another case dealt with the relocation of 20,000 residents belonging to 4,386 households in Joe 
Slovo community, ten kilometers from Cape Town. Based on a Western Cape High Court order 
to construct improved houses to replace the informal structures at Joe Slovo, the case was 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others.
876
 The 
Constitutional Court formulated two issues for determination. Had a case been made for eviction 
under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE Act), based on whether it had been proved that the residents were unlawful occupiers under 
the PIE Act?  Further, was the conduct of the respondents reasonable, under the interpretation of 
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section 26 of the Constitution?  The Court ruled in favor of relocation that must be fair to the 
residents and in line with the spirit of the Constitution.
877
 Justice Ngcobo reasoned that: 
 What must be emphasized is that the government has a wider range of needs to meet. As we 
held in Grootboom, ‘housing must be made more accessible not only to a larger number of 
people but to a wider range of people.’ There are those who can afford to buy houses and there 
are those who can cannot. Income determines what form of housing people can afford. In 
developing a policy to provide access to adequate housing, the government must endeavour to 
address all these needs. And the primary obligation to achieve the progressive realization of the 
right of access to adequate housing rests on government. It must determine how and when this 
should be done. This, however is subject to the requirement of progressive realization of the 
right-it must progressively facilitate accessibility. How and when the obligation must be fulfilled 
depends on the availability of resources, in particular, the availability of land.
878
   
Justice Ngcobo then analyzed the concept of reasonableness developed by the Court:.                             
In considering reasonableness, the enquiry is not ‘whether other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been better spent.’ Rather, the enquiry should be confined to the question 
whether the measures that have been adapted are reasonable bearing in mind ‘that a wide range 
of possible measures could be adopted by the State its meet its obligations,’ Thus in determining 
whether the government has complied with its obligation to provide access to adequate housing, 
courts must acknowledge that the government must determine and set priorities but must ensure 
that, in setting those priorities, it has regard to its constitutional obligations. In short the 
obligation of government must not be construed in a manner that ties its hands and makes it 
impossible to comply with its constitutional obligations.
879
      
6.7. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties 
The case of City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties is 
also worth considering, as it dealt with access to shelter for relocated persons, based on whether 
the City of Johannesburg could rightly claim responsibility for those displaced by its relocation 
policies and exclude those relocated by private developers.
880
 This case concerned eighty-six 
inhabitants of Saratoga Avenue, Bera, Johannesburg, who squatted within business premises 
owned by Blue Moonlight Properties. Justice Van der Westhuizen held that  
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By drawing a rigid line between persons relocated by the City and those evicted by private 
landowners, the city excludes from the assessment, whether emergency accommodation should 
be made available, the individual situations of the persons at risk and the reason for the 
eviction…the policy does not meaningfully and reasonably allow for the needs of those affected 
to be taken into account.
881
    
The Court subsequently held that the policy of exclusion was unreasonable.  
As a result, I find that whereas differentiation between emergency housing needs and housing 
needs that do not constitute an emergency might well be reasonable, the differentiation the City’s 
policy makes is not. To the extent that eviction may result in homelessness, it is of little 
relevance whether removal from one’s home is at the instance of the City or a private property 
owner. The policy follows from the City’s incorrect understanding of its obligations under Ch12 
and its claim that it lacks resources. The City’s housing policy is unconstitutional to the extent 
that it excludes the occupiers and others similarly evicted from consideration for temporary 
accommodation. The exclusion is unreasonable.
882
     
6.8. City of Johannesburg and Others v. Mazibuko and Others    
The case of indigent citizens of Phiri township in Soweto, Johannesburg, who could not afford 
water rates is another case worth considering. In City of Johannesburg and Others v. Mazibuko 
and Others,
883
 the Supreme Court of Appeal examined section 4 of the Water Services Act, 
section 27(1) of the Constitution, and the 2002 General Comment 15 of the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on accessibility of water services provision 
to the most vulnerable in society.
884
 The Court then evaluated the City’s water policy,885 after 
which it analyzed the City’s budgetary limitations.886 Justice Streicher held that  
However, the free water policy of the City was adopted on the basis that it was in terms of the 
Water Services Act obliged to provide the residents within its area of jurisdiction access to 6 
kilolitres water per household per month or 25 litres per person per day, that this obligation did 
not entail that the provision had to be free to those who could not afford to pay and that the 
obligation superceded the constitutional duty that it may have had before the Act was enacted. 
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For the reasons stated the policy was materially influenced by an error of law and falls to be set 
aside on that basis.
887
         
 The Court held that the water policy had to be reformulated to conform to the 
Constitution against the backdrop of available resources.
888
 The Court further held that  
 In terms of s4 of the Water Services Act, water services must be provided in terms of conditions 
set by the water services provider and these conditions must provide for the circumstances under 
which water services may be limited or discontinued and for procedures for limiting or 
discontinuing water services. Furthermore, procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of 
water services must be fair and equitable, provide for reasonable notice of intention to limit or 
discontinue the services and for an opportunity to make representations. They may not result in a 
person being denied access to basic water services for non-payment, where that person proves to 
the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority that he or she is unable to pay for basic 
services.”889  
6.9. Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others  
Both sides appealed to the Constitutional Court against the preceding decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal regarding City of Johannesburg and Others v. Mazibuko and Others. The 
Constitutional Court reversed the judgment in the case of Mazibuko and Others v. City of 
Johannesburg and Others.
890
 The applicants appealed on the basis that fifty liters of water was 
required by a person daily as opposed to the forty-two liters decided by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, and that an order should have issued against the city of Johannesburg to provide indigent 
residents of Phiri in Soweto with free water.
891
 The Court held that 
The Constitution envisages that legislative and other measure will be the primary instrument for 
the achievement of social and economic rights. Thus it places a positive obligation upon the State 
to respond to the basic social and economic needs of the people by adopting reasonable 
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legislative and other measures. By adopting such measures, the rights set out in the Constitution 
acquire content, and the content is subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
892
   
Justice O’Regan proceeded to distill from the Court’s previous decisions in Grootboom and 
Treatment Action cases; her enforcement obligations mandated by the Constitution in respect of 
socioeconomic rights through the reasonable test formulated in the two cases. 
Thus the positive obligations imposed upon government by the social and economic rights in our 
Constitution will be enforced by courts in at least the following ways. If government takes no 
steps to realise the rights, the courts will require government to take steps. If government’s 
adopted measures are unreasonable, the courts will similarly require that they be reviewed so as 
to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness. From Grootboom it is clear that a measure 
will be unreasonable if it makes no provision for those most desperately in need. If government 
adopts a policy with unreasonable limitations or exclusions as described in Treatment Action 
Campaign (No 2), the court may order that those be removed. Finally, the obligation of 
progressive realisation imposes a duty upon government continually to review its policies to 
ensure that the achievement of the right is progressively realised.
893
     
The Court disagreed with the position of the Supreme Court of Appeal for overlooking its 
reasonableness test jurisprudence in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2), but, 
rather, quantified the content of the right water under section 27(1)(b), which provides for the 
right to “sufficient food and water.”894 The Court in applying its test of reasonableness to the 
city’s water project found that 
The City has provided a detailed account of the project and its genesis. It has also made plain 
that its Free Basic Water Policy has been under constant review since it was adapted. In 
particular the City has sought to ensure that those with the lowest incomes are provided, not only 
an additional free water allowance, but also with relief in relation to the charges levied for other 
services provided for by the City, such as electricity, refuse removal and sanitation services. The 
City accepts that it is under an obligation to take measures progressively to achieve the right of 
access to sufficient water and its conduct so far indicates that it will take further steps to meet 
this obligation.
895
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  Justice O’Regan then ruled that the prepaid water meters introduced into Phiri and the 
Free Basic Water Policy under Operation Gcin’amanzi did not violate section 27(1)(b) of the 
South African Constitution, and she set aside the orders of both the trial and appellate courts.
896
  
 The above cases demonstrate the added advantage of subjecting socioeconomic policies 
of government to litigation to benefit from judicial scrutiny and determine whether such policies 
keep fidelity with constitutional provisions. The opportunity to adjudicate over socioeconomic 
policies of government complements and reinforces existing mechanisms of accountability 
within a country. But in the following paragraphs I will highlight the fact that South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court from the Grootboom case to the Mazibuko case missed the golden 
opportunity to fortify and enhance its reasonableness test with the minimum core baseline 
formulated by the ICESCR Committee.
897
  
6.10. Reasonableness and the Minimum Core        
The South African Constitutional Court exhibited undue deference to the South African 
executive and legislative branches when it refused to employ the golden opportunity in 
Grootboom
898
  to outline the minimum core contents of a right of access to housing. Judge 
Yacoob declared: “In this case, we do not have sufficient information to determine what would 
comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of our Constitution. It is not in any event 
necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a Court to determine in the first instance the 
minimum core content of a right.”899 This is unlike the position of American courts in Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and New York, analyzed in the previous chapter, which outlined the minimum 
contents of free qualitative education for children based on constitutional provisions to guide 
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policies to be crafted by the executive and legislative branches within specific time limits. 
Moreover, unlike, South Africa’s Constitutional Courts, the American courts exercised 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure compliance with their orders. Argentina and Colombia 
socioeconomic jurisprudence, also discussed in the previous chapter, have both adopted the 
ICESCR Committee’s minimum core obligation to govern the right to health care justiciable 
under their constitutions.
900
           
 The South African Constitutional Court has generally refrained from supervisory 
jurisdiction and trusted the “goodwill” of the executive and legislative branches to comply with 
the reasonableness doctrine verdicts of the Court.
901
 Judge Yacoob’s major reason in Grootboom 
for rejecting the minimum core approach was that the Court lacked the capacity of ICESCR 
Committee, to gather the necessary information to determine the minimum contents of access to 
housing. In addition, the Court found it difficult to aggregate the diverse needs of the right of 
access to housing.
902
 The South African Constitutional Court thus exhibited undue deference to 
the executive and legislative branches.
903
       
 Reasonableness has also been explained as a minimalist interpretation of constitutional 
rights, in pursuant of separation of powers so that the courts will not become policy makers, but, 
rather, they will evaluate the reasonableness of legislative and executive policies to fulfill 
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constitutional mandates.
904
 “Nevertheless, the danger that reasonableness review can 
degenerate into an excessively deferential or formal standard of review cannot be discounted.”905 
Deference was apparent in the South African cases I analyzed above in this chapter.
906
 It also has 
been suggested that the reasonableness concept can be complemented by litigation against 
misspending of public funds in South Africa.
907
        
 In the Treatment Action case (No. 2), the court immediately rejected the minimum core 
approach of the ICESCR Committee.
908
 It refused to define the contents of a minimum core of 
right of access to health care, and conflated the right (section 27[1]) with the measures (section 
27[2] under a test of reasonableness, in her appraisal of government policies dealing with the 
provision of the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to health care. In this particular case, 
there was no need to exhibit deference to the executive and legislative branches, because 
government restrictions placed on the provision of nevirapine, a drug for the prevention of 
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mother-to-child transmission of the HIV virus, to select research health centerswas unreasonable 
since adequate supplies existed to cover health facilities nationwide.     
 South Africa’s Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction covers South Africa, unlike ICESCR 
Committee’s global jurisdiction. It must be noted that the ICESCR Committee operates a 
mediatory and aspirational arena unlike the adversarial national arena of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court, whose decisions are constitutionally binding and budget implicating. This 
might be a more transparent ground on which to explain the deference exhibited by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa to the legislative and executive branches, versus the 
argument that it does not possess the capacity to gather data to determine the minimum core of a 
socioeconomic right.
909
          
 A better argument could also have been made by the Constitutional Court that the South 
African Constitution mandates a test of reasonableness.
910
 The drafters of the Constitution were 
aware of the existence of the minimum core concept before opting for the reasonableness 
concept. As I explain below, South Africa has not ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, despite the fact that it influenced the socioeconomic rights 
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provisions of its 1996 Constitution. The Court could also argue that its contextual purposive 
approach of the reasonableness test to realize socioeconomic rights promotes South Africa’s 
transformative constitutionalism project better than a minimum core concept.
911
    
 Besides, there is also the danger of the judiciary agreeing with an executive that sets a 
minimum core concept as the maximum standard. A test of reasonableness incorporates the 
philosophy behind the minimum core content and goes beyond it. “However, reasonableness 
review must incorporate substantive factors such as the interpretation of the relevant socio-
economic right, and a detailed, contextual assessment of the impact of the denial of the right on 
the complainant group.”912 It considers all the various components of socioeconomic rights, in 
tandem with the Constitutional mandate of reasonableness.
913
 Litigants must also introduce 
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misappropriation of public funds into their pleadings to check government’s defense of lack of 
funds. 
914
 It bears reiterating that 
Attempting to improve the implementation of economic and social rights using a minimum core 
approach is a noble aim but one which is not without its dangers. The minimum core of a state’s 
obligations must never be used as a reason for inertia. The only justification for adopting a 
minimum core approach is that it should be viewed as a springboard for further action.
915
  
 
 The origin of the minimum core concept discussed in chapter 4 has been attributed to 
German basic law, wherein certain rights cannot be limited. This is akin to clauses in numerous 
national constitutions, which, at a minimum threshold, permit of no derogation from certain 
fundamental rights, for example, the right to life or freedom from torture and inhuman treatment 
even in periods of emergencies.
916
          
 The likelihood of the South African Constitutional Court reconsidering its rejection of the 
minimum core obligation to serve as a baseline for the reasonable test formula appears to be very 
slim in the near future.
917
 In addition South Africa has refused to ratify the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, despite the fact that its provisions influenced 
the entrenchment of justiciable socioeconomic rights in the 1996 South African Constitution.
918
 
“Failure to ratify the Covenant means that there will be little pressure on South Africa to 
conform with the jurisprudence of the CESCR with the result that South African law on social 
and economic rights will follow its own separate path. This is already illustrated by South 
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Africa’s deviance from the standard of the ‘minimum core obligation.’919”   
 South Africa’s ratification of the CESCR is no guarantee that its courts will apply the 
CESCR Committee’s jurisprudence. It is striking to note that South Africa ratified the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1996, but its courts have seldom relied upon it. 
Professor Frans Viljoen has been disappointed by this fact, and believes it “is a reminder that the 
professional training of both judges and senior counsel dates from a period when the African 
human rights regional human rights system was absent from legal studies.”920 South Africa in 
1995 ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 1998 it ratified the Convention Against Torture, 
Convention Against Racial Discrimination, the Genocide Convention and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
921
 Despite all the above ratifications, “South Africa’s 
implementation and compliance practices or results are not transparent.”922                 
Conclusion                              
The South African Constitutional Court, in its early years, while interpreting the transformative 
and unique African Constitution, wherein socioeconomic rights are justiciable, made some 
groundbreaking decisions in relation to health care, housing, and social security. It formulated a 
reasonableness test doctrine in evaluating the seriousness/effectiveness of the various programs 
that the South African government had designed to implement socioeconomic rights. But the 
Court has also struggled to justify its rejection of the minimum core concept of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Court would rather hide behind a purported inability 
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of access to information to interpret the core contents of the socioeconomic rights. 
Socioeconomic rights were embedded in the South African Constitution to facilitate 
accountability of government’s socioeconomic policies in order to fulfill the transformative goals 
of the 1996 South African Constitution.        
 Nevertheless, no one can deny the fact that the reasonableness doctrine of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa has led to improved accountability of the South African 
government in the crafting of inclusive and responsive socioeconomic policies on health care, 
housing, and social security. The reasonableness test, developed by South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court in the adjudication of socioeconomic rights to health care, housing, and social security 
under the 1996 South African Constitution, represents a paradigm for Nigeria’s quest for 
improved accountability in public governance. Indeed it is a paradigm that could be added to 
existing mechanisms of accountability in countries like Nigeria that are grappling with huge 
deficiencies in public governance accountability. As the experience of South Africa shows, 
justiciable socioeconomic rights can only be a part of the tapestry of accountability mechanisms 
and not a cure-all stand-alone device. This sobering reality must always be understood by 
accountability theorists, practitioners, and advocates.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.0. Introduction                         
I argue in this chapter that constitutionally justiciable socioeconomic rights can complement and 
enhance the existing mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria. Constitutionally justiciable 
socioeconomic rights can ameliorate the accountability deficit of the Nigerian state through the 
subjection of government’s socioeconomic policies to judicial scrutiny. Section 7.1 evaluates 
constitutional legitimacy and the capability of courts to adjudicate over socioeconomic rights. 
Section 7.2 shows that existing mechanisms of accountability can be complemented and 
enhanced by constitutionally enforceable socioeconomic rights that subject government’s 
socioeconomic policies to judicial scrutiny. Section 7.3 reiterates the fact that the only instance 
of the Nigerian government effecting a positive change in its socioeconomic policies emanated 
from the SERAC decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. But 
subsequent decisions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, which ordered implementation of 
Nigerian legislation on basic education and legislation incorporating socioeconomic rights under 
the African Charter on Human and Human Rights, have not been complied with, because 
government lawyers believe that the Nigerian Constitution as the supreme law of the land 
renders socioeconomic rights nonjusticiable.       
 Chapter 1 established the presence of several mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria’s 
legal regime and their limitations. Chapter 2 proved the accountability deficit of public 
governance in Nigeria through the analysis of health and education data as well as judicial 
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decisions on official and corporate corruption. Chapter 3 showed the limitations of 
socioeconomic rights as nonjusticiable and directive principles of state policy in Nigeria on the 
power of judicial review. The Nigerian Supreme Court’s analysis of socioeconomic rights as 
constitutional directive principles of state policy in Nigeria conclusively shows that the court 
needs to be empowered to subject government policies on socioeconomic rights to objective 
scrutiny. In chapter 5 I showed the capacity of the courts in the American States of Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and New York to adjudicate upon the constitutionality of educational policies in 
keeping fidelity with constitutional provisions and in their crafting of remedies to achieve the 
objectives and intent of the constitutional provisions.  Chapter 5 also showed that the varied 
experiences of the transformative constitutions of Argentina and Colombia that contain 
justiciable socioeconomic rights have made their governments adopt programs and policies that 
are accountable to their citizens. In addition, chapter 5 showed that India, where socioeconomic 
rights are nonjusticiable directive principles of state policy, has amended its Constitution to make 
education for children up to the age of fourteen free and compulsory. The chapter proved that 
some African countries in the past two decades have incorporated socioeconomic rights in their 
constitutions to improve accountability in public governance.     
 This concluding chapter analyzes the possibility of making socioeconomic rights 
justiciable in Nigeria. It further argues and reiterates the position of chapter 4, that the SERAC 
case on socioeconomic rights, decided by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Against Nigeria, is the only time that the Nigerian government has been made 
accountable in socioeconomic policy matters. Subsequently, the Nigerian government has 
refused to conform to the decisions of the Economic Community of West African States Court of 
Justice regarding noncompliance with the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act and breaches of 
socioeconomic rights provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. I argue 
that this fact makes it imperative for there to be a constitutional amendment to make 
socioeconomic rights justiciable under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
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in order to make Nigeria conform to its treaty obligations under international human rights law, 
to improve its accountability in socioeconomic policy formulation and implementation. In 
addition, there would be the added benefit of domestic judicial scrutiny of government’s 
socioeconomic policies.   
 This chapter also reiterates the fact that decisions of the South African Constitutional 
Court on socioeconomic rights analyzed in chapter 6 proves that governments can be made 
accountable for their socioeconomic policy decisions, when the constitution provides for 
socioeconomic rights as enforceable rights. This chapter recommends an amendment of the 
nonjusticiable socioeconomic rights provisions of Chapter II of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, 
to be made justiciable to empower the judiciary’s input into the accountability matrix of public 
governance in Nigeria to complement and fortify existing mechanisms of accountability in 
Nigeria.   
7.1. Constitutional Legitimacy and Capability of Courts to Adjudicate over Socioeconomic 
Rights                                 
In chapter 4,  I evaluated the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which between 1989 and 2009, issued twenty-one general comments clarifying the norms of 
various articles of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
923
 
General Comment 9, issued on December 3, 1998, reiterates a key component of this 
dissertation―the belief in the constitutional legitimacy and capability of courts to adjudicate 
over socioeconomic rights in the context of domestic application of the CESCR. 
924
 At the 
domestic level, member countries have a duty to give effect to the provisions of the CESCR.
925
 It 
is equally important that the domestic legal system must enable citizens’ access to effective 
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remedies in regard to violations of the CESCR.
926
       
 The debate over the relative ease of the judicial remedies in civil and political rights, as 
opposed to the constraints of applying resource allocation implications of adjudicating 
socioeconomic rights, was addressed by General Comment 9, and it directly implicates the 
constitutional legitimacy and capability of courts to adjudicate over socioeconomic rights.  The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clarified the debate by stating that:  
It is sometimes suggested that matters involving the allocation of resources should be left to the 
political authorities rather than the courts. While the respective competences of the various 
branches of government must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts are 
generally already involved in a considerable range of matters which have important resource 
implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which 
puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible 
with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would 
also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in society.
927
  
This clarification reinforces the argument of my dissertation, that courts are well equipped to 
adjudicate over the constitutionality and soundness of government’s socioeconomic policies. The 
same competencies required in adjudication over civil and political rights that implicate 
budgetary expenditures also apply to adjudication over socioeconomic rights.   
 In the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
928
 the case relating to socioeconomic rights violations by Nigeria 
evaluated in chapter 4, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights stated 
categorically, without mincing words,  that  
The uniqueness of the African situation and special qualities of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights imposes upon the African Commission an important task. International law 
and human rights must be responsive to African circumstances. Clearly, collective rights, 
environmental rights, and economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in 
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Africa. The African Commission will apply any of the diverse rights contained in the African 
Charter. It welcomes this opportunity to make clear that there is no right in the African Charter 
that cannot be made effective.929        
In chapter 4, I also showed that the Economic Community of West African States equally 
exhibited its competence to adjudicate over socioeconomic rights provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in cases involving Nigeria’s violations of its provisions.   
 In 1976, Professor Chayes observed that American courts, were increasingly adjudicating 
over the constitutionality and soundness of government’s socioeconomic policies: 
In enacting fundamental social and economic legislation, Congress is often unwilling or unable 
to do more than express a kind of general policy objective or orientation. Whether this be 
legislative abdication or not, the result is to leave a wide measure of discretion to the judicial 
delegate…The fundamental ground of traditional reservations about constitutional adjudication 
is that the courts may be called upon to act counter to the popular will as expressed in 
legislation.930  
These concerns were effectively addressed by the courts of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New 
York that I analyzed in section 5.2, and the courts concluded that they were constitutionally 
empowered by their states’ Constitutions to adjudicate upon the constitutionality of public 
educational policies.         
 Professor Chayes also tackled the question of judicial deference to majoritarian 
considerations in the sense of an unelected body of judicial officers moderating upon and 
adjudicating upon the fidelity of administrative policies to the constitution: 
Public law litigation is at once more and less intrusive: more because it may command 
affirmative action of political officers; less because it is ordinarily limited to adjusting the 
manner in which state and federal policy on education, prisons and mental institutions, and the 
like is carried forward. Its target is generally administrative rather than legislative action, action 
that is thus derivative rather than a direct expression of the legislative mandate. Moreover, one 
may ask whether democratic theory really requires deference to majoritarian outcomes whose 
victims are prisoners, inmates of mental institutions, and ghetto dwellers. Unlike the numerical 
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minorities that the courts protected under the banner of economic due process, these have no 
alternative access to the levers of power in the system.931     
 Professor Chayes recognized that the concept of separation of powers did not envisage 
that government could be broken into three watertight branches.932 He identified the institutional 
advantage of the judiciary as: 
…an effective mechanism for registering and responding to grievances generated by the 
operation of public programs in a regulatory state. Unlike an administrative bureaucracy or a 
legislature, the judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved. It is also rather well 
situated to perform the task of balancing the importance of competing policy interests in a 
specific situation. The legislature, perhaps could balance, but it cannot address specific 
situations. The bureaucracy deals with specific situations, but only from a position of 
commitment to particular policy interests.933      
Remedies or relief under public litigation utilizes existing mechanisms of adjudication, 
but it extends beyond litigants before the courts to shape public policies that impact the society in 
the future. “Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logically derived 
from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is 
forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important 
consequences for many persons including absentees.”934  In section 5.2 of the previous chapter, I 
showed that remedies were effectively administered by the courts in Kentucky, New Jersey, and 
New York States to correct deficiencies in the educational programs of the states.  
 The South African Constitutional Court in Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others, emphasized that its constitutional role in the adjudication of 
socioeconomic rights might result in the evaluation of government’s policy.935 It further stated 
that the Constitution made it mandatory for the Court to declare as unconstitutional a policy 
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inconsistent with its provisions, and where socioeconomic rights have been violated, the Court 
must provide a remedy.936 The Court also asserted that it was empowered to issue mandatory 
orders, which it had exercised in previous cases against government agencies, one of which 
required a comprehensive plan allowing public access from a government agency to facilitate 
prisoners’ participation in voting.937 The Court disagreed that its sole power in the case was 
limited to declaratory orders, but, rather, that it was duty bound to grant effective relief, which 
depending on the manner of right violated could involve both mandatory orders and supervision 
under its jurisdiction.938 The Court then interpreted judicial powers in a constitutional democracy 
operating separation of powers.  
South African courts have a wide range of powers at their disposal to ensure that the Constitution 
is upheld. These include mandatory and structural interdicts. How they should exercise those 
powers depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Here due regard must be paid to 
the roles of the legislature and the executive in a democracy. What must be made clear, however, 
is that when it is appropriate to do so, courts may-and if need be must-use their wide powers to 
make orders that affect policy as well as legislation.                
The Court then issued orders aligning government health policies with constitutional objectives, 
but granted the government the latitude to reformulate its health policy to be consistent with the 
Constitution.939            
 The 1960, 1963, 1979, and 1999 Nigerian Constitutions all empowered the judiciary to 
strike down any legislation or address any action that violated their provisions. The Nigerian 
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judiciary has accordingly struck down numerous legislative acts that violated the Constitution.940  
The judiciary has also vigorously protected the fundamental human rights provisions in the 
Constitution.941 The Nigerian judiciary is widely perceived as a strong defender of the 
Constitution and as a willing protector of the ordinary citizen.942 The same principles formulated 
by the Nigerian judiciary in striking down unconstitutional legislation or in securing fundamental 
human rights, will be applicable to judicial adjudication over socioeconomic rights presently 
listed as nonjusticiable Chapter II provisions of Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
of State Policy.943 The Nigerian judiciary possesses the necessary competencies to evaluate 
socioeconomic policies of government and align them with constitutionally enforceable or 
legislated socioeconomic rights. 
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7.2. Making Socioeconomic Rights Justiciable in Nigeria                 
Comparative constitutional law has proved that courts’ political influence increase when access 
to courts is simplified.
944
 The Columbian 1991 Constitution reminds us that the judiciary can 
only be an accountability benchmark guarantor of any particular society’s struggle for fairness 
and justice in the allocation of state resources in a constitutional democracy. In Nigeria, the 
judiciary can be empowered through justiciable socioeconomic rights to make government 
officials accountable for just and equitable utilization of substantial oil revenues and huge taxes 
in developing the Nigerian economy and poverty eradication. “Constitutional justice can become 
an important instrument for democratic progress, only if we think of it as part of broader social 
struggles. The accomplishment of the emancipation promises made by the 1991 (Colombian) 
Constitution is too serious a matter to leave it only to judges: citizens’ participation is 
indispensable for the realization of democracy.”945 This reinforces the argument of this 
dissertation, that a holistic approach of complementing existing mechanisms of accountability in 
Nigeria with justiciable socioeconomic rights in order to subject government’s socioeconomic 
policies to judicial scrutiny, assisted by relaxation of access to courts by civil society, will 
continuously lead to improvements in the formulation of responsive and inclusive government 
socioeconomic policies. This will ultimately improve the quality of health care and education of 
the populace while at the same time reducing poverty.      
 Education and health are essential foundations for rapid economic development.
946
 The 
ruling elite in societies determine the trajectory of social arrangements. Quasi-economic liberals 
who dominate the sociopolitical terrain in Nigeria have been greatly influenced by Western 
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liberalism, but Nigerian laissez-faire oligarchs dominant since 1966 have no understanding that 
economic liberalism does not equate with callous laissez-faire. Karl Polanyi went to great lengths 
in his seminal work, The Great Transformation, to explain the difference.
947
 Simply put, 
coercive law of the state was employed to establish the conditions for a market-based economy 
through labor law and antitrust legislation.
948
 These were used to establish “the preconditions of 
a self-regulating market”949 and defang the excesses of a laissez-faire economy ridden with 
cartels and monopolists.         
 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals for 2015 are to eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower 
women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and last to develop a global partnership for 
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development.
950
 The eight goals are all in sync with Chapter II provisions on fundamental 
objectives and directive principles of state policy of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, and will be boosted if Chapter II provisions, which contain socioeconomic 
rights are amended to be constitutionally enforceable.
951
 UNICEF in its 2010 annual report 
recognized the importance of qualitative education and health care for children as the basis for a 
prosperous society.
952
 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) detailed the importance of early childhood care and education, as over ten and a half 
million children under the age of five die yearly from preventable diseases.
953
 UNESCO has 
demonstrated that early childhood education is sine qua non for a sustainable society.
954
 
Secondary education or high school is equally vital for adolescents and teenagers to attain their 
full potentials in life.
955
 The curriculum or contents of secondary education is now recognized as 
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vital in equipping the young ones with skills that will make them effective and successful 
members of a knowledge-based society in a globalized world.
956
                         
7.3. Socioeconomic Rights Applied to Ameliorate Nigeria’s Accountability Deficit  
The potentials of the international tribunals of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights and the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States serving as 
alternative avenues of enforcement of socioeconomic rights in Nigeria have not been realized 
fully, as I demonstrated in chapter 4.  The jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court, in the Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal
957
; Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v. Grootboom 
958
; and  Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others,
959
 treated in chapter 6, points the way forward for employing 
socioeconomic rights domestically to subject Nigerian government policies to accountability 
requirements.  These South African cases subjected government policies to a high accountability 
threshold to maximize the proper utilization of resources in the housing and health sectors. This 
is imperative, having established in Chapter II, the limitations of existing mechanisms of 
accountability in securing accountability of government’s socioeconomic policies in Nigeria. 
South Africa, unlike Nigeria, has a constitutional mandate to tackle poverty.
960
 South African 
courts, unlike Nigerian courts, are empowered to address poverty through justiciable 
constitutionally provided socioeconomic rights. South Africa’s highest court, the Constitutional 
Court, has utilized this power to formulate the standard of reasonableness, concept to evaluate 
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the reasonableness of government policies in the fulfillment of socioeconomic rights, especially 
with regard to the most vulnerable in society, the poor.
961
 This has enabled the courts to make the 
South African state accountable for its socioeconomic policies.
962
 Nigeria has great lessons to 
learn from the South African constitutional example.         
 Nigeria is a paradox to be resolved with millions of its citizens wallowing in poverty 
while a few privileged officials in charge of state resources squander billions of dollars in 
revenues. Existing mechanisms of accountability in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria must be complemented by enforceable socioeconomic rights to subject 
socioeconomic policies of government to judicial scrutiny. Socioeconomic rights are vital in 
securing the quality of life. Basic requirements like adequate nutrition, qualitative health care, 
basic education, and potable water are the minimum requirements a developing country must 
provide for its citizens, particularly a country like Nigeria whose oil revenues have fostered the 
greatest levels of inequality in the world. The policies of the ruling elite in Nigeria have 
treacherously betrayed the socioeconomic welfare policies of the first set of Nigerian leaders 
who, from 1960 to 1966, educated the young; provided health care, a potable water supply, and 
manufacturing jobs; invested massively in agriculture; and fostered a nurturing environment 
during the formative years of the present prodigal ruling elites in Nigeria. Hence, it is not 
surprising, as attested to by the Siemens and Halliburton cases, analyzed in chapter 2, that such a 
class of political elites will be readily influenced by bribes from multinational firms to secure 
sweet deals in the petroleum extractive industry, the major source of public revenues in Nigeria. 
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All available mechanisms of accountability, including constitutionally enforceable 
socioeconomic rights must be on deck to ameliorate Nigeria’s accountability deficit in public 
governance.    
Dissertation Findings                        
1. Judicial decisions on the constitutional right to education provisions in the Constitutions 
of Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York States effected positive changes in 
socioeconomic policies on education formulated by the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Judicial scrutiny in these states has enabled their governments 
to be accountable to the public for the formulation of effective policies, which made 
available sound and free public education for children.    
2. The groundbreaking 1993 decision of the Supreme Court of India, in the challenge to 
states’ regulation of private school fees case of Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh analyzed in section 5.3; which extended the fundamental right to life under 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to encompass a right to basic education for children 
up to the age of fourteen, led to the 2002 constitutional amendment, which transformed 
Article 45 on the provision of primary education of the Directive Principles of State 
Policy into a justiciable fundamental right to primary education. This has resulted in the 
formulation of effective policies on primary education, thereby making free public 
primary education available to Indian children. 
3. The reasonableness doctrine of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, developed in the 
adjudication of socioeconomic rights to health care, housing, and social security under 
the 1996 South African Constitution, has led to improved accountability of the South 
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African government to the people in the formulation of effective policies to implement 
the constitutional provisions on the right to health care, housing, and social security. 
4. Judicial scrutiny of government’s compliance with constitutional provisions assures 
accountability of government to the governed in line with constitutional mandates.   
5. A liberal and expanded interpretation of access to courts or standing is crucial in enabling 
affected members or classes of the public to test compliance of public policies with 
constitutional provisions in the law courts, thereby ensuring accountability of 
government’s policies to the governed. 
6. It is very instructive that India, in 2002, opted for a constitutional amendment to 
transform the nonjusticiable provision on primary education of the Directive Principles of 
State Policy into a justiciable fundamental human rights provision under its Constitution. 
7. A content analysis of the health and education sectors in Nigeria shows that 
socioeconomic policies of government in both sectors have not been effective and 
accountable to the public/governed.     
8. The same principles formulated by the Nigerian judiciary in striking down 
unconstitutional legislation or in securing fundamental human rights, will be applicable to 
judicial adjudication over socioeconomic rights. The Nigerian judiciary possesses the 
necessary competencies to evaluate socioeconomic policies of government and align 
them with constitutionally enforceable or legislated socioeconomic rights.                        
 Recommendations                            
1. Nigeria can complement existing mechanisms of accountability, such as the rule of law, 
by making socioeconomic rights justiciable and thereby subject the government’s 
socioeconomic policies to judicial scrutiny and test its compliance with constitutional 
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provisions, ultimately improving the accountability of the government to the governed in 
the formulation of transparent, responsive, and inclusive socioeconomic policies. 
2. The nonjusticiable Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria relating to the socioeconomic 
rights of education and health care must be transformed into justiciable fundamental 
human rights. Such amendment will stop the refusal of the Nigerian government to abide 
with decisions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, because according to Nigeria, education 
is a nonjusticiable Fundamental Objective and Directive Principle of State Policy.     
3. Access to the courts in the area of standing must be relaxed and broadened in Nigeria, as 
practiced by the Supreme Court of India, provisions in the South African Constitution, 
rules of court of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and the courts in Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and New York States in the United States of America. 
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